I think there is some flawed logic here. In general the article fail to compare and contrast the Ukrainians and the Russians on similar grounds.
To an outside observer it feels like picking and choosing talking points instead of a completely honest assessment of the situation.
For example, the authors engage with assessments of Russian casualty numbers, yet fail to mention how Ukrainian officials have multiple times now published UA casualty numbers that indicate, at best, a 1:2 overall casualty ratio.
Current ratios may, naturally, differ from that.
It also ignores the enduring Ukrainian manpower issue that Ukraine has seemingly been unable to solve, while Russian recruitment is, according to Ukrainian intelligence, able to replace the casualties it's taking in Ukraine.
One needs to consider that when talking of attrition.
Yes Ukrainian UAV production is good, but on the frontlines there is a general UAV parity with both sides now using massed UAV's.
Yes the Russian economy is suffering but we are still a ways away from a collapse according to multiple experts and the Bank of Finland forecast.
Russian equipment losses are horrific.
But Russians have long moved towards infiltration tactics, and even if Russia can no longer go on the offensive due to equipment losses, Ukraine still needs to defeat the defending Russian infantry for large scale gains on the ground.
Even light infantry supported by artillery, drones and mines has shown itself to be extremely resilient even against determined mechanized assaults.
And if Ukraine goes on the offensive the battlefield dynamics now working for it would be working for Russia.
The combined western economy is certainly stronger than the Russian economy and could easily outproduce it, but it's not currently mobilized to a war footing like the Russian economy is.
Things are in motion, but it needed to begin years ago to have effect in near future.
That's not to say that Russia is somehow coming out of this war unscathed. It is certainly not. It will take years for Russia to recover its military and economy, and decades to fully recover from the losses it has taken (if it ever can).
Russia can't continue this war forever.
However, neither can Ukraine and with current dynamics of the war Ukraine seems to be running out of time faster than Russia is.
Even if Russian offensive power is exhausted Russia can likely continue the attrition of Ukraine on a defensive stance for some time.
For Ukraine to be able to go on the offensive and force a complete Russian withdrawal the dynamic of the war have to change significantly.
Unlike the articles comparisons of Vietnam there is no insurgency and Russia believes losing this war is existential to its regime.
The comparisons to the German offensive of 1918 also seem ill-advised, considering the entente industrial power, manpower advantage, military-technological advantage and the multiple successful offensive that it had conducted on the western front.
Meanwhile Russia has been on the offensive for most of the war, technologically the sides are at a relative parity, and Russia, not Ukraine, holds the manpower advantage.
While Ukraine and its allies have the larger industrial base it's not taken advantage of fully.
All that being said we cannot be too pessimistic. While Russia still has the initiative and the edge, as shown by the difficulties emerging in Kursk, Ukraine is strong enough that it should not be forced in to a bad ceasefire and peace.
Russia needs to be ground down until it's ready to sit at the negotiating table in good faith. But even if we get to that point it seems unlikely that Russia can be forced to give up large swathes of land.
Of course, a lot depends on our definitions of "victory".
If victory is defined as Ukraine staying sovereign and free to decide on it's own future, I agree. Ukraine can win (while Russia might not lose)
However if victory is defined as total Russian withdrawal and reparations, then the Ukrainian victory looks as elusive as ever.
After breaching Selydove and Hirnyk early in the week, the Russians started offensive operations in the Vuhledar direction on Friday..
Due to these developments the situation on the South Donetsk frontline has turned very difficult.
Dark red = 20. OCT
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Vuhledar front:
On Friday the Russians began large scale attacks towards Shakhtarske and Bohoiavienka.
They gained ground quickly, advancing almost 7km towards Shakhtarske.
These attacks were supported by large scale artillery and air bombardments.
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In Bohoiavienka the Russians had managed to advance within 3km of the town before Friday.
Although the initial attacks may have been repelled, video footage from Bohovienka and reports from Shakhtarske indicate that Russians have a strong foothold in both villages.
After a few weeks of (relatively) lower intensity actions, the Russians have resumed offensive operations in the Selydove-Hirnyk area, south of Pokrovsk.
In the past few days, we've seen the Russians make tactical gains throughout the AO.
Selydove direction, a thread.
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As said, after an operational pause and transfer of reinforcements, the Russians have restarted offensive operations.
They are taking advantage of Ukrainian lack of manpower and using infiltration tactics, sending small infantry units through gaps in the Ukrainian line.
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The Russian advance here has been relatively rapid, over the past three days. Pictured is the confirmed change since monday.
According to unconfirmed reports, the Russians may control much of the grey area.
Confirmed advance is up to 2,6 kilometers, but likely further.
Just a reminder, at least a part of the 59th is in the salient north of Krasnohorivka.
We've repeatedly seen the willingness of the Ukrainians to spend lives over territory, but in recent months these sort of complaints from the front have become increasingly common
With the experienced brigades being drawn to Kursk and getting replaced with greener ones, and with increased pressure, it seems the UA high command is expecting to do more with less. If the line doesn't hold it seems the blame is pinned on the soldiers, not the orders.
Some have blamed the increase in these sort of orders and repercussions on Syrskyi, and I there may be some truth to it.
However, we also saw these style of stubborn static defense actions in Bakhmut and under Zalushnyi.
Many Ukrainians are justifiably angry due to the strike at the 179th training centre with more than 250 casualties
As has been the case lately, the anger is directed not just at the Russians but at their own leadership as well.
Many Ukrainians have pointed out that this isn't first time something like this happens. There have been multiple mass causalty events caused by the Ukrainians housing large numbers of soldiers in pre-war military facilities.
Yavoriv, Mykolaivka, Desna...
Some have also pointed to the strike on the 128th brigade from last november.
Time and time again negligent leadership leads to preventable Ukrainian casualties. Time and time again no-one is held responsible.
This also applies to many situations on the frontline itself.
It's overtly positive and completely uncritical, failing to take into account the risks of the operation, or the unclear operational and strategic goals.
It conflates tactical success of the first two-three days with operational success.
It fails to assess long term unknowns.
It ignores how the Russians have managed to delay, and in places stop, the Ukrainian advance in Kursk with limited forces.
It fails to look how the Kursk offensive has made possible the rapid Russian advance in Pokrovsk by removing experienced units from the frontline.