One fact about the global economy should not be subject to debate any more -- the US is more than meeting global demand for reserve assets (a significant change from 2002 to 2014 ... )
1/ many
And since China has had a policy of limiting its Treasury holdings (and shifting fx reserves over to the SCBs and policy banks) since around 2010, China's share of the Treasury market has shrunk radically ...
2/
The split is imprecise (Treasuries held by central banks in offshore custodians count as "private") but there is no real doubt that the role of official investors in the market has shrunk -- and there has been a big increase in private US holdings ...
3/
The stock in private domestic hands still is absolutely huge (it is around 50% of GDP) but it is up ~ 20 pp of GDP compared to the pre-COVID era, and a lot of that increase has been funded by US money market funds, either directly or indirectly (via repo)
4/
These structural shifts help explain why the Treasury issued a lot of bills in 2022 and 2023 -- that was where the demand was ...
Note issuance actually picked up significantly over the course of 2024 ...
5/
Note issuance is now running at just under 5% of US GDP -- a level consistent with a stable bill share if the fiscal deficit is around 6% of GDP. Counting QT, the market absorbed note supply equal to the fiscal deficit last year ...
6/
Foreign demand for notes has been stable at around 1.5 pp of GDP/ $450b -- a decent number absolutely and relative to history, but modest v total supply.
7/
Increased note (coupon paying Treasuries, bills are sold at a discount to pay) issuance has been facilitated by gigantic fall off in mortgage issuance (Fed tightening clearly impacted the secondary market in housing)
8/
And shifting from the flow of funds data to the Bertaut Judson monthly flow data, the bulk of foreign demand for Treasury coupons does look to be from true private holders. b/c China shifted to bills at the margins, my estimates imply its note holdings fell modestly in 2024
9/
Bottom line -- the increase in the stock of Treasuries in the market since the start of the pandemic has largely been absorbed domestically ... a point that is well known among actual market participants (who like to point that there are more price sensitive buyers)
10/
& absent a very elastic definition of reserve demand that includes private holdings abroad, it no longer is really accurate to say the US external deficit reflects excess global demand for reserve assets. That was the case imo from 03 to 13 -- but the world has changed
/end
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Some ball park tariff math based on the estimated increase in tariffs from @EtraAlex -- the just pay it cost of today's tariffs are around $500b (1.75% of US GDP), the total Trump 2 tariffs are around $750b (2.6% of US GDP).
1/
The "just pay it" cost isn't a good estimate of actual revenue -- trade adjusts down, so actual tariff collections are lower. But it is a decent baseline for estimating the short-run shock --
2/
For example, if the elasticity of trade to the tariffs is around 1, US imports would fall from ~ $3.25 trillion to ~ $2.5 trillion (a fall of $750b). That is getting close to a percentage point of WGDP if the US is excluded. Not quite there, but close
3/
Martin Wolf seems to think China's recent export surge has reached its natural limits: "investing even more in manufacturing just guarantees ever more excess capacity and thus protection aimed against the inevitable surges of Chinese exports"
nice chart too ;)
Wolf confirms that China seems a real upside in Trump's global trade war --
"what is happening to the US has clear upsides for their own country [China]. It has dawned on just about everybody by now that Trump’s signature is worthless. A man who is trying to demolish the Canadian economy is not going to be a reliable friend to anybody else"
The Saudi balance of payments for q4 is out, and it confirms that Saudi Arabia ran a current account deficit in 2024 -- and (per my estimates), the balance of payments "breakeven" for Saudi Arabia is around $90 a barrel.
1/
One implication, of course, is that the Saudis are on track to run a substantial external deficit in 2025 --
(@Rory_Johnston can improve the estimated breakeven with a better net oil exports number for 2024!)
2/
@Rory_Johnston Spending on imports (broadly defined, includes services) is above where it was back in 2014 -- The various MBS visions didn't come cheap
Say a US firm gets access to Korea's local market to sell insurance. It won't employ Americans to run that business ... the firm's global business benefits, but there is little impact on the US economy
The classic example is TPP, where the US would have liberalized the US auto market (the 'TPP" content requirement was lower than the "NAFTA" content requirement) in exchange for stronger protection of offshore pharmaceutical IP
2/
That would have raised the offshore profits of US big pharma (i.e. more production and profit in Singapore) but not generated more direct activity in the US as big pharma never liked manufacturing in the US for global sales (and paying US tax)
3/
One sign of "American exceptionalism" (US equity outperformance + sustained demand for US debt through thick and thin) is that the US has a lot more external liabilities than external assets.
A lot more!
1/
I have focused heavily on the net external debt position precisely because it doesn't hinge heavily on stock market valuations (and the FDI position is a bit problematic as foreign FDI is valued using the US stock market). 2/
Of course valuation still plays a small rose there -- the market value of foreign holdings of US bonds is about $1.5 trillion below the purchase price (using the sum of flows)
I usually focus on non-petrol trade because oil has its own unique dynamics. But if there really is an across the board 20% tariff on all imports, the pre-tariff baseline is imports of 11% of GDP ...
1/
Some simple tariff math. The "just pay it" cost is thus 2.2% of GDP. But actual tax revenue from the tariff will be lower. If the short-term elasticity is 1, imports fall by a little more than 2% of GDP, to around 9 pp of GDP & the direct tax revenue is 1.75 pp of GDP. 2/
That is a big sum, particularly as it is being put in place ahead of any offsetting tax cuts. Moreover as @jnordvig highlighted over the weekend, Trump is taking a real risk by implementing the tariff in a way that maximizes uncertainty ... 3/