Some thoughts on the European response to the chaos now emanating from the White House - on Ukraine and more broadly, based on chats with senior European policymakers directly or indirectly involved in formulating the bloc's response 1/
It's clear to me that EU leaders & their most senior officials are clearly seized of this moment. They aren't under any illusions about the risks to Ukraine or European security. US alignment with Russia can do two things: result in panic or focus. Right now we're seeing focus 2/
Making €bn available for Ukraine & the EU's own security & defence is not a sufficient response. But it is a necessary one. So the EU has unleashed national budgets, the EU budget, the EU's borrowing capacity & private capital via the EIB, to enable much more defence spending 3/
Germany has proposed the same thing (no more borrowing constraints for defence, and a €500bn facility for infrastructure). This is in response to risks that *might* transpire in Ukraine & wrt NATO. If those risks actually manifest, an even more forceful response is likely 4/
This could include another next Generation EU facility - €800bn or more - for defence. Or the seizure of Russia's €200bn+ of frozen assets parked in Euroclear. Nothing is off the table. Officials describe this as the EU's “Darwinian moment” - it will either adapt, or die 5/
Most EU officials don't believe the US will deliver a backstop in Ukraine. The US wants to step out. Not in. So there will be no European peacekeeping force. No ceasefire. Just more war. Yet the EU will have no choice but to keep doing “whatever it takes” to support Ukraine 6/
Bc a bad outcome in Ukraine is existential for European security. If Putin wasn't constrained by Biden, why will he stop now he is being enabled by Trump? Especially as officials see Trump's approach in Ukraine as the 1st step in a more disorderly withdrawal from the continent 7/
That's why new meeting formats & coalitions of the willing are sprouting up in real time: the 2 Paris meets & London on 2 March. Critics will say this is the EU fragmenting. It's not. It's adapting. Officials in Bxl are incredibly happy the UK is engaging on European security 8/
This leads us to Hungary. Last night @PM_ViktorOrban symbolically stood against the EU26 on Ukraine. Yet he could prove *a lot* more disruptive - blocking more aid to Ukraine, complicating the EU's ability to seize Russia's frozen assets or maintain EU sanctions against Russia 9/
Senior officials are clear this can't go on indefinitely. After all, are all of the EU's other leaders really going to let Orban jeopardise the Union's ability to fundamentally protect itself and its citizens when the stakes are this high? The answer is: surely not 10/
So a whole host of ideas are being talked about... including, wait for it, kicking the Hungarians out! Sceptics will argue there is currently no legal mechanism to do this. That's true. But in times of existential crisis, treaty considerations have a history of melting away 11/
The EU's no bailout clause didn't prevent it from funnelling €100's of billions to Greece to keep it afloat between 2009-2013. The EU's lack of competence in health did not prevent @EU_Commission from developing, manufacturing & deploying billions of COVID-19 vaccine doses 12/
The only thing that matters is the will of the majority. That will is now focussed on deterring Russian aggression. That starts in Ukraine. The appetite to over-engineer solutions to constantly get around Orban's vetoes is rapidly diminishing. He'd be wise to tread carefully ENDS
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