Annual assessment and forecasts from the Chiefs of Ukraine’s intelligence services. (Part 1)
Kyrylo Budanov, Chief of HUR:
Russia acknowledged relying on entirely false data [prior to invasion], marking a complete failure of its special and intelligence services. 1/14⬇️
These assessments were based on information from agents operating within Ukraine, leading to the expenditure of vast sums of money. Consequently, Russia's analysts drew flawed and irrational conclusions. 2/14
These factors led the Russian Federation, when initiating the "special military operation," to aim for what was termed the 3+10 plan: capturing Kyiv within three days and, no later than ten days after, suppressing any pockets of resistance. 3/14
Ultimately, this strategy escalated into a full-scale war.
Regarding munitions, especially guided air bombs and new equipment, the Russians are making notable advancements and increasing production. 4/14
Half of their munitions are sourced from Korea. Furthermore, large-scale shipments of 170mm self-propelled howitzers and 240mm multiple launch rocket systems have commenced. 5/14
This year, Russia has lowered its recruitment target for new military personnel by nearly 100,000. How successfully they meet this goal remains to be seen over time. 6/14
The Russian Federation has not abandoned its goals but faces major obstacles in achieving them. In response, it has increasingly turned to terrorist tactics, relying heavily on missile and drone attacks. 7/14
The initial North Korean troop deployment consisted of 10,000 soldiers, with approximately 4,000 severely wounded or killed. Replacements are being prepared but have yet to arrive. 8/14
North Korea is significantly increasing its arms shipments to Russia, primarily supplying 170mm howitzers and 240mm multiple launch rocket systems. 9/14
North Korean instructors are assisting in training personnel to operate this equipment. So far, Russia has received 120 units of both system types. 10/14
Initial deployments revealed low accuracy of KN-23 ballistic missiles. After modernization work conducted by Russian specialists, the accuracy has now improved to an acceptable level. 11/14
Under the current plan, North Korea is set to deliver 148 more such missiles to Russia this year. 12/14
Russia attempted several times to develop a drone launch system using Mi-8 helicopters. Two out of three attempts ended in explosions of the FPVs onboard, and since then, Russia has stopped conducting such experiments. 13/14
Budanov named two reasons why a ceasefire in Ukraine could happen as early as this year: At the very least, Russia requires a break—a ceasefire. One reason is its lack of sufficient strength, and the second is the immense financial burden it faces. 14/14
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Kyrylo Budanov, Chief of Ukraine's Defense Intelligence (HUR), reflects on the past years and analyzes the future trajectory of the war.
There are two reasons there could be a ceasefire in Ukraine this year: At the very least, Russia requires a break - a ceasefire. 1/14 ⬇️
Another reason is its lack of sufficient strength, and the second is the immense financial burden it faces.
Russia acknowledged relying on entirely false data [prior to invasion], marking a complete failure of its special and intelligence services. 2/14
These assessments were based on information from agents operating within Ukraine, leading to the expenditure of vast sums of money. Consequently, Russia's analysts drew flawed and irrational conclusions. 3/14
The Battle of Avdiivka: firsthand accounts from Ukrainian soldiers
Vladimir Kalibri, former deputy commander of the 110th Brigade (Apr 2022 – Feb 2023) said Russian forces dropped up to 100 guided bombs daily, while Ukrainian troops faced severe weapon and ammo shortages. 1/19⬇️
Of course, one of the key factors was our lack of ammunition, weapons, and aviation support. I personally experienced guided aerial bombs (KABs). They are highly demoralizing and played a significant role. The enemy could drop up to 100 KABs on Avdiivka in a single day. 2/19
But the most crucial factor was the human element—there were not enough well-trained and motivated personnel. Our brigade had been there since the beginning of the war, holding the position for nearly two years. 3/19
Ukraine's Chief of Defense Intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov about ceasefire, potential peacekeepers in Ukraine and new Russian attempts of destabilization:
"While the Ukrainian and Russian sides currently hold diametrically opposed positions, a ceasefire is likely achievable" 1/6 ⬇️
How long it will last and how effective it will be is another matter. But I believe something will happen, as most of the necessary conditions are in place. 2/6
Budanov questioned whether deploying peacekeeping forces could guarantee Ukraine's security.
"Show me a single country where peacekeepers have truly been effective. Maybe such a case exists, but I don't recall one. I've studied many examples—nowhere." 3/6
Very interesting points made by Valerii Zaluzhnyi, ex CinC and now Ambassador to the UK:
We are somewhat behind, particularly in the development of technology for deploying unmanned systems on fiber optics, which provide a significant advantage to Russia at the moment. 1/8 ⬇️
We also cannot achieve widespread use of weapons like guided air bombs, nor can we effectively defend against them, giving Russia another advantage. 2/8
Lastly, we are unable to match the scale of human resources that Russia can mobilize, nor can we afford to pay the high price for the relatively minor victories they have achieved, all due to the combination of these three factors. 3/8
Kyrylo Budanov, Chief of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence (HUR) shares insightful details about Russia-DPRK cooperation and the war against Ukraine.
Despite heavy casualties, North Korean forces remain actively engaged in joint operations with Russian troops. 1/12 ⬇️
Budanov estimated that about 4,000 troops had been killed or seriously wounded.
North Korean troops are embedded within Russian units, conducting joint operations in small groups rather than maintaining their own front-line positions. 2/12
“They move as part of larger Russian formations, executing combined operations.”
Regarding the possibility of further North Korean deployments, Budanov said there was no concrete evidence of additional special forces or infantry reinforcements. 3/12
Interesting points from the Commander of the anti-tank battalion of the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, Oleh "Romakha" Romanov "I believe that Izium is a certain key to Donbas." 1/16⬇️
Izium is the last supply artery for our entire agglomeration, including Druzhkivka and Kostiantynivka, which are currently defending Toretsk and Chasiv Yar. That’s why the situation in the Kharkiv sector is far from straightforward. 2/16
Our front isn’t collapsing—we have unity, and it prevents us from failing. We carry a responsibility, knowing that behind us are peaceful towns and our families. I don’t believe that will happen here. 3/16