Frontelligence Insight Special Report: AWOL Trends and Casualty Ratios in Russia and Ukraine
In assessing overall manpower casualty ratios, we analyzed Russian AWOL figures alongside Ukrainian estimates, factoring in KIA, MIA, and recruitment rates to assess the war’s prospects
2/ Thanks to @InformNapalm, a Ukrainian OSINT community, we analyzed a screenshot of a Russian presentation slide detailing desertion numbers. The percentage and corresponding figures allowed us to calculate the total number of AWOL cases across all Russian military districts.
3/ As shown in the translated graph, the Southern MD has the highest number of desertion cases. This is unsurprising, as it includes the former 1st and 2nd Army Corps (now the 51st and 3rd CAAs), which are largely composed of forcibly mobilized residents from occupied territories
4/ Through simple calculations, as demonstrated in the image, we determined the total number of desertion and AWOL cases in the Southern Military District, arriving at a figure of 22,577 cases.
5/ After applying the same method to each district, we arrived at a total of 50,554 documented AWOL cases across all military districts. While this number is not exhaustive, desertion rates among naval/air force specialists are low enough to be considered insignificant overall
6/ According to the US ARI report What We Know About AWOL and Desertion (Ramsberger & Bell, 2002), the desertion rate in the US Army during the Vietnam war period 1968-1971 averaged ~ 5%. This rate, comparable to current desertion levels in Russia, does not indicate a collapse
7/ Our team estimates that Ukrainian military AWOL rates are higher than Russia's, with the caveat that many Ukrainian soldiers went AWOL to join preferred ones rather than waiting for official transfers. Additionally, some deserters returned through the amnesty program
8/ To determine the loss ratio, we employed a slightly different method. Rather than combining regular KIA, MIA, and WIA numbers, we focused on KIA, MIA, heavily wounded, and desertions. This helped us to mitigate the inflated numbers caused by medium and light injuries
9/ When factoring in KIA, heavily wounded(disabled), MIA, and deserters, the total number of permanently lost personnel is estimated at approximately 560,000 for Russia and 300,000 for Ukraine. This results in an approximate loss ratio of 1:1.87 for irreversible manpower losses.
10/ While these numbers may seem favorable for Ukraine, it suffers from smaller mobilization base and weaker mobilization. Russia, with a population at least three times larger and a more effective recruitment system, should ideally suffer from a loss ratio closer to 1:3
11/ Russia holds a clear advantage in sustaining force generation. Even under the most conservative recruitment estimates and optimistic casualty figures, Russia is able to maintain its force generation over time - not only to gradually replace losses but also to form new units
12/ From a strictly manpower and force generation perspective, our team has a negative outlook for Ukraine, unless a significant factor would influence recruitment or shift the casualty ratio to 1:3. Political and economic factors are beyond the scope of this trend prediction.
13/ In general, when both sides in a war face growing AWOL rates, it signals growing exhaustion. In such situations, neither side is likely to achieve a decisive victory nor suffer a total collapse in a near term, unless a significant balance shift happens
Thank you for reading. This is a short version, and the full report, with more details and files containing AWOL cases, is available on our website (link below). We encourage you to follow us and consider becoming a paid subscriber to support our project
One of the most critical yet unresolved questions of this war is the true impact of drone attacks inside Russia. Our team has been working with media organizations and volunteers to tackle this. But finding the answer isn’t easy, and we need your support. Here’s how you can help:
2/ The simplest and most effective way to support our investigation is through donations. This helps cover essential expenses like satellite imagery, expert analysis, and time. You can donate via BuyMeaCoffee:
3/ We’re also looking for volunteers to assess the damage, particularly those with expertise in damage surveys, industrial building damage assessments, and the oil and gas industry: especially in evaluating potential refinery damage. Feel free to contact us at
frontel@proton.me
As we move into the second month of the year, Frontelligence Insight has prepared an early assessment report covering recent developments on the frontlines and within both Ukrainian and Russian military forces. Below are some key highlights from the report. 1/ 🧵Thread:
2/ The frontline dynamics for Ukraine remain challenging, with setbacks in Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, Kupyansk, and Toretsk. While leadership is working to address organizational and recruitment issues, it will take time for these changes to be implemented and impact the battlefield.
3/ Russian forces are facing high losses, with tens of thousands of AWOL cases and a significant depletion of armored vehicles, which are being replaced by civilian transport. Nevertheless, they continue advancing in areas where Ukrainian defenses are stretched with few people
In collaboration with @casusbellii, our team Frontelligence Insight investigated a large Russian convoy: over 100 vehicles, including tanks, trucks, IFVs, artillery, and other equipment, that rolled into Bamako, Mali. We've assessed its composition and origins. 🧵Thread:
2/ On January 17, 2025, local media Cap Mali+, streamed a more than 30-minute video of a column of vehicles passing through unnamed Malian streets. The convoy included over 100 vehicles, with roughly half consisting of trucks and the other half made up of combat vehicles
3/ The location of the footage was geolocated to the southwestern outskirts of Bamako, near coordinates 12.545009, -8.120543. The convoy was moving toward the center of the Malian capital.
You may not have heard of tantalum, but there’s a good chance it’s in the phone or computer you're using to read this. It’s also a key part in Russia’s military electronics, and its shortage, driven by sanctions, is causing disruptions. Frontelligence Insight's latest assessment:
2/ Russia relies on tantalum to produce tantalum powders for capacitors used in control, navigation, and signal processing systems. While Russia has tantalum deposits, they are limited, and it lacks advanced processing facilities to process a raw tantalum
3/ Historically, tantalum processing has been conducted at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Kazakhstan, a facility built during the Soviet era. When sanctions were implemented, Kazakhstan joined them, cutting off Russia’s primary supply of processed tantalum.
1/ Why is Ukraine losing ground? There are many explanations, ranging from a lack of aid to a lack of political will to win. The reality, however, is far more complex. This thread offers a brief excerpt from my recent analysis, with the full link provided at the end.
🧵Thread:
2/ Many struggles that the Ukrainian military faces stem from before 2022 and have scaled significantly by 2025. A mobilized force, where teachers, farmers, and IT workers replaced the professional core, turned what began as 'growing pains' into systemic flaws
3/ A damning report on Ukraine’s 155th Anne of Kyiv Brigade grotesquely exposed systematic issues. Despite training in France and sufficient funding and equipment, the unit faced high AWOL rates and fragmentation across frontline units. The issues that lead to it are systematic
When Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell in Syria, a critical geopolitical question emerged: can Russia maintain its foothold in the MENA region, and if so, how? What does this mean for Ukraine? Below are the key points from the latest Frontelligence Insight report:
2/ Maxar satellite images, dated December 17, show an unusual buildup of vehicles at the Tartus Naval Base. Video from site show that most of these vehicles are logistical, with only a few appearing to be combat vehicles. We identified approximately 150 vehicles and 29 containers
3/ It is assessed that the vehicles are likely being prepared for evacuation from the Tartus by naval vessels. Indications suggest that two Russian cargo ships, Sparta and Ursa Major, could be involved in the operation. It could take over a week for them to reach the port