1/ Russia's shortage of armoured vehicles and lack of an analogue for the M113 APC or M2A2 Bradley IFV has led soldiers to weld troop-carrying 'booths' onto rusting Soviet-era MT-LB armoured fighting vehicles. It highlights the Russian defence industry's failure to adapt. ⬇️
2/ The MT-LB, built in Ukraine, Bulgaria and Poland from the early 1970s, is designed to carry 11 men in addition to a driver and gunner. However, like other Soviet-era APCs, it suffers from low headroom and narrow exit doors which slow down disembarcation from the vehicle.
3/ This has often been a problem for Russian forces in Ukraine, as it leaves disembarking troops highly vulnerable to enemy fire. In one incident recorded by the Ukrainians, an entire Russian assault squad was wiped out in seconds as it exited its MT-LB.
4/ The MT-LB's light armour (only 3-14 mm thick) also makes the vehicle itself highly vulnerable to drones and direct enemy fire. It is incapable of resisting the Bradley's 25mm autocannon, let alone tank fire.
5/ As the Russian 'Military Informant' Telegram channel notes, "The production of new armoured vehicles is not capable of sufficiently covering the heavy losses incurred in them, and the number of vehicles removed from storage that are suitable for combat operations is becoming…
6/ …fewer and fewer – many types of equipment in the 1st and 2nd storage categories [i.e. in the best conditions, generally under cover] have already been exhausted, and those stored in less acceptable conditions require more and more time for major repairs and modernisation."
7/ Russian troops have frequently complained about the weakness of Russian armoured personnel carriers, calling them "complete shit that burns and kills our soldiers". They have attempted to upgrade existing vehicles with home-made armour.
8/ This is the result, as 'Military Informant' notes, of the Russian military-industrial complex's failure to adapt to the needs of the Ukraine war. As another Russian warblogger has commented, failed projects like the Armata tank have taken priority.
9/ "Over the years of war, neither the industry nor the Ministry of Defence have been able to give birth to a notional analogue of the M113 APC for these purposes, and the USSR did not produce such equipment at all, which excludes its presence in storage bases.
10/ "Due to the fact that there is simply nowhere to quickly get such equipment from, and no one is going to produce it, the role of assault APCs has to be played by the MT-LB, which is completely unsuitable for this.
11/ "[It is] not adapted either in terms of its armour, or in terms of mine protection, or in terms of the convenience of placing and landing troops."
12/ Additionally, as 'Military Informant' points out, drones have fundamentally changed the environment in which troops disembark:
"At the same time, due to the dominance of drones over the battlefield, the tactics of using armored vehicles have also undergone serious changes."
13/ "Now, APCs and IFVs do not fight together with infantry, but try to deliver them to the dismounting line as quickly as possible, and then leave the danger zone as quickly as possible so as not to become a victim of a drone."
14/ While in many cases this has been achieved by having the troops ride on the roof of the vehicle, this leaves the soldiers extremely vulnerable to drone and small arms attacks, which can wipe out entire squads before they can even disembark.
15/ The Russians have found a solution of sorts by welding a metal 'booth' to the top of MT-LBs, "by cutting off part of the roof and placing it on top of a higher structure, allowing the equipped landing force to be more comfortably accommodated, and, if necessary,…
16/ …quickly leave the vehicle under fire. Note that even this simple modernisation is carried out by repair units in the army and by the crews of the vehicles themselves, and not at factories."
17/ The booths have the advantage of allowing quick disembarkation and some protection from shell splinters and small arms fire. They are still very vulnerable to drones, however, and obliterate the MT-LB's low profile.
18/ As 'Military Informant' complains, this highlights the fact that military equipment makers "often do not care at all about what the front actually needs, and the leadership of the Ministry of Defence does not understand this."
19/ "We have long and often written about the current situation and the need in the army for both simple front-line armored personnel carriers and their heavily armored versions. But, unfortunately, the situation has not yet moved on from an impasse." /end
1/ Russia is reportedly considering proposing a wide-ranging economic partnership with the Trump administration, including joint cooperation to push fossil fuels as an alternative to Chinese and European clean energy solutions, in opposition to curbing climate change. ⬇️
2/ Bloomberg is reporting that Russia has prepared a seven-point memo that includes a return to the dollar settlement system, reversing Putin's by now well-established policy of creating an alternative system insulated from US economic pressure.
3/ The proposals also include joint US-Russian ventures in manufacturing, nuclear energy, oil and LNG extraction, preferential conditions for US companies in Russia to compensate for past losses, cooperation on raw materials, and jointly working against clean energy.
1/ Why does the Russian government appear to be so clueless about the role Telegram plays in military communications? The answer, one warblogger suggests, is that the military leadership doesn't want to admit its failure to provide its own reliable communications solutions. ⬇️
2/ Recent claims by high-ranking officials that Telegram isn't relevant to military communications have prompted howls of outrage and detailed rebuttals from Russian warbloggers, but have also pointed to a deeper problem about what reliance on Telegram (and Starlink) represents.
3/ In both cases, the Russian military has failed abysmally to provide workable solutions. Telegram and Starlink were both adopted so widely because the 'official' alternatives (military messngers and the Yamal satellite constellation) are slow, unreliable and lack key features.
1/ Telegram is deeply embedded into Russian military units' internal communications, providing functionality that MAX, the Russian government's authorised app, doesn't have. A commentary highlights the vast gap that is being opened up by the government's blocking of Telegram. ⬇️
2/ The Two Majors Charitable Foundation writes that without Telegram, information exchange, skills transfer, and moral mobilisation work within the Russian army will be crippled:
3/ "I'd really like to add that for a long time, we've been gathering specialized groups in closed chats, including those focused on engineering and UAVs, to share experiences and build a knowledge base. Almost everyone there is a frontline engineer.
1/ Russia's Federal Customs Service is seeking to prosecute Russian volunteers who are importing reconnaissance drones from China to give to frontline troops. It's the latest chapter in a saga of bureaucratic obstruction that is blocking vital supplies to the Russian army. ⬇️
2/ Much of the army's equipment, and many of its drones, are purchased with private money by volunteer supporters or the soldiers themselves. High-tech equipment such as drones and communications equipment is purchased in China or Central Asia and imported into Russia.
3/ However, the Federal Customs Service has been a major blocker. Increased customs checks on the borders have meant that cargo trucks have suffered delays of days or even weeks, drastically slowing the provision of essential supplies for the Russian army.
1/ Leaked casualty figures from an elite Russian special forces brigade indicate that it has suffered huge losses in Ukraine, equivalent to more than half of its entire roster of personnel. Scores of men are listed as being 'unaccounted for', in other words having deserted. ⬇️
2/ The 10th Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade (military unit 51532) is a special forces (spetsnaz) unit under the GRU. It is a 2002 refoundation by Russia of a Soviet-era spetsnaz unit that, ironically, passed to Ukraine when the Soviet Union broke up in 1991.
3/ Since the invasion of February 2022, the brigade has been fighting on the Kherson front, which has seen constant and extremely bloody fighting over the islands in the Dnipro river and delta. Russian sources have reported very high casualties.
1/ Russian warbloggers are continuing to provide examples of how Telegram is used for frontline battlefield communications, to refute the claim of presidential spokesman Dmitri Peskov that such a thing is "not possible to imagine". ⬇️
2/ Platon Mamadov provides two detailed examples:
"Example number one:
Aerial reconnaissance of Unit N spotted a Ukrainian self-propelled gun in a shelter in the middle of town N."
3/ "Five minutes after the discovery, the target's coordinates and a detailed video were uploaded to a special secret chat group read by all drone operators, scouts, and artillerymen in that sector of the front.