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Mar 25 23 tweets 7 min read Read on X
Almost every day, we hear about strikes against targets inside Russia, but we rarely get the full picture of their actual impact on the war. Radio Liberty and Frontelligence Insight have joined efforts to analyze hundreds of data points to answer this question.

🧵Thread Image
2/ Our research covered the period from September 2024 to February 2025, divided into two sections: strikes on military targets, infrastructure, and on the energy sector. We found that strikes on Russia’s energy sector caused at least $658 million in damage over ~6 months
3/ The real damage to the Russian energy sector and the economy as a whole may be higher. In at least 67 out of 100 cases, Ukrainian strikes were successful, while in another 33 cases the result of the attacks remains unknown or it is impossible to prove Ukraine's involvement. Image
4/ The highest number of successful strikes against targets inside Russia was recorded in November 2024. The analysis is almost entirely based on the impacts verified by the @GeoConfirmed service. The actual number of impacts for the specified period may be higher. Image
5/ Ukrainian drones and missiles most frequently struck targets 100-150 km away, with slightly fewer strikes at 150-200 km and 50-100 km. This suggests most strikes target areas near the Russian-Ukrainian border or front line. Image
6/ September 2024 stands out as the most successful month, marked by direct hits on some of Russia’s largest ammunition depots in its western regions: key stockpiles that had sustained frontline operations since 2022. Notably, strategic depots in Toropets and Tikhoretsk Image
7/ Tikhoretsk Ammunition Depot, in particular, became a key storage hub for North Korean artillery ammunition deliveries starting in 2023. Its infrastructure, like most major Soviet-era ammunition depots, was specifically designed with a rail connection Image
8/ The destruction of the Toropets depot alone is estimated to have resulted in the loss of 30,000 to 160,000 tons of munitions, dealing a tangible blow to Russian logistics and frontline supply chains. Image
9/ Using our evaluation model and analyzing each target with satellite imagery, available photo and video footage, and other documentary data, we determined that more than half of the recorded strikes between September and February had limited impact Image
10/ Intelligence and response times have significantly improved compared to previous years. For example, Ukraine struck a Shahed drone storage/launch site near Oryol shortly after it opened in December. Construction of the site began in August 2024 and was completed by December.
11/ An analysis of Damage Rating shows that over half of recorded strikes on military facilities and infrastructure caused moderate to low damage. One likely factor, as our team assumes, is the relatively small warhead size of certain Ukrainian drones used in these attacks Image
12/ By 2024, Russian forces were far more adapted than in 2022, when they assumed Ukraine had little capability to strike beyond artillery range. With the introduction of longer-range weapons like HIMARS and Scalp/Storm Shadow, they adjusted, reducing the number of easy targets Image
13/ Regarding the destruction and damage of oil and energy infrastructure such as oil tanks, Ukrainian strikes over the past six months have destroyed 50 reservoirs and damaged another 47 Image
14/ In most cases, both destroyed tanks and visibly damaged storage facilities were never repaired. The only exception is a tank damaged in the January attack on the port of Ust-Luga. The roof of the RVS-30,000, which sustained minor damage, was repaired within a month Image
15/ The largest strike on an oil storage facility in terms of total damage occurred on October 7 in Feodosia (annexed Crimea), where 11 tanks with a total volume of 69,000 cubic meters were destroyed. Our estimates suggest the maximum monetary damage could exceed $37.5 million. Image
16/ If we consider all damaged storage facilities—excluding the rebuilt one—as destroyed, the total damage increases significantly, according to our calculations. Experts suggest that attacks on refineries, rather than strikes on oil depots, cause the most damage to the economy Image
17/ Based on our calculations, the upper limit of direct damage to the Russian economy from Ukrainian strikes over the period is estimated at a conservative $658 million. However, Russia's total revenue from oil exports in 2024 was estimated by the IEA at $189 billion
18/ While the number of Ukrainian strikes in these six months is not enough to turn the tide of the war in Ukraine's favor, the frequency and success rate of strikes are much higher than in 2022 and 2023. War is a nonlinear process and 6 months of observations can be insufficient
19/ Thank you for reading this thread. You can find the full version on our website, which includes a much more detailed analysis, along with methodology, data, expert opinions, and additional details

frontelligence.substack.com/p/melting-the-…
20/ Please consider donating to support our project, as we operate without external funding, allowing us to publish independently. Since we don't have sponsors, you can support us by donating via the BuyMeACoffee service

buymeacoffee.com/frontelligence
21/ I would like to separately thank the @Geoconfirmed team for providing verified data, @kromark for provided satellite images and analysis, and the many experts who gave their expert opinions, including @KofmanMichael
22/ We would also like to note that RFEL journalist @legal0ve, who worked with us and did an amazing job, is open to job proposals from other news agencies, considering the recent budget cuts that have affected the work of Radio Liberty @RFERL
23/ Thank you again for reading. Please don't forget to like and share the first message of the thread to help with the algorithms

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More from @Tatarigami_UA

Jul 29
Over three days, Ukrainian long-range drone strikes have dealt a tangible logistical blow to a rail line linking the military and industrial hubs of Volgograd and Rostov-on-Don. Preliminary analysis points to the destruction of traction substations and fuel tanks. 🧵Thread: Image
2/ The strikes have repeatedly targeted infrastructure along the rail line, which serves both industry and the supply of Russian forces, including those in Donetsk and Luhansk. The pattern points to a deliberate and systematic effort to disrupt the route Image
3/ Video uploaded by residents of Orlovskiy shows the local traction substation "Dvoynaya", which powers the railway movement, engulfed in flames. We've geolocated the site and assess it's likely to remain temporarily out of service. Coordinates: Image
Read 9 tweets
Jul 28
Units like K-2, Madyar’s Birds, the Lasar Group, and the 3rd Corps stand out as well-organized formations that, through leadership, organization, media savvy, and initiative, have delivered solid results often to the point where their unit presence can shift battlefield dynamics: Image
2/ For all their success, these units are just a small part of Ukraine’s forces. They can’t hold the whole frontline or make up for systemic flaws. Nurturing leaders takes time - they can’t be copied. To extrapolate personal skill into institutional strength , you need a system.
3/ The priority remains systemic reform: to build a military where all units, if not matching the elite few, at least operate within reach of their standards. The Ministry of Defense has made progress since late 2024, but Ukraine is still lagging behind where it needs to be
Read 7 tweets
Jul 27
In June, Reuters reported that North Korea could deploy more troops to Russia as early as July or August to support its war in Ukraine, citing South Korea’s National Intelligence Service and lawmaker Lee Seong-kweun. With July coming to an end, it’s worth revisiting this
2/ According to earlier reports in June and July, an additional 25,000 - 30,000 troops could be deployed, a force roughly equivalent to a military corps. As of late July, there has been no confirmation or evidence of additional North Korean troops near the Ukrainian border.
3/ In exchange for supplying Russia with artillery shells and missiles, North Korea is likely receiving technical assistance on satellite launches and missile guidance systems, Lee Seong-kweun reported back in June, citing the NIS briefing.
Read 9 tweets
Jul 27
Another Ukrainian drone strike inside Russia, likely targeting a railway traction substation in the Volgograd region. The strike caused a visible fire. Some reports mentioned a nearby oil refinery, but our analysis points to the substation. More details in the thread: Image
2/ NASA’s FIRMS system locates the fire in the area where the substation is located, marked by the red rectangle on the map. The governor of Volgograd also stated - due to falling drone debris, power supply to the railway’s network in the Oktyabrsky district has been disruptedImage
3/ The Zhutovo railway traction substation (110/35/27/10 kV) powers the electrified rail line between Volgograd and Kotelnikovo. Disabling it cuts power to electric trains, disrupting traffic along this important logistical route. But what makes it particularly important?
Read 7 tweets
Jul 26
When it comes to the results of Ukrainian strikes deep inside Russia, one of the most asked questions is why Ukrainian drone strikes cause damage that often appears insufficient. The answer lies largely in engineering trade-offs: the balance between range and payload. Thread 🧵: Image
2/ Drones that fly far have to allocate a lot of their weight and space to fuel/batteries, which leaves less room for explosives. Long range also creates aerodynamic issues - to carry more fuel, drones needs to be bigger, which makes them heavier, slower, easier to intercept
3/ Advanced materials and engineering could help mitigate these limitations, but such solutions often dramatically increase costs and reduce scalability, which are critical factors in a war of attrition. And even high-end drones remain vulnerable to simple and cheap air defense
Read 8 tweets
Jul 26
In the early morning of July 26th, multiple videos surfaced showing a UAV strike on the Russian "Signal" radio plant in Stavropol. Our team has conducted a preliminary BDA assessment and gathered key context on the facility’s role in Russia’s military production. 🧵Thread: Image
2/ The factory is located roughly 500 km from the area under Ukrainian control. The strike targeted one of its production facilities, around the 2nd and 3rd floor. The building appears to have avoided critical structural damage, though localized fires were reported Image
3/ The facility serves both military and civilian sectors. In recent decades, Signal has been involved in a range of defense and industrial projects. Notably, it supplied cathodic protection equipment for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran. Image
Read 11 tweets

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