One fact about the global economy should not be subject to debate any more -- the US is more than meeting global demand for reserve assets (a significant change from 2002 to 2014 ... )
1/ many
And since China has had a policy of limiting its Treasury holdings (and shifting fx reserves over to the SCBs and policy banks) since around 2010, China's share of the Treasury market has shrunk radically ...
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The split is imprecise (Treasuries held by central banks in offshore custodians count as "private") but there is no real doubt that the role of official investors in the market has shrunk -- and there has been a big increase in private US holdings ...
3/
The stock in private domestic hands still is absolutely huge (it is around 50% of GDP) but it is up ~ 20 pp of GDP compared to the pre-COVID era, and a lot of that increase has been funded by US money market funds, either directly or indirectly (via repo)
4/
These structural shifts help explain why the Treasury issued a lot of bills in 2022 and 2023 -- that was where the demand was ...
Note issuance actually picked up significantly over the course of 2024 ...
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Note issuance is now running at just under 5% of US GDP -- a level consistent with a stable bill share if the fiscal deficit is around 6% of GDP. Counting QT, the market absorbed note supply equal to the fiscal deficit last year ...
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Foreign demand for notes has been stable at around 1.5 pp of GDP/ $450b -- a decent number absolutely and relative to history, but modest v total supply.
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Increased note (coupon paying Treasuries, bills are sold at a discount to pay) issuance has been facilitated by gigantic fall off in mortgage issuance (Fed tightening clearly impacted the secondary market in housing)
8/
And shifting from the flow of funds data to the Bertaut Judson monthly flow data, the bulk of foreign demand for Treasury coupons does look to be from true private holders. b/c China shifted to bills at the margins, my estimates imply its note holdings fell modestly in 2024
9/
Bottom line -- the increase in the stock of Treasuries in the market since the start of the pandemic has largely been absorbed domestically ... a point that is well known among actual market participants (who like to point that there are more price sensitive buyers)
10/
& absent a very elastic definition of reserve demand that includes private holdings abroad, it no longer is really accurate to say the US external deficit reflects excess global demand for reserve assets. That was the case imo from 03 to 13 -- but the world has changed
/end
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"The country’s protracted property slump and weak social safety net have curbed consumer spending, resulting in zero inflation last year and an increasing reliance on external demand to prop up growth."
Joe Gagnon (@GagnonMacro) should take a victory lap; the IMF has conceded intervention does have a real impact --
"A growing empirical literature finds that such intervention can systematically generate real exchange rate depreciation and raise current account balances"
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I also take a bit of satisfaction in this conclusion; it explains why I have been systematically tracking official asset accumulation for close to 20 years!
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The next step is for the IMF to rethink how intervention & official asset accumulation enters into its current account model. The current variable only uses formal central bank intervention & interacts it "optimal" v realized capital controls. So it has no practical impact
3/
Before the global financial crisis, in 06 and 07, the US fiscal deficit was under 2 percent of GDP and note issuance was under 1 pp of GDP in 07. That was also the time of peak reserve accumulation
The low level of US fiscal deficit prior to the global crisis + the small stock of Treasury debt prior to the crisis, especially relative to reserves, are 2 things that many have forgotten; constantly surprised by folks who think US fiscal was an pre crisis issue
2/
So I would posit two things --
a) US real rates would be substantially lower with the current "glut" of Asian manufacturing dollars if the US fiscal deficit was 1-2% of GDP v 5-6% of GDP; the swing in the fiscal deficit/ stock of Treasuries are important omitted variables 3/
Happy to see the IMF has noticed the expansion of global current account imbalances --
And guess what, the IMF seems to have rediscovered the idea that currency manipulation can drive imbalances (though manipulation has been renamed "macro-industrial policy" ... )
1/ many
The IMF doesn't find that "micro" industrial policy has a big impact on global imbalances, only economy wide "macro-industrial policies"
2/
"An example of such a policy is an export-led growth strategy operationalized through a combination of real exchange rate depreciation and enforced low domestic demand" --
that sounds a lot like foreign exchange rate intervention to me (Welcome to the club, @pogourinchas)
"The problem is there was never enough cash to fund all his [Crown Prince MBS] ambitious initiatives."
Indeed. That's why measures lie the balance of payments breakeven are useful. The Saudis needed $90 plus oil -- or near unlimited access to debt financing
1/
Going into the current conflict, the Saudis were borrowing $100b a year from the rest of the world (that's a form of reverse petrodollars so to speak)
2/
"The country’s projects ran into the trillions of dollars—far more than a government with a $300 billion annual budget could afford."
Imports of computers are up massively (tho not from China) and show no sign of slowing down -- that will mechanically pull the true trade deficit (setting gold flows aside) w/o a big sustained fall in other imports
Pharma/ Irish imports have been weak for a few months now -- probably unwinding front running but I also wonder if the tariff threat led some companies to "unbundle" pricing at the border, & lower their declared import price while charging more for the IP separately