/short thread with statistics for 3rd aniversary of the start of the war/
Russian and Ukrainian visually-confirmed equipment losses since the start of the Russian 2022 invasion of Ukraine by category
Huge thanks to all Oryx and @WarSpotting team members and everyone else who have been helping us (and the wider OSINT community) collect and analyze the evidence of equipment losses.
Special credit to the Ukrainian military for thier epic performance on the battlefield :)
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Since people are asking for Starlink alternatives, here is their current status.
No satellite service comes even close to Starlinks capabilities and capacity and that wont change for years (and one of those that might become competitive, Amazon Kuiper, would also be a US system)
The best alternative is to lay optical fibers and other "normal" connections to Ukrainian positions and ensure that there is a good LTE (it has decent speed and better coverage than 5G) connectivity for mobile users.
Just for pure regundancy reasons, I would expect at least the fixed Ukrainain positions in the rear areas to already have some "normal" alternative. Without Starlink, the worst affected would be mobile users near the frontline.
This thread presents arguments why IMO the reconstitution of the Russian military after the war in Ukraine is likely to take a long time.
Some fo these factors are interconnected and can involve disruptive feedback loops.
note: I am not an expert on Russian politics or military
This should not be mistaken for encouraging Western governments to slow-walk increasing military spending, reforms, creating new units, etc.
After all, even in its weakened state, Russian military will still be a dangerous opponent - especially if US support would be uncertain.
1. The Russian budget and economy are highly dependent on oil prices and while predicting (with reasonable reliability) the oil price isnt possible, it is IMO fair to acknowledge that the massive gloval growth in adoption of renewables and EVs will impact oil demand.
The number of Russian T-55s and 62s in storage that is in repairable condition isnt all that great - and using them as APCs would mean that they cant be used to replace losses of tanks, ARVs, etc.
T-64s and T-72A/Urals lack production of critical parts, making it hard to reactivate them /besides stripping several to put together 1 functional tank) and more modern T-72s and T-80s are needed to replace tank losses
/thread/
An explanation of Oryx methodology regarding equipment losses:
Oryx loss lists are based on visual evidence.
Exceptions where visual evidence isnt available are made only in rare cases where the losses are officially confirmed by the side that suffered them, or if confirmed by very reliable sources for the side that suffered those losses.
Equipment losses where the team is not confident in the owner/operator are not listed on either UA or RU loss lists (until more data allows us to establish the owner/operator).
A long thread about commercial and government alternatives of Starlink mega-constellation - plus some info about Starlink and alternative approaches to build an alternative without breaking the bank.
Let's start with the current status of Starlink and what makes building such a satellite mega-constellation so hard and expensive and how Starlink is unique (at least for now).
Starlink currently has around 6000 satellites in orbit with dozens more being launched on a weekly basis. This not only increases the capacity of the system but also makes it more resilient to most external factors and it makes it easier for terminals to connect
As usual, there are a bunch of problems with this CNN report: 1. The Russian figure is supposed to be all-calibers while the Western figure is 155mm only - The Russian equivalent (152mm) is around half of those 3M.
2. Western artillery supplied to Ukraine is more accurate - so you need fewer rounds to achieve the same effect
3. NATO artillery ammo production will narrow that gap by late 2024 and if the US Congress approves the military aid package for Ukraine, which contains money for further ammo production expansion, NATO production is likely to match the Russian production around late 2025