🧵 The IDF released today their investigation into the 10/7 conduct of the IDF, and prior to 10/7, here are the key takeaways from it.
The IDF did not consider the scenario of a broad surprise attack. It was perceived as unlikely, and not even a scenario close to it. This is a key issue that the IDF was not prepared for.
The Gaza Division was defeated after several hours. Between 6:30 and 12:30, the IDF did not control the area surrounding Gaza, and most of the massacres and kidnappings took place. It took the IDF about 10 hours to begin to regain operational control of the area until most of the terrorists were eliminated—or returned to the Strip.
The IDF was surprised by the attack itself, by the enormous number of terrorists that flooded the Gaza perimeter, by the mobility and speed of the terrorists, and by the incredible cruelty that Hams had planned.
The IDF relied on misconceptions that collapsed, according to which the Gaza Strip is the secondary enemy and therefore requires less engagement, Hams is deterred and interested in peace and civilian benefits, the conflict with Hams can be managed and even promoted with it, and Hams and the Palestinian Authority can be differentiated.
The IDF allowed the presence of a serious and dangerous threat on our border while relying too much on the barrier, and the defense elements in the border area are lacking—a low ratio of fighters.
The IDF was conscious of intelligence superiority and control over reality: it was utterly confident that there would be an early intelligence warning before any attack.
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