This is one of the final design options for the Type 43 Destroyer. This little known cancelled project to succeed the Type 42, was far more important than generally realised, and far more capable too.
A short thread on the forgotten destroyer design. /1
The Type 43 emerged in the late 1970s as the successor platform to T42, intended to carry Seadart to provide air defence to task forces operating globally, but particularly in the North Atlantic.
By 1979 the goal of the design was to help the RN get 20 AAW platforms in the fleet. The aim was to maximise the number of engagements that each ship could manage, with the T43 capable of handling 4 channels of fire, vice the 2 of the T42
Type 43 was designed from the outset to be a highly capable platform, able to manage the highest levels of threats. The goal was to make it survivable, potentially using 2 x Sea Dart & Seawolf missile launchers. This much is well understood. But, then 'things got weird'
As the design grew, so did the aspiration for it. The next requirement bolted on for the T43 was to go from being AAW, to also being an ASW platform as well. Now she was to operate Seaking/Merlin sized helos, and deploy Towed Array or VDS to prosecute submarine targets.
To make it even more ASW focused, the RN decided to add the requirement to deploy Ikara, essentially a flying torpedo, to the design! This was now becoming a monster ASW and AAW platform, only mirrored by HMS BRISTOL.
To ensure that the gunnery officers were kept busy, it was intended to fit a 76mm Otto Melara gun, and MM38 Exocet missiles as well to provide a punchy anti-surface warfare capability. Suddenly you have a monster of a platform on your hands...
The result was a platform capable, on paper, of carrying out simultaneous task group area air defence operations, and carrying out Towed Array sonar work against Soviet submarines. Basically a 42/22 combo on one hull - a very bold strategy.
Multiple designs were explored, but the definitive version by 1979 that the RN seriously looked at was the 4 COF design although debate raged about fitting one or two Seadart launchers (and never seems to have been finalised).
The ships particulars were huge. Of the four designs, they were 6400 standard - 8600 deep displacement, and 156- 166m long with 398 - 435 crew. These would have been the size of COUNTY class DDGs - very large and very capable.
They were expensive platforms - the cost estimated at £199 - £224m per hull (around £1bn in 2025 prices), when the entire budget was around £15bn per year. The RN expected to spend £2.5bn on the project for 10 ships, the same as they planned to spend on the TRAFALGAR class SSN.
The design the RN fell in love with was incredible, and probably the most balanced surface ship design of the Cold War. It would have been a superb combination of AAW and ASW capability on paper, even if in practise it was hard to do both missions at the same time.
The planners and the requirements team came under heavy pressure to defend their position. This image shows the sort of defence robustly mounted to the Vice Chief Naval Staff, explaining why the RN NEEDED the 'Ferrari', not the 'Ford Focus'...
The requirements team loved the design, but VCNS felt that it had no prospect of success. When an RN 3* is advocating buying the RAF more Tornado jets to do air defence over buying an air defence destroyer, you should realise your project is in trouble!
Wiser heads rapidly prevailed in the RN and noted that the plan would not meet with Ministerial support, and that there would be other ways of building the ship. This note sums up the Naval Staff view though on why Type 43 was the answer to the problem.
The Controller of the Navy probably sounded the death knell for the project with firm direction that a Type 43 should cost no more than 2/3rds the cost of 2 x Type 42. A harsh but necessary dose of realism.
The plan was to order the first Type 43 in 1984/1985, and the first entry to service in 1989. It is entirely possible that if ordered, they would still be in service today, as they would have been built on similar timeframe to the Type 23. The RN would likely not have got T45...
Even in 1979 the view was the hull would last 20-30 years and had the space to be modernised to carry VLS silos and potentially AEGIS like capabilities. Its likely we'd have them in service today in some way.
The T43 was cancelled in 1980, with a brief focus on the T44 (an austere version based on T22 hull) not progressing far before the Nott Review of 1981. The RN then looked to the NATO Frigate Replacement and Horizon project before finally building T45.
HMS DARING entered service in 2009, 20 years after Type 43 should have done so. In size and dimensions, the two designs are not dissimilar, although T45 is a far more capable AAW platform. It will remain 'the one that got away'.
This thread on the Type 43 destroyer may interest @NavyLookout @UKDefJournal @EngageStrategy1 @fightingsailor @navalhistorian @c21st_sailor @DrRowanAllport @ajcboyd @BeaverWestminst @IBallantyn @CovertShores @TomSharpe134 @simonharley @alessionaval @Strategyforwar1
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In Dec 1987 Mikhail Gorbachev landed at RAF Brize Norton for meetings & lunch with British PM Margaret Thatcher, enroute to Washington.
While positive, he also directly attacked Thatcher for her sending missiles to Afghanistan.
A short thread on an incredible meeting.
During 1987 the UK/Soviet relationship was tentatively improving, despite Cold War issues. Both leaders had a desire to improve their working relationship, so when the opportunity came, with Gorbachev flying to DC, the UK invited him to call in for a bilateral and lunch.
The visit lasted a few hours, but was enough time to discuss issues of formal substance. No10 and the FCO worked to identify the likely Soviet goals of the bilat, and in turn agree the key talking points for the British delegation.
In May 1990, the RAF Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) visited Russia for defence talks with senior military leaders. His visit report is a fascinating insight into Russian fears of German unity, Soviet airpower and the "airborne ballet" display.
Short thread on his visit as latest
The visit was intended to build confidence and links between senior military figures. It was seen overall as a success, marking openness in engagement, and with questions, often on military issues, answered. This was notable for being so unusual!
Initial talks were with Marshal Yefimov, focusing on arms control. He made clear his concerns about the challenges a unified Germany posed to the balance of power, and how the Soviets did not see their trainer aircraft as military jets ("they were not in any sense war-goers") - unlike the RAF Hawk and other NATO jets which had a combat mission in wartime.
As the Cold War ended, senior British officers visited the Soviet Union and sent back powerful visit reports, capturing their experiences and engagements with the Russians. This is the first of several tweet thread, about when ACM Craig, CDS visited in December 1990.
CDS visited from 9-14 Dec, as the guest of his Soviet opposite number (Gen Moiseev). The visit took him to Moscow, Leningrad and Murmansk.
In a note to SofS, he commented on the weakness of Soviet understanding of history, particularly WW2 and their ability to be masters at tweaking arms control. He felt as the Cold War ended, the Soviet military was at risk as it re-engaged with society.
Do you know the difference between a "special operation" a "sensitive operation" a "clandestine operation" and a "deniable operation"
Pinstripedline thread on 1970s SAS, MI6 and GCHQ operations and how the Govt tried to conceal their existence from official records...
In 1973 Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke Trend was alarmed to see reports of deniable operations involving the SAS in Oman in wider public documents. He sent a formal admonishment to the head of the FCO and to the MOD over concerns about poor information security.
Sir Dennis, the FCO PUS wrote back agreeing, noting that "deniable operations should never, as a matter of principle, be referred to in documents..."
He felt two rules applied to these operations - no formal records in the archives, and no automatic distribution across Depts.
This is HMS ARK ROYAL in 2008. In 1992 the Royal Navy made serious plans to permanently convert her to an LPH in place of ordering HMS OCEAN.
Thread on the 'LPH that never was'...
Throughout the 1980s the RN wanted to buy two Aviation Support Ships (ASS) to replace HMS HERMES and BULWARK to support the Royal Marines if they moved to Norway during wartime.
These ships would have supported the 3 INVINCIBLE class, and the 2 LPDs.
These plans were delayed by the end of the Cold War, but the RN still badly wanted to have an LPH with large flight deck capable of moving troops and equipment to support global power projection. The problem was that there was no money in the budget for these ships.
This is the Argentine Navy aircraft carrier 25 De Mayo.
On 29 April 1982, during the early stages of the Falklands War the MOD met to discuss a paper setting out the 'rules of engagement' under which the Royal Navy would be authorised to sink her.
Thread/
The carrier, a former Royal Navy Colossus class, was seen as one of the biggest threats to the task group.
The MOD analysis of her capabilities credited here with around 11-14 fixed wing jets (Skyhawk and Etendard) as well as Tracker recce aircraft.
The MOD analysis felt that the carrier group could pose a risk not just to the Amphibious Task Force on passage to the main Task Force, but also to UK units at Ascension Island, as well as ships and aircraft operating or sailing from there.