Now a sixteen-antenna circular CRPA satellite navigation system has been recovered from a Russian “Shahed-136” UAV.
This device may have considerable resistance to Ukrainian GPS/GLONASS electronic warfare jamming. 1/
The CRPA antenna exploits the fact that a GPS satellite signal and a ground based jamming signal arrive from different directions.
It consists of an array of antennas that measure the direction and time of arrival of different signals, so a jamming signal can be filtered out. 4/
A Ukrainian EW device may broadcast instructions to Russian drones with ELRS frequency-hopping to stop their motors during flight so that they fall out of the sky.
It exploits that some Russian drone suppliers apparently use the same binding key for all their ELRS controllers. 1/
Usually this key is unique for each controller that binds with its drone and sets the frequency hopping pattern.
For “convenience” Russian COs may not want that.
This allows the EW device to search for known ELRS packet signatures tied to the reused binding key signatures. 2/
A spoofed signal can then be sent mimicking a legitimate control packet, using the same key and frequency hopping sequence.
This signal could include a command to set the throttle to zero while in flight!
The device may also scan for other repeated signatures to attack.
3/
The electronic components of a Chinese-made circular CRPA jamming-resistant satellite navigation system, from a Russian Shahed kamikaze UAV.
It weighs a kilogram, so it is definitely not meant for smaller UAVs. 1/
The CRPA antenna exploits the fact that a GPS satellite signal and a ground based jamming signal arrive from different directions.
It consists of an array of antennas that measure the direction and time of arrival of different signals, so a jamming signal can be filtered out. 3/
A Russian blogger candidly explains how corruption blocks the development of a domestic drone industry.
“How to screw the government and get a medal for it? Let's continue the topic.
The recipe is simple and, in principle, has not changed for the last 20 years: 1/
“1. We go to China, determine the range of components (let it be electric motors) that the Chinese are ready to produce. We take samples. 2. We order a clone of engine samples with RKD from local Kulibins. The cost price doesn't matter. 2/
“Along the way, we get a bunch of photos of production and individual parts. 3. We register this clone as an engine of our own production. 4. We drag ready-made motors or large-unit kits from China (here you can also save on taxes), .. .
3/
A Russian prototype high speed interceptor UAV.
Each side is racing to develop this major new category of drones aimed at interdicting fixed wing reconnaissance and especially long-range kamikaze UAVs such as the Russian “Shahed” and Ukrainian “Luytyy”. 1/
Ukraine has a major advantage over the Russians with its advanced acoustic UAV detection and control systems “Sky Fortress” and radar system “Sky Hunter”.
These systems are already in place for directing ground based fire teams and FPV interceptors. 2/
The limited speed and endurance of FPV interceptors is inhibiting the full potential of these detection and fighter control systems.
The last piece of the anti-UAV puzzle for Ukraine is an operational high speed interceptor UAV. 3/
A Russian blogger on how Russia lost the race to small drone dominance.
“Sasha Yaremchuk reports that the air in Sudzha is "dirty". I'll rephrase it a little - the enemy dominates the skies, both in Sudzha and in other parts of the front. 1/
“At the beginning of the SVO, Ukraine prioritized the development of various types of UAVs and electronic warfare. Russia lost this race for light weapons and protection, as the generals thought that these were toys and that real weapons should cost billions.
2/
“And a small thing for 15-45 thousand rubles would not cause any damage.
However, the war showed that the greatest harm is caused by drones. These same toys for 45 thousand rubles caused the greatest damage to manpower and military equipment.
3/
“The crests themselves say that 80 percent of the Russian army's losses are due to drones, we have our own assessment, I will not name them, but the fact that we take the Ukrainian drones very seriously is an indisputable fact.
2/
“As an example, I will cite the Krasnolimansk direction, where over the past few days, massive use of FPV drones has been recorded, both quadcopter and aircraft type. The enemy is working non-stop on our near and far rear, using hundreds of birds.
3/