It's seems relevant to go back and examine the EU brokered peace deal - the Six Point Plan - between Georgia and Russia in 2008, following several days of war:
Point 1 - No use of force:
In the war’s aftermath, cease-fire violations by Russia led to continued violence. 1/9⬇️
Since 2008, Russian occupation forces have repeatedly killed, wounded, or illegally detained Georgian citizens near the occupation line. 2/9
Point 2 - cessation of hostilities: After declaring a unilateral ceasefire on August 11, 2008, Georgia ceased hostilities, but Russia continued its advance, seizing Akhalgori and the Kodori Gorge. Today, Russia occupies about 20% of Georgian territory. 3/9
Point 3 - humanitarian aid
Despite the agreement, humanitarian aid was limited to Russian-controlled routes. Russian occupation forces frequently blocked crossing points, worsening the humanitarian situation on the ground. 4/9
Point 4 - return of Georgian armed forces to their usual quarters: Georgian forces returned to their pre-conflict bases, resuming their positions before the outbreak of hostilities. 5/9
Point 5 - Russian armed forces to withdraw to the positions held before hostilities began in South Ossetia:
Russia not only violated this principle but also intensified its military presence in the occupied territories. 6/9
Permanent military bases were established in both Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with deployments comprising regular army troops, border guards, and FSB personnel. 7/9
Point 6: Launch of international discussions on security and stability arrangements for Abkhazia and South Ossetia: On August 26, 2008, Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. 8/9
Moscow subsequently signed several military and economic agreements with the de facto authorities of both regions. Additionally, Russia has launched a campaign aimed at securing international recognition for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 9/9
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Profound insights from Commander of the 37th Separate Marine Brigade of Ukraine, Serhii Shatalov, on Ukraine’s strengths, challenges, and the path to ending the war.
On the Kurakhove direction: Russians have the initiative and a manpower advantage of at least 1:10. 1/21⬇️
The situation was challenging (in October), as it remains today. We carried out the mission with limited resources — operating without one battalion, which was stationed in Toretsk. 2/21
Two headquarters battalions were understaffed, and many attached units were entirely decimated and lost their command. Despite this, we were able to stabilize the situation in the early stages and secure key positions, which we have maintained to this day. 3/21
UP's insightful interview with General Serhii Naiev, the former Commander of the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (2020-2024)
"The military did not have a single document stating that Russia's offensive would begin on February 24, 2022." 1/28 ⬇️
Did you feel that politicians didn’t believe in the possibility of war, given what they were saying?
– My commander, General Zaluzhnyi, and I are military men. We follow the legally established procedures for preparing the Armed Forces to carry out their assigned tasks. 2/28
It’s not a matter of politicians saying something and us passively accepting it. We do our job.
We conducted planning, training exercises, and drills at training grounds. Zaluzhnyi later ordered military units to be brought to readiness at their permanent bases. 3/28
How the FSB Recruits Ukrainians to Sabotage Territorial Recruitment Centers (TCC) and Ukraine’s Efforts to Combat It.
Since the beginning of the year, Ukraine has witnessed nine sabotage attacks on Territorial Recruitment Centers (TCC) and police departments. 1/21 ⬇️
Recently, reports of sabotage at TCC and police departments have increased significantly. 2/21
Law enforcement agencies attribute this to Russia reaching another peak in its operations, exploiting internal instability in Ukraine, the failed mobilization efforts, and widespread dissatisfaction with the recruitment centers. 3/21
A very interesting update on the Pokrovsk direction.
Oleksiy Herman, chief of the EW unit of the 111th Brigade (UAF), shares details about the situation:
Indeed, the intensity of Russian assaults has dropped significantly. 1/12⬇️
This is due to the enemy's heavy losses and, as I understand it, their difficulties with replenishment. 2/12
We must also understand that everything they pass through—cities and logistics—has been destroyed. Remember Bakhmut, Chasiv Yar, Niu York, Toretsk—there's no infrastructure left. 3/12
Very insightful details about North Korean soldiers in Kursk Oblast shared by Ukraine's Special Operation Forces.
According to a 🇺🇦 operator from the 84th Tactical Group, the troops sent to the Kursk region were DPRK Special Operations Forces, not regular soldiers. 1/23⬇️
"If the North Korean authorities find out that one of their soldiers has surrendered, their family will face severe repercussions—likely execution or forced labor." 2/23
"That’s why the Korean fighter who blew himself up when one of our tactical groups approached chose a grenade over captivity." - says SSO operator "Greek" 3/23
Very insightful details about North Korean soldiers and how Ukraine's Special Operations Forces capture them in Kursk Oblast
Per to a 🇺🇦 operator from the 84th Tactical Group, the troops sent to the Kursk region were DPRK Special Operations Forces, not regular soldiers. 1/23⬇️
"If the North Korean authorities find out that one of their soldiers has surrendered, their family will face severe repercussions—likely execution or forced labor." 2/23
"That’s why the Korean fighter who blew himself up when one of our tactical groups approached chose a grenade over captivity." - says SSO operator "Greek" 3/23