Andrew Batson Profile picture
Mar 17 9 tweets 2 min read Read on X
A lot of people feel like China's "special action plan" on boosting consumption has too little action, or too much planning. These are understandable reactions, but I think misread the nature of the document, which is fundamentally political not economic.
Pretty much by definition, a document issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party is not going to be a technical economic plan. Nor could a document published AFTER the government budget have any fiscal commitments not already in the budget.
The purpose of the plan is to send political signals first of all to cadres throughout the government, and second of all to the population at large. It's a declaration that the work broadly characterized as "boosting consumption" is of the highest political importance.
But here "boosting consumption" does not mean technical goals such as raising the consumption share of GDP, or achieving a certain growth rate of consumption. Which is why people interested in those things are likely to find it frustrating.
Instead it is about what Premier Li Qiang, in his government work report, called "people-oriented macro policies." I would summarize it as the government doing things that people will notice affecting their daily lives in tangible and positive ways.
They are looking to generate these kind of reactions: "My dad's pension just went up." "I got a new phone for basically free." "They finally installed an elevator in my building." "I can finally afford childcare." (these are all actual things in the plan)
Viewed this way, the primary goal of the plan is to solve a political problem: that people don't feel the government is improving their lives. If it works, the plan might have economic effects (higher confidence, lower savings rate), but it's not narrowly about those.
It's always been my feeling that the top-down narrative of the last few years, with its overriding focus on technological self-sufficiency (explicitly) and war preparation (implicitly), is not actually that popular within China outside the nationalist right.
So I'd take the consumption rhetoric as the government's recognition that it needs a broader program that speaks to people outside the tech sector. It doesn't mean scaling back goals for tech, just recognizing that they aren't the be-all and end-all of politics.

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More from @andrewbatson

Jun 1, 2023
Interesting discussion here on the causes of China's high manufacturing share of GDP and the recent change. This is actually a question that can be answered more precisely -- here come some charts
Since we know the value of manufacturing exports (~18% of GDP) and the share of domestic value-added in those exports (~80%) we can break down manufacturing value-added into the portions serving external and domestic demand Image
It's remarkable how closely balanced external and domestic demand are for manufacturing, given the enormous size of China's economy. We can see that exports have taken a smaller share over time, until the pandemic export boom reversed the trend.
Read 6 tweets
Dec 30, 2022
A short thread on some China-related books read or written about in 2022 1/
Joseph Torigian's *Prestige, Manipulation, and Coercion*, a historical take on Chinese elite politics, was quite thought provoking 2/ andrewbatson.com/2022/10/11/it-…
My own mental model for understanding Chinese politics has been strongly shaped by Joseph Fewsmith's *Rethinking Chinese Politics* which came out last year; it led me to Ken Jowitt's *New World Disorder*, an older but very interesting book. 3/
andrewbatson.com/2022/02/08/soc…
Read 6 tweets
Sep 27, 2022
The World Bank is now forecasting that China's GDP will grow just 2.8% in 2022. This number isn't out of line with what others are now expecting, but 2.8% is certainly a low number, so low that it was recently considered a purely hypothetical worst-case economic scenario.
In its 2021 financial stability report, the PBOC ran banking-system stress tests based on various growth scenarios. In the worst one, the "severely adverse" scenario, it assumed 2.8% GDP growth in 2022. In other words, China is now actually in the severely adverse scenario.
The PBOC's own models suggested that nonperforming ratios would rise to 7.5% in 2022 and 9.7% in 2023 in the severely adverse scenario (note that in their scenario, GDP growth does not recover in 2023 but slows further to 2%).
Read 5 tweets
Mar 7, 2022
What happened to "common prosperity"? Xi Jinping's new favorite slogan is almost completely missing from the government's official policy agenda for 2022, as presented in the documents for the annual legislative session.
Li Keqiang's government work report contains exactly one mention of 共同富裕, which is rendered as "prosperity for all" in the official English translation. And it's a pretty generic statement.
The Ministry of Finance's budget report also contains exactly one mention of common prosperity, which is simply a note of a provincial initiative. But it sets no goals for the central government.
Read 7 tweets
Sep 17, 2021
Everyone is trying to figure out when China's regulatory onslaught is going to end, or at least reach some kind of tradable turning point. I think we have to take seriously the possibility that it's not a quick campaign, but the start of preparations for the 2022 Party Congress.
The always-thoughtful Jude Blanchette articulated the case for this in a good episode of the Sinica podcast. Relevant excerpts follow supchina.com/2021/09/16/red…
The 20th Party Congress of course is going to be a big deal, presumably the start of Xi Jinping's third term. He will want to articulate an ambitious agenda that will justify his breaking of precedent. And we should expect to start getting signals for that agenda now.
Read 5 tweets
May 9, 2021
The geopolitics of financial flows: the collapse of Australia's political ties with China has been mirrored by a reduction in financial ties, with Australian investors reducing China exposure in 2020 after years of increases.
h/t to the Australian Financial Review for highlighting this interesting data
Russia presents the opposite case: its closer geopolitical alignment with China was signaled back in 2017-18 by the central bank buying a bunch of renminbi bonds, as the expense of US Treasurys
Read 5 tweets

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