Almost every day, we hear about strikes against targets inside Russia, but we rarely get the full picture of their actual impact on the war. Radio Liberty and Frontelligence Insight have joined efforts to analyze hundreds of data points to answer this question.
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2/ Our research covered the period from September 2024 to February 2025, divided into two sections: strikes on military targets, infrastructure, and on the energy sector. We found that strikes on Russia’s energy sector caused at least $658 million in damage over ~6 months
3/ The real damage to the Russian energy sector and the economy as a whole may be higher. In at least 67 out of 100 cases, Ukrainian strikes were successful, while in another 33 cases the result of the attacks remains unknown or it is impossible to prove Ukraine's involvement.
4/ The highest number of successful strikes against targets inside Russia was recorded in November 2024. The analysis is almost entirely based on the impacts verified by the @GeoConfirmed service. The actual number of impacts for the specified period may be higher.
5/ Ukrainian drones and missiles most frequently struck targets 100-150 km away, with slightly fewer strikes at 150-200 km and 50-100 km. This suggests most strikes target areas near the Russian-Ukrainian border or front line.
6/ September 2024 stands out as the most successful month, marked by direct hits on some of Russia’s largest ammunition depots in its western regions: key stockpiles that had sustained frontline operations since 2022. Notably, strategic depots in Toropets and Tikhoretsk
7/ Tikhoretsk Ammunition Depot, in particular, became a key storage hub for North Korean artillery ammunition deliveries starting in 2023. Its infrastructure, like most major Soviet-era ammunition depots, was specifically designed with a rail connection
8/ The destruction of the Toropets depot alone is estimated to have resulted in the loss of 30,000 to 160,000 tons of munitions, dealing a tangible blow to Russian logistics and frontline supply chains.
9/ Using our evaluation model and analyzing each target with satellite imagery, available photo and video footage, and other documentary data, we determined that more than half of the recorded strikes between September and February had limited impact
10/ Intelligence and response times have significantly improved compared to previous years. For example, Ukraine struck a Shahed drone storage/launch site near Oryol shortly after it opened in December. Construction of the site began in August 2024 and was completed by December.
11/ An analysis of Damage Rating shows that over half of recorded strikes on military facilities and infrastructure caused moderate to low damage. One likely factor, as our team assumes, is the relatively small warhead size of certain Ukrainian drones used in these attacks
12/ By 2024, Russian forces were far more adapted than in 2022, when they assumed Ukraine had little capability to strike beyond artillery range. With the introduction of longer-range weapons like HIMARS and Scalp/Storm Shadow, they adjusted, reducing the number of easy targets
13/ Regarding the destruction and damage of oil and energy infrastructure such as oil tanks, Ukrainian strikes over the past six months have destroyed 50 reservoirs and damaged another 47
14/ In most cases, both destroyed tanks and visibly damaged storage facilities were never repaired. The only exception is a tank damaged in the January attack on the port of Ust-Luga. The roof of the RVS-30,000, which sustained minor damage, was repaired within a month
15/ The largest strike on an oil storage facility in terms of total damage occurred on October 7 in Feodosia (annexed Crimea), where 11 tanks with a total volume of 69,000 cubic meters were destroyed. Our estimates suggest the maximum monetary damage could exceed $37.5 million.
16/ If we consider all damaged storage facilities—excluding the rebuilt one—as destroyed, the total damage increases significantly, according to our calculations. Experts suggest that attacks on refineries, rather than strikes on oil depots, cause the most damage to the economy
17/ Based on our calculations, the upper limit of direct damage to the Russian economy from Ukrainian strikes over the period is estimated at a conservative $658 million. However, Russia's total revenue from oil exports in 2024 was estimated by the IEA at $189 billion
18/ While the number of Ukrainian strikes in these six months is not enough to turn the tide of the war in Ukraine's favor, the frequency and success rate of strikes are much higher than in 2022 and 2023. War is a nonlinear process and 6 months of observations can be insufficient
19/ Thank you for reading this thread. You can find the full version on our website, which includes a much more detailed analysis, along with methodology, data, expert opinions, and additional details
20/ Please consider donating to support our project, as we operate without external funding, allowing us to publish independently. Since we don't have sponsors, you can support us by donating via the BuyMeACoffee service
21/ I would like to separately thank the @Geoconfirmed team for providing verified data, @kromark for provided satellite images and analysis, and the many experts who gave their expert opinions, including @KofmanMichael
22/ We would also like to note that RFEL journalist @legal0ve, who worked with us and did an amazing job, is open to job proposals from other news agencies, considering the recent budget cuts that have affected the work of Radio Liberty @RFERL
23/ Thank you again for reading. Please don't forget to like and share the first message of the thread to help with the algorithms
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Did you know Russia’s Su-34 and Su-35S jets, used in bombing campaigns, contain over 1,100 microelectronic parts from 11 Global Export Control Coalition countries? A new joint investigation by IPHR, NAKO, and Hunterbrook uncovers the supply chain. 🧵Thread with key takeaways:
2/ Most components come from the US, but the supply chain spans Germany to Japan. Of 891 parts from 138 firms, 59% are under strict export controls. 36.3% of shipments were small-value (less than $10000), pointing at intermediaries and shell companies use to evade sanctions
3/ Despite sweeping sanctions, Russia continues to receive Western semiconductors at industrial scale. An analysis of more than 180,000 customs records from 2023 shows approximately $805.6 million worth of microelectronics arriving from top-tier global suppliers.
Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Russia has launched 28,743 Shahed/Geran drones at Ukraine - 2,736 of them in June of this year, according to President Zelensky. Our team took a brief look at the Shahed numbers and noted the following trends and figures🧵:
2/ The 2,736 drones launched in June, many targeting Kyiv, make up nearly 10% of the total, proving growing production. This aligns with earlier warnings from Ukrainian intelligence, which estimated Russia’s monthly output at around 2700 Shahed-type UAVs and roughly 2500 decoys
3/ Ukrainian Air Force data shows 5,438 drones of this type were launched at Ukraine in June 2025 - about twice the number cited by Zelensky. The gap likely comes from the Air Force counting both Geran and decoys UAVs, while Zelensky referred only to strictly Geran drones
As Ukraine marked Naval Forces Day, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet started the morning fending off a joint air and sea drone attack on its base in Novorossiysk. Early footage shows no major damage. Our team reviewed satellite imagery from the day before, here’s what we know🧵:
2/ As of July 5, four Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines were present at the Novorossiysk naval base - which is nearly the entire remaining operational submarine force of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. These submarines are equipped to launch Kalibr cruise missiles.
3/ Valuable naval assets, including an Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates, minesweepers, patrol boats, and corvettes, were anchored in the bay at the time of the attack. The strike occurred overnight, and by late morning, local authorities declared the situation to be safe
In recent months, Russia has focused on drone strikes deeper behind the front, aiming to disrupt Ukraine’s supply lines. In return, Ukraine has turned to hitting Russian drone teams. In an effort called "Dronocide," Ukrainian troops found 90 suspected drone sites in Zaporizhzhia
2/ The Armed Forces of Ukraine claim that 42 enemy positions were destroyed or heavily damaged in precision strikes. Notably, it does seem that the operation was a coordinated joint efforts between the Air Force, Defense Intelligence, drone units, and a land forces brigade.
3/ Coordination between various branches and units has long been a persistent issue for the Armed Forces. But based on this limited evidence presented in the video, there are optimistic signs that coordination and joint execution is improving to some degree.
On 5 July, Ukrainian forces carried out a strike on the Borysoglebsk airfield in Russia. Reports indicate that a depot with glide bombs, a trainer aircraft, and possibly other aircraft were hit. Our team has conducted a brief analysis of imagery a fire map - here’s what we found:
2/ NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System detected at least three thermal anomalies at the Air Base. While it's not very precise or comprehensive, the heat sources appear to be located in 2 areas: the central part of the airfield and the logistical section
3/ While not conclusive, this serves as a credible independent indicator suggesting a possible strike on the logistical area - where Russian forces may have stored ammo, or fuel. The fire in the central part of the airfield appears to be near the Radar Landing System
For many in developing countries, Russia offers a chance to earn blood money they might never otherwise see. Hundreds of Cubans have taken that path, and our team Frontelligence Insight used them as a case study to find out how many foreigners are now fighting for Russia.🧵Thread
2/ In 2023, a major data leak exposed records of hundreds of Cuban mercenaries, later investigated by @InformNapalm. We analyzed 176 personal files and found that most recruits were between 30 and 39 years old, followed by those aged 40 to 49 - with a few even over 60.
3/ With their full names in hand, tracing their whereabouts on Russian social media was relatively easy. One mercenary in particular, Enriquez Linares Livan Michel, proved especially useful. His social media profile contained both photographs and geodata.