Thread by @FennellJW

In the spirit of @MtarfaL, and as a Gloucestershire lad, I'll tell the story of the Glorious Glosters at Imjin River.

Their heroic stand is a modern day Rorkes Drift, impressing on both adversaries and US allies the dogged never-say-die fighting power of the British infantryman.

@MtarfaL In early 1951 the Chinese Army attacked the US-led Unitied Nations forces in Korea in order to recapture Seoul.

The line of advance was held by US I Corps comprising the 1 ROK, 3rd, 25th and 24th US Divisions.

The 29th British Bde was attached to the 3rd US division.

@MtarfaL 29th, led by Brig. Tom Brodie, held the gap between 3rd US and 1 ROK Divs on the Imjiin River. Their 12 mile sector was too wide to be properly defended, so Brodie established three hilltop strong points overlooking river crossing point. The Glosters held the left hand flank.

@MtarfaL Two miles to the east of 1st Glosters were the 1st Northumberland Fusileers, and on the oppostie side of the river, connected by two pontoon bridges, the Belgian contingent. The 1st Royal Ulster Rifles were held back as a reserve behind the Belgians, with the Bde HQ.

@MtarfaL The postion was temporary and recently occupied and no minefields had been laid nor defences dug. But the brigade had been reinforced with an RA regiment of artillery, a heavy mortar battery and squadron of 8th Royal Irish Hussars with Centurrion tanks.

@MtarfaL Little did Brodie know that his sector was to be attacked by the entire Chinese 63rd Army Group of three divisions, a total of 27 infantry battalions against four.

On the night of the 22nd April forward patrols infiltrated behind the Belgian position to capture the pontoon bridges. RUR was sent forward, but arrived too late, and covering fire from the 1st NF held up the Chinese so the Belgians could fight their way back across the river.

The Chinese also managed to ford the river in front of the Northumberland Fusileers, attacking both front and right flank companies simultaneously and forcing the Fusileers to abandon their position under cover from the tanks of 8th Hussars.

On the left of the line Lt. Col. James Power Carne, the Cornish C/O of the Glosters had postioned a 17 man patrol on the river bank.

This tiny detachment would hold up three assaults by the PLA 559th regiment that morning, only retiring when they ran out of ammunition.

During the night A and D companies were attacked by 559th regiment. Outnumbered six to one, A Company was forced to withdraw from Castle Hill, but not until after Lt Philip Curtis of Plymouth had single handedly destroyed a machine gun postion. He was postumously awarded the VC.

The next morning the right wing was reinforced by the 3rd Division reserve, US 7th Infantry Regiment, but failed to retake the postions lost, although the Belgians, RUF and NF were able to retire in good order form a new defensive line around 29 Bde command post.

On the left, the Glosters held their positions until 20:30, when A Company, now down to less than half strength and having lost all their officers and NCOs, fell back to Hill 235. D Company fell back with them to avoid being isolated by the Fusileers withdrawal to thier right.

During the night of 23/4 the brunt of the Chinese assault was stemmed by B Company on Hill 316. Outnumbered 18:1 they endured six assaults, calling in artillery to break up the last at daybreak. Out of ammo, they withdrew at 08:10. Only 20 survirvors made it to Hill 235.

As B Coy fought to hold the left flank, the PLA 188th Division crossed the Imjiin and attacked the Ulster Rifles on the right. Now all three Chinese divisions were across the river. Most dangerous was a deep penetration between the Glosters and Fusileers.

To prevent the Glosters being completely surrounded on Hill 325, Brodie organised a relief force from the temporarily attached Philippine Army 10th BCT and 8th Hussars.

Philippine Chaffee and Irish Hussar Centurion tanks made it to with 2,000 yards of the Glosters...

..when the lead tank was hit blocking the approach route. Brodie ordered the column to withdraw.

A further attempt to relieve the Glosters was planned by using 1st and 3rd Battalions of US 65th Infantry but cancelled when PLA intensified attacks on the I Corps Sector.

On the 25th, I Corps was ordered to execute Plan 'Golden A' before it was overrun: a general withdrawal to new positions north of Seoul.

No further attempts were made to relieve the Glosters.

29th Brigade withdrew under intense PLA pressure.

The Belgian Volunteer Corps earned a Presidential Unit Citation for holding blocking positions during the withdrawal.

Among those killed were Lt. Col. Foster, C/O of the Northumberland Fusileers.

Throughout 24/25th the Glosters continued to resist on Hill 235 (Glosters Hill) against wave after wave of Chinese assaults. Attempts at air dropping supplies failed and from the 25th artillery support was withdrawn.

Brodie left the final decision to Carne, and on the 25th, short of ammunition and water, he ordered his company commanders to "to make for the British lines as best as they could".

Only D Company under Major Mike Harvey made it back to I Corps lines, & 459 men ended up as PoWs.

Although they didn't realise it at the time, 29th Bde and neighbouring 1 ROK Divsion had broken the advance of the Chinese 63rd, 64th and 65th Armies and saved Seoul.

PLA casuaties were from 10-15,000 during the battle, and 63rd Army, facing 29th Bde, was pulled out of the line.

1st Battalion the Gloucetershire Regiment lost 620 men of the 1,029 casualties suffered by 29th Brigade during the battle, and could muster only 217 men on 27th April.

Of those 59 were KIA and a further 39 died in captivity.

Two VCs were earned by Carne and Curtis and a George Cross by Lt. Terry Waters for conduct after capture.

Four DSOs and eight MC and MMs were also awarded to Glosters, including as DSO for one Anthony Farrah-Hockley, as well as a Presidential Unit Citation.

Perhaps equally impressive is the citation for Lt. Waters, a young officer who did everything in his power to keep his men safe while in captivity and yet sacrificed his own life to maintain British honour.

The only possible quesrion mark is whether Brodie should have withdrawn the relief force quite so precipitously on the 24th when they were so close to Hill 235. More may have escaped captivity if he had ordered Carne to break out and meet up with them....

Hindsight etc.

We would commend the performance of 29 Bde and the Glosters if they were part of the modern, all volunteer and professional British Army, but in 1951 they were National Service conscripts, which makes their performance on the Imjiin even more remarkable.

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