One fact about the global economy should not be subject to debate any more -- the US is more than meeting global demand for reserve assets (a significant change from 2002 to 2014 ... )
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And since China has had a policy of limiting its Treasury holdings (and shifting fx reserves over to the SCBs and policy banks) since around 2010, China's share of the Treasury market has shrunk radically ...
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The split is imprecise (Treasuries held by central banks in offshore custodians count as "private") but there is no real doubt that the role of official investors in the market has shrunk -- and there has been a big increase in private US holdings ...
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The stock in private domestic hands still is absolutely huge (it is around 50% of GDP) but it is up ~ 20 pp of GDP compared to the pre-COVID era, and a lot of that increase has been funded by US money market funds, either directly or indirectly (via repo)
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These structural shifts help explain why the Treasury issued a lot of bills in 2022 and 2023 -- that was where the demand was ...
Note issuance actually picked up significantly over the course of 2024 ...
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Note issuance is now running at just under 5% of US GDP -- a level consistent with a stable bill share if the fiscal deficit is around 6% of GDP. Counting QT, the market absorbed note supply equal to the fiscal deficit last year ...
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Foreign demand for notes has been stable at around 1.5 pp of GDP/ $450b -- a decent number absolutely and relative to history, but modest v total supply.
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Increased note (coupon paying Treasuries, bills are sold at a discount to pay) issuance has been facilitated by gigantic fall off in mortgage issuance (Fed tightening clearly impacted the secondary market in housing)
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And shifting from the flow of funds data to the Bertaut Judson monthly flow data, the bulk of foreign demand for Treasury coupons does look to be from true private holders. b/c China shifted to bills at the margins, my estimates imply its note holdings fell modestly in 2024
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Bottom line -- the increase in the stock of Treasuries in the market since the start of the pandemic has largely been absorbed domestically ... a point that is well known among actual market participants (who like to point that there are more price sensitive buyers)
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& absent a very elastic definition of reserve demand that includes private holdings abroad, it no longer is really accurate to say the US external deficit reflects excess global demand for reserve assets. That was the case imo from 03 to 13 -- but the world has changed
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As @Aligarciaherrer has already observed, May's data shows ongoing domestic weakness (even increasing domestic weakness) even as China's exports continue to outperform global trade. It is an explosive combination.
The retail sales numbers speak for themselves -- tho there is a goods v services distinction, and the rolloff of some of last year's incentives for durables purchases matters.
The investment numbers also aren't good
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China's property market slump is now 5 years old and there is no sign that it has bottomed ... which it in and of itself remarkable. clearly time to clean up and recap the property developers, painful as that will be. on this I fully agree with the IMF
Korea's won is incredibly weak (global financial crisis or Korean BoP crisis levels ... ) even though Korea's fundamentals are sound (BoP has a massive surplus, fiscal debt is modest, etc).
Will be interesting to see if the Koreans can mount a defense this week ...
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A bit of background: Korea is experiencing a massive, positive terms of trade shock (chip prices are up so much that it has overwhelmed the rise in price of oil) and Samsung and Hynix are generating massive profits that have pushed the KOPSI way up
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Korea's fiscal position is solid too - not much government debt (thanks to a still stingy system of retirement benefits) and there will be a massive tax windfall from Samsung and Hynix. KRW weakness is all flow driven
For a few months now I have been hearing from folks close to the PBOC that the outflow from the state banks was driven by fx deposit growth, not by backdoor intervention. The blog takes that argument VERY seriously
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One is that onshore fx deposits themselves are a bit funky -- and have been for a long time. They don't move with rate differentials or any other obvious economic variable, so they could be (but I have no smoking gun proof) policy driven
The argument that China has a comparative advantage at industrial policy is a bit like the argument that the US has a comparative advantage at exporting debt. It is a good line, but even quips need a limiting principle ...
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I am not sure this week's Free Lunch column came up with that limiting principle; the notion that "the west might be better off simply leveraging the benefits of Chinese scale" suggests getting out of China's way across the board
But China has -- in Greg Ip's phrase (based on Rhodium's analysis) -- an "industrial policy for everything," which would imply that China is on track (with its comparative advantage at industrial policy) to dominate most industrial sectors
Germany's goods and services surplus has collapsed, and its surplus is now down to 2.5% of its GDP -- about half the level of China's far larger economy
Germany unlike China does report that its accumulated surpluses have generated an investment income surplus -- and China's reported deficit by all accounts (even that of the IMF, which grades China on a very generous curve) makes no sense
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I have criticized Germany for overly restrictive budgeting and excess surpluses in the past -- but fiscal has changed (thanks to the defense budget) and the surplus has fallen substantially ...
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I wanted to highlight this chart, as it is the chart that best illustrates why the available data points to active Chinese state management of the exchange rate. it shows that there is a predictable pattern to fx settlement --
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When spot is at the weak edge of the 2% band defined by the PBOC's daily fix, there are predictably sales in settlement (someone is defending the band) and when spot is at the midpoint, there are predictably purchases (esp. when the fix is appreciating)
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That is of couse the pattern one would expect from central bank intervention (apart from buying at the mid point not the strong side of the band) -- and for 17 years settlement was basically equal to changes in the PBOC's f. assets