SITREP 13.03.2025: Ukraine withdraws from Kursk.
Over the past 10 days, a Russian offensive pushed Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk salient, ending a 7-month operation.
What happened? Why did Ukraine withdraw? What’s next? 🧵
You can read a longer version on our Substack
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Over the past 10 days, a Russian offensive pushed Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk salient, ending a 7-month operation.
What happened? Why did Ukraine withdraw? What’s next? 🧵
You can read a longer version on our Substack
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In August a Ukrainian offensive captured over 1200 km² of Russia's Kursk oblast.
The claimed goals were to draw Russian forces from Pokrovsk, capture leverage for negotiations and spoil a Russian operation from Sumy. It was likely also meant to shift the discourse.
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The claimed goals were to draw Russian forces from Pokrovsk, capture leverage for negotiations and spoil a Russian operation from Sumy. It was likely also meant to shift the discourse.
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However, the Ukrainians failed to expand & secure their flanks and over the next 6 months the Ukrainian perimeter in Kursk diminished steadily. By the beginning of March the Ukrainians only held a bit over 300 km² of terrain in a narrow salient around the town of Sudzha.
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Ukraine’s position was linked to Sumy via 2 roads, MSR (Main Supply Route) via the border post and and SSR (Secondary Supply Route) near Oleshnya
By Feb, The Russian capture of Sverdlikovo created a bottleneck, turning these routes into kill zones for Russian FPV drones.
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By Feb, The Russian capture of Sverdlikovo created a bottleneck, turning these routes into kill zones for Russian FPV drones.
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With drones watching both roads and mild winter conditions making off-road movement difficult, Ukraine’s supply lines were crumbling.
Meanwhile, Russian forces managed to form a small bridgehead over the Psel River near Kurilovka.
On March 5, they attacked westward.
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Meanwhile, Russian forces managed to form a small bridgehead over the Psel River near Kurilovka.
On March 5, they attacked westward.
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Ukrainian sources claims that the two Russian battalions in this attack were North Korean troops. While plausible, there’s no hard evidence yet.
Nevertheless, by March 6, Russians severed the SSR, leaving the MSR as the only route in and out.
The situation turned critical.
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Nevertheless, by March 6, Russians severed the SSR, leaving the MSR as the only route in and out.
The situation turned critical.
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The advance threatened to cut off the entire Ukrainian force in Kursk, especially if another pincer was launched from the north.
Ukraine counterattacked, containing the Russian forces but failing to push them back.
At this point, the entire operation was collapsing.
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Ukraine counterattacked, containing the Russian forces but failing to push them back.
At this point, the entire operation was collapsing.
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As the SSR was lost, Russia launched a renewed attack in the north, hitting Malaya Loknaya and Martynovka.
Ukrainian forces began withdrawing to Sudzha and Kazachya Loknaya, likely not as a planned retreat but in response to battlefield realities.
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Ukrainian forces began withdrawing to Sudzha and Kazachya Loknaya, likely not as a planned retreat but in response to battlefield realities.
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In the rear, Russia bombed key bridges over the Loknaya, Sudzha, and Psel rivers, forcing Ukrainian soldiers to flee on foot—some marching over 30 km.
Drone footage showed Ukrainian infantry withdrawing in tight columns prioritizing speed over cover.
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Drone footage showed Ukrainian infantry withdrawing in tight columns prioritizing speed over cover.
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Russian milbloggers posted videos of dead Ukrainians and captured equipment, including an intact M1 Abrams.
Soldiers who made it back to Sumy indicate the retreat was in part chaotic and poorly coordinated—possibly initiated at the local level before higher-ups reacted.
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Soldiers who made it back to Sumy indicate the retreat was in part chaotic and poorly coordinated—possibly initiated at the local level before higher-ups reacted.
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Okay, a few words on the pipeline bandits:
A Russian force infiltrated Ukraine’s rear via an abandoned gas pipeline.
Emerging near Sudzha, they moved into forested areas.
Ukraine hit them with cluster munitions, but their ultimate fate remains unclear.
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A Russian force infiltrated Ukraine’s rear via an abandoned gas pipeline.
Emerging near Sudzha, they moved into forested areas.
Ukraine hit them with cluster munitions, but their ultimate fate remains unclear.
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Ukraine claims the infiltrators were destroyed. Russia says they pushed north & south instead, capturing Kubatkin and threatening retreat routes.
Initial reports put the force at ~100 men, later claims suggest 400–800. A battalion-sized unit seems plausible.
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Initial reports put the force at ~100 men, later claims suggest 400–800. A battalion-sized unit seems plausible.
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Whether they fully achieved their objectives is unclear, but their presence likely contributed to local Ukrainian commanders’ decision to withdraw.
This infiltration was likely a factor in destabilizing the already crumbling Ukrainian defense.
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This infiltration was likely a factor in destabilizing the already crumbling Ukrainian defense.
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Despite all this, Ukraine regrouped at Kazachya Loknaya and Sudzha, delaying Russia and buying time.
By March 11, Russia took Kazachya Loknaya. On March 12, they raised flags in Sudzha.
By March 13, only a few km² of the Kursk salient remained in Ukrainian hands.
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By March 11, Russia took Kazachya Loknaya. On March 12, they raised flags in Sudzha.
By March 13, only a few km² of the Kursk salient remained in Ukrainian hands.
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Officially, Ukraine denied abandoning Kursk even when Russian troops were already in Sudzha. In reality, the salient was clearly lost, with little value left.
Fighting will likely continue in Sudzha’s outskirts and border villages as the operation wraps up.
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Fighting will likely continue in Sudzha’s outskirts and border villages as the operation wraps up.
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So what happens now?
The key question: How many troops & how much equipment did Ukraine save?
While Russia didn’t fully encircle the northern salient, some Ukrainian units were lost. Prisoner footage remains limited but may increase in coming days.
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The key question: How many troops & how much equipment did Ukraine save?
While Russia didn’t fully encircle the northern salient, some Ukrainian units were lost. Prisoner footage remains limited but may increase in coming days.
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Some Ukrainian soldiers compared the withdrawal to Debaltseve (2015).
It’s likely Ukraine abandoned most heavy equipment that was still in the salient due to drone threats over their final supply route.
The number of casualties and lost equipment is still unknown
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It’s likely Ukraine abandoned most heavy equipment that was still in the salient due to drone threats over their final supply route.
The number of casualties and lost equipment is still unknown
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Ukraine will likely fall back to defensive positions in Sumy. After that, the next steps are uncertain for both Russia and Ukraine.
Russia holds the initiative but they could either -Press into Sumy, forcing Ukraine to commit more troops -Shift forces to Donetsk
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Russia holds the initiative but they could either -Press into Sumy, forcing Ukraine to commit more troops -Shift forces to Donetsk
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If Russia focuses on Donetsk, Ukraine could also shift its withdrawn Kursk forces eastward, while pushing onto Sumy would force Ukraine keep a force there.
We believe Russia will more likely maintain some pressure on Sumy, limiting Ukraine’s ability to reposition.
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We believe Russia will more likely maintain some pressure on Sumy, limiting Ukraine’s ability to reposition.
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Some have claimed that Russia’s advance was due to the pause in US intelligence sharing. We disagree. The operation’s scale suggests planning and preparations started well before the pause in intel sharing forewarning. No major disruptions were seen on other fronts.
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That said, the intelligence pause may have caused local disruptions, but it wasn’t the decisive factor. The real issue was Russian pressure on Ukrainian logistics—once supply lines were cut, withdrawal was inevitable
We have seen this play out multiple times during the war.
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We have seen this play out multiple times during the war.
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Russia has used large-scale infantry assaults successfully before. The collapse followed familiar patterns. At most, the intel gap worsened situational awareness, but did not cause the collapse.
The situation was likely exasperated by the pulling back of drone units.
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The situation was likely exasperated by the pulling back of drone units.
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The Kursk operation started as a bold Ukrainian gamble but ended in retreat.
Did it achieve its goals? Was it worth the cost?
Unsurprisingly my personal answers to both are "no" and "no".
I'll elaborate on that next time.
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Did it achieve its goals? Was it worth the cost?
Unsurprisingly my personal answers to both are "no" and "no".
I'll elaborate on that next time.
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Meanwhile we have a much longer version of this post up on our blog. You should go and check it out. I'll link to it below this tweet.
We also thank all the colleagues whom we've followed these developments with, and of course, @wihurinrahasto which keeps us running.
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We also thank all the colleagues whom we've followed these developments with, and of course, @wihurinrahasto which keeps us running.
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This naturally should not just randomly have to word "forewarning there". Twitter decided to play with me and I had to repost a bunch of stuff and do some edits, leading to this.
One additional map of the northern retreat, which, for some reason, was not added to the post about captured equipment.
For some reason this picture was not added to this post:
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