Colonel Pavlo Palytsa, a seasoned officer and Deputy Head of the Ukrainian Presidential Office, discusses war, reforms, and mobilization.
I believe that to fully analyze the Battle of Bakhmut, we need more time, and it should be done thoroughly. 1/14⬇️
Honestly, I sometimes reflect on how the battle would have unfolded if we had then the technologies, forces, and resources that we have now. 2/14
There was a massive limitation in artillery—not just in ammunition but in the number of guns. Across the entire defensive sector, which at times covered 70% of Bakhmut itself, the brigade commander had only two 155mm guns. 3/14
That was all we had to strike the enemy or support the infantry. In such conditions, achieving results was extremely difficult. Yet, commanders at all levels ensured that the necessary outcomes were delivered. 4/14
What are NATO standards? NATO is undoubtedly a powerful organization. But for the third year, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been holding back the full-scale military aggression of Russia—a global player that expected to take over much of Ukraine in just a few days or weeks.
This is a nuclear-armed country, and yet we are resisting and will continue to fight. I believe NATO should study the standards of the Ukrainian army. 6/14
The ideal Ukrainian Armed Forces should be a professional, contract-based army with a high level of readiness, strong motivation, and excellent training for both soldiers and commanders, including staff and management bodies. 7/14
It should be a high-tech force with a significant lethal potential for the enemy—an army that wins not by numbers but by quality. 8/14
As a brigade commander, I faced three major challenges that hindered frontline effectiveness. First, personnel availability and training. Second, access to effective weaponry, particularly drones. Third, the structure of the command system. 9/14
After joining the President’s Office, I was able to start addressing these issues. I’m particularly glad that brigades now have direct funding for drone procurement and components, allowing them to develop this critical capability. 10/14
Drones now account for a significant portion of enemy destruction, including personnel and equipment, increasing overall effectiveness. Now, the focus is on ensuring that the successful strategies of some brigades are scaled across the entire army to sustain this progress. 11/14
We are restructuring the Armed Forces into a corps-based system. It’s a difficult task, but it’s necessary. We are working to implement these changes not just quickly, but effectively. 12/14
We are considering a system where mobilized soldiers can transition to fixed-term contracts under clear and fair conditions. For example:
1. Soldiers mobilized in 2022 could sign a contract and be discharged after six months. 13/14
Those mobilized in 2023 could have the option to leave after 10–12 months.
Those drafted in 2024 would have a longer contractual period before discharge. 14/14
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Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi shares interesting details about the dynamics of the war:
Discussions about potential negotiations impact the military, as they do everyone. However, our task is to stay focused and not succumb to weakness. 1/14 ⬇️
We are conducting active defense, particularly in sectors where the enemy has a numerical advantage, such as the Pokrovsk area, where Russian forces have outnumbered us 4.5 to 1. Notably, Russia expended more resources in 2024 than the previous two years (2022-2023) combined. 2/
Initially, Russian tactics were predictable. However, in 2024, they replaced their entire command structure, and unfortunately, this led to more creative and adaptive operations. 3/14
Vadym Skibitsky, Deputy Chief of Ukraine's Defense Intelligence, shares invaluable insights on the war:
Russia's strategic plans remain unchanged - seeking full occupation or control of Ukraine. Their goal is to ensure Ukraine becomes either neutral or pro-Russian. 1/17⬇️
The key shift after the full-scale invasion was Russia's initial belief that they could quickly seize all of Ukraine's territory. However, once fighting began and they encountered resistance, their plans began to adjust. Russia’s objectives are constantly being modified. 2/17
As of now, their primary goal for 2025 is to capture Donetsk and Luhansk, complete the "special military operation," and maintain control over occupied territories like Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Crimea. 3/17
Oleh Ivashchenko, Chief of Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service, assesses the course of the war:
Russia needs ceasefire. They require a break to restore their economy, accumulate new supplies, prepare their army, regroup forces, and resume aggression against Ukraine. 1/8⬇️
Russia, without Ukraine and Belarus, which it has nearly occupied, is no longer an empire. We are aware of the future plans, and we know about them at least until 2030. 2/8
Does the Russian Federation, Putin, want to end the war? No, they do not. The tasks set so far remain unfulfilled. 3/8
Kyrylo Budanov, Ukraine’s Chief of Defense Intelligence, on the current state of the war and its future trajectory:
Russia has not managed to achieve their goal yet. Has Russia's strategic goal changed? Unfortunately, the answer is still "No". 1/17⬇️
I think, this objective will never change.
The Russian Federation does not see itself as a federation, it sees itself as an empire.
An empire needs at least three states to exist: Russia, which is there, Belarus, which is partially there, and what’s missing is Ukraine. 2/17
Without it the existence of the Russian empire is impossible. Any expert on Russia will confirm this. That is why it will not stop and will do everything to take over Ukraine by military, political, non-political, and some internal social means. 3/17
Kyrylo Budanov, Ukraine’s Chief of Defense Intelligence, on the current state of the war and its future trajectory:
Russia has not managed to achieve their goal yet. Has Russia's strategic goal changed? Unfortunately, the answer is still "No". 1/17⬇️
I think, this objective will never change.
The Russian Federation does not see itself as a federation, it sees itself as an empire.
An empire needs at least three states to exist: Russia, which is there, Belarus, which is partially there, and what’s missing is Ukraine. 2/17
Without it the existence of the Russian empire is impossible. Any expert on Russia will confirm this. That is why it will not stop and will do everything to take over Ukraine by military, political, non-political, and some internal social means. 3/17
Ukraine's Defense Intelligence on Russian plans against Ukraine:
Russian propaganda, including state-owned media, is actively promoting the narrative that the goals of the so-called Special Military Operation have already been achieved or are about to be achieved. 1/10⬇️
While this may not have been explicitly stated by the Kremlin, pro-government media and state-affiliated analysts are pushing this message in real time, reinforcing the official propaganda line. 2/10
Russia is a totalitarian society where the population of the aggressor state can be convinced of anything and have their opinions drastically changed on various issues. 3/10