How #Ukraine 🇺🇦 is planning to stop #Russia 🇷🇺 in #Donetsk Oblast', once and for all.
A strategical frontline and fortification works assessment for the month of March 2025.
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After extremely tough fighting, and tactical counterattacks and disruptions, the Ukrainians were able to finally mostly stabilize the contact line along most of the Donets'k's front and extinguish the most dangerous Russian offensives for the Pokrovs'k - Myrnohrad agglomeration.
Seeing this, Russia decided to shift its focus elsewhere, especially concentrating on the Uspenivka - Rozlyv axis.
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Russia coupled the shift in their area of activity with the utilization of the armor they have likely been stockpiling for some time (Russia is suffering from a serious lack of armor all along the frontlines), and broke through on a mechanized assault to Bohdanivka. They were denied consolidation only thanks to massive efforts by the involved brigades.
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The situation on the Bahatyr axis is also hot: while the Ukrainians are still clinging on to Andriivka and Kostyantynopil', the Russians shifted again their attention further south at Rozlyv. For the past week they have been running into the village and gaining footholds in basements, before flooding into even more and this way capturing the village. After those 3 villages, Russia will immediately attack Bahatyr from the south and south-east, this way cutting the Bahatyr - Velyka Novosilka road, and try to gain a foothold on the heights north of Oleksiivka. This way they will trap the Ukrainians in the valley between Bahatyr and Oleksiivka, just like near Andriivka.
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About the Kotlyne salient.
The Uspenivka sector remains highly dynamic. The Russians are trying to capture it, but they're denied this by constant Ukrainian counterattacks. As of now they're trying the "alternative" way of bypassing it from the south. At the moment the Ukrainians are trying fiercely to dislodge the Russians that have gained a foothold in Novooleksandrivka. Fighting is ongoing.
About Udachne, the Russians sometimes try to advance from the VPS-1 mine westwards, but they're denied access to Udachne's residential area.
In Kotlyne, the situation is as dynamic in the VPS-2 mine as is in the part of the village south of the railway. Fighting continues.
Same for Pishchane. Intense fighting is ongoing for the VPS-3 mine and Pishchane itself. The Russians are also trying to bypass the settlement by attacking Zvirove and a trench system behind Pishchane.
In Shevchenko, the Russians were able to recapture everything but the north-easternmost outskirts, where a Ukrainian presence is still registered.
Russian offensives with unknown levels of successes are also reported near Novoukrayinka further east.as it
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Let's speak numbers.
Despite heightened numbers of Russian attacks every day, their gains continue to decrease every month. In March, Russia captured only 133 km^2 according to DeepState, compared to the 730 km^2 captured in November 2024. Moreover, for every hour that Russia does not make progress near the agglomeration, Ukraine has more time to strengthen its defenses there, which we will analyze in depth in this thread.
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Let's look at the area from another point of view.
Every blue line represents a solid defensive line that could've been used by Ukraine to delay Russia by weeks. Can you see where I'm going with this? Many, many exceptionally good lines were lost in the past year, often without fighting. Now Ukraine is forced to fortify itself on worse lines, often in the middle of random fields, which causes many unnecessary casualties. That is, the Ukrainians could've made command reforms much, much earlier, and by now Russia would've probably still been stuck at the Selydove - Novohrodivka - Hrodivka line.
As you can see, though, there are still a lot of tough nuts that Russia will have to crack if it wants to capture the agglomeration.
Now, the interesting part. Let's see how the Ukrainians adapted these lines and dug on them.
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Dark blue: trenches dug in March
Red: trenches dug before March
This month, the Ukrainians decided to "get serious" in terms of trenches. We arrived at the conclusion that the Ukrainians have completely switched to digging smaller, but more numerous and better equipped Slovyanka-styled trenches. This is happening all along Ukraine. In particular, in this direction we can easily see that the most active areas were Mezhova and Demuryne. In both areas we can see that the Ukrainians dug a lot of new trench systems. East of Novopidhorodne, for example, there are tens of systems on every single treeline for kilometers, while the Demuryne - Havrylivka line was incredibly upgraded, with dozens of new systems stretching all the way from Mykolaivka to Havrylivka.
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Orange: anti-tank ditches dug in March
Yellow: anti-tank ditches dug before March
In front of the trench systems belonging to the Demuryne line, Ukraine has dug a massive anti tank ditch stretching the same distance as the trench systems. Moreover, Novopavlivka is in the process of being encircled by a ditch, while many, many more anti-tank ditches are being dug north of Pokrovs'k at the Hryshyne line. Serious activity is also registered west of Kostyantynivka. This is to correlate with the Russian threats of capturing ground west of the city from the Vozdvyzhenka and Torets'k salients.
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Here's a new, peculiar strategy adopted by Ukraine all along this sector of the country's frontlines: double and triple ditches and dragon's teeth lines.
Personally, I'm against this, as I see this as a failure by Ukraine to recognize changes in Russia's strategies. That is, excavators are being utilized to dig anti-vehicle ditches, but Russia is using vehicles less and less. Instead, I think trenches should be prioritized, especially in contrast to not only extensive ditch lines, but also to triple anti-tank ditches.
Perhaps, they have something else in plan. Time will tell.
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Dark blue: dragon's teeth placed in March
Light blue: dragon's teeth placed before March
The most notable changes in the dragon's teeth layer that I applied in March were, as expected after the trenches and the anti-tank ditches in front of Demuryne, a dragon's teeth line belonging to the same defensive line. Moreover, a line was placed just meters in front of the anti-tank ditch right on the Dnipropetrovs'k - Donets'k Oblast' borders, which is not a very common occurrence. Activity, as was for the ditches, is also registered north of Pokrovs'k, and, even more, west of Kostyantynivka.
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Black: barbed wire placed in March
Gray: barbed wire placed before March
These pictures nicely tell about the part of the Ukrainian military that recognized correctly the situation at the front and promptly adapted. To counter increased Russian infantry usage, Novopavlivka's southern entrance is now protected by a barbed wire line, the line of the Demuryne defense node was also enlarged, as well as the lines near Novooleksandrivka, west of Uspenivka. The Ukrainians also continue actively placing north of Pokrovs'k, exploiting gained time because of the Russian inability to secure Kotlyne and Udachne, important bridgeheads north of the Pokrovs'k - Mezhova railway.
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General view of the whole Pokrovs'k - Chasiv Yar section of the frontline. The pictures are high-resolution, zooming in is encouraged.
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In conclusion, we can conclude, analyzing the most prominent Ukrainian fortification efforts, that the Ukrainians, even if their counterattacks are constantly registered, are preparing for a retreat to the solid and stronger light blue line.
Ukraine has been able to adapt its strategies, not falling behind Russian dynamism, and, most importantly, to enact scaled reforms on their command structure. Furthermore, the Ukrainians exhausted Russian potential on some of their most strategically dangerous areas of advance and Russian stockpiles of armored equipment.
This is why I view, considered fully the current situation regarding available resources to Russia and the internal and military situation of Ukraine, impossible for Russian forces to capture the Pokrovs'k - Myrnohrad agglomeration up to the medium-term.
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Here's the end of this thread! If you learned something new, consider reposting this analysis and following me on my Telegram channel (t.me/PlayfraOSINT), where I will also post some of my personal thoughts and, obviously, analyses.
Thanks for reading, and have a great rest of the day/night 🫡
You might've noticed that I "disappeared" for 2-3 weeks or so. This was unfortunately due to an increase in the load of material regarding my studies. I also exploited this time to take some kind of break, whilst still trying my best to update, at least, the trenchmap. But, as my "break" is over now, I have no more excuses! I will, as such, be much, much more active in the spring, and especially the summer months this year, when I will have a ton more free time. Stay tuned!
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About the recent severe worsening of the situation in #Siversk: events that led to this and information from the field.
Unfortunately, in the last 2 weeks, after more than 3 years of effective defense of the sector by Ukrainian units, Russian forces made significant progress in the Siversk direction and in the city itself.
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The main unit commanding the city's defense is the very experienced 54th Mechanized Brigade (with battalion "K-2" drones "Sky Fury").
Because of the gradual prioritization of other directions and the de-prioritization of more dormant and/or stable ones like Siversk, the Ukrainian command has not allocated any big amount of resources to the Brigade in the last months, or even years, choosing to distribute them in more critical sectors instead. As such, because of slow attrition, manpower and other needs of the brigade were not replenished at a sufficient rate, making it slowly become severely understaffed in manpower up to today.
Taking advantage of this, recently the Russian command finally reinforced the sector with new brigades, adding them to the ones made up of terrible-quality DPR and LPR forces, which severely impeded any progress on their part in the last years, among other reasons.
1/🧵Uspenivka sector, Pokrovske front, according to information from the field. Short update thread.
In the last few days, the situation, finally, significantly improved for Ukrainian forces after the transfer of the reinforcements I talked about here ().
After a period of generally large successes in this sector, in the last days Russian forces have been suffering a lot in wounded and dead servicemen, and, while further north near Vyshneve fast advancements are still recorded, they factually didn't advance by a meter near Uspenivka in recent days (the orange polygon you see is a correction, and DeepState updates are being published with a delay and generally diminish Russian gains here).
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Until now, the Russians advanced well to Uspenivka, effectively exploiting the very well-built Ukrainian trenches (that were simply abandoned by Ukraine) to accumulate their own manpower and transfer it without Ukrainian FPV threat. Once they reached the Yanchur river, it was imperative for them to force it immediately to exploit an almost complete lack of any Ukrainian organized defense effort, but to do this it was essential to secure the farm at 47.770945, 36.454224 (east of Novomykolaivka), and the small part of Novomykolaivka located east of the Yanchur river (1 single line of houses) at 47.771161, 36.447422.
🇺🇦⚔️🇷🇺 Day 1300, comprehensive frontline and rear situation report: territorial changes, trends, strategies and objectives of both sides, fortifications.
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Zaporizhzhia Oblast', Stepnohirsk sector.
Russian forces continue offensive operations in the sector, despite generally low media coverage.
The Russians gather up in Plavni's center to move through the gray zone to northern Plavni, and accumulate there. After this, they try to move into southern Prymorske, but are eliminated in the accumulation phase or cleared out by frequent Ukrainian infantry raids.
The Russians also often try to move through the kill zone in the fields north of Kamyanske, but the area is open enough for Ukrainian drone operators to control well and eliminate any movement, causing high casualties to the Russians.
Further northeast, the Russians constantly attempt to move into the 3rd microdistrict. This is because the district is composed of still mostly intact high rise buildings, that can be used for a safer accumulation for further assault operations.
From the 3rd microdistrict, the Russians seem to prefer attacking Ahrarna St. in southern Stepnohirsk.
Because of this predictability, the Ukrainians are zeroed in and constantly counterattack with all fire methods available.
Because of little successes evidenced after trying to take Stepnohirsk head-on, the Russians are slowly shifting their attention eastwards. An accumulation is recorded northeast of Kamyanske in the indicated area.
In general, the Ukrainians seem to be effectively holding the borders, combining fire damage with active defense, and achieving a favorable ratio of casualties with the Russian side. Russian successes here, at the moment, are not significant in any way.
White = trenches
Yellow = ditches
Blue = dragon's teeth
Gray = barbed wire
In the Uspenivka sector, Russian forces are advancing through vast rural areas. The Ukrainians can do little to nothing to counter this because of the almost total lack of manpower in this particular direction, that has not seen activity since 2022, and from which many units were transferred to other areas deemed more critical.
The trenches you see in this direction are either empty, because of the critical lack of men to man them, or unused, because they are outdated relative to drone warfare, as they are situated in the middle of fields and uncovered.
At the moment, fighting is ongoing for Olhivske, and Russian forces came close to Novoivanivka, for which fighting will likely soon start.
A bit north, after the capture of Zaporizke without much resistance, the village of Novomykolaivka was captured soon after. Russian forces are expected to continue along this small valley to Kalynivske, which suffered heavy FAB bombardments last week.
Near fortified Berezove, Russian forces decided to bypass both this village and Ternove, seemingly after encountering resistance, and advanced significantly between the 2 villages in the treelines.
This forced the Ukrainians to retreat from Ternove, for which fighting is ongoing, in favor of some outdated fortifications just north of it, which, as said multiple times, provide only an extremely small advantage.
Lyman and the 3rd battle for the city at 5km on the horizon.
Russian 🇷🇺 plans, Ukrainian 🇺🇦 defenses, logistics, and what's next.
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Lyman is a medium-sized town located in the northern corner of Donetsk Oblast' and counted about 20,000 inhabitants in 2022.
Immediately after the start of the invasion, while the Russians were able to advance with almost no resistance in Luhansk and eastern Kharkiv Oblasts, they encountered very strong resistance in Donetsk Oblast' along strong and prepared defensive lines, reinforced for 8 years since 2014.
Nonetheless, after being pushed out of northern Ukraine and having scaled down their plans to capture Ukrainian-controlled Donbas, the Russians immediately recognized the importance of precisely 2 cities to reach their goals: the cities of Lyman and Izyum.
Control over these two cities allowed the Russians to pose an extremely serious threat to Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, the two "capitals" of Ukrainian-controlled Donbas, from the northeast and northwest.
Old "panic fortifications" built facing westwards from Slovyansk and Kramatorsk can still be easily found to this day, proving this strong problem that the Ukrainians faced.
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In August 2022, in fact, the Ukrainians started a small scale "preparation"counteroffensive south of Izyum, with the likely aim of pushing the Russians back to the Siversky Donets river, to strenghten Donbas' northern flank.
Just a month later, the successful September 2022 counteroffensive started exactly in this general sector, with the aim of reaching the Oskil river to finally secure the Donbas, understanding that a frontal attack was already impossible at this time and that the flanks were their only vulnerability.
Izyum city was recaptured on September 12th with almost no Russian resistance, and Lyman on October 1st, with the Russians retreating disorganizedly and with losses under threat of encirclement to Zarichne.
Summing everything, in total the project took about 2 weeks of mapping, or about 30 hours if I hadn't stopped (haven't counted exactly, that's an estimate).
In the project is included just about everything:
- Trenches visible from updated satellite imagery ESRI
- World War 2 trenches and emplacements
- Singular foxholes
- Invisible trench systems under foliage, only visible through Planet imagery
- Dragon's teeth obstacles
The covered area goes from the village of Torske to Kreminna, totaling 175 km².
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This thread won't really be a standard one, but rather some sort of "gallery" with photos and descriptions of different kinds of interesting things I found in the forest and the trenches dug in it.
The Zolotyi Kolodyaz catastrophe. For whoever is asking "what the hell", "why" and "how".
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This thread will be more raw than the others. No sugarcoating, 101% objectivity.
As discussed in my previous thread, there are multiple reasons for this breakthrough, the main of which are:
- completely inadequate command
- sheer amount of Russian resources that were committed
- Ukrainian disorganization
- New Russian mobile groups that simply bypass scattered Ukrainian resistance points.
This breakthrough was NOT opened because of 1 reason in particular, but all of them.
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The main tactic of the Russians in this direction is almost completely based on infantry, very likely with motorized "attachments" like bikes and motorcycles. No mechanized component was noticed.
At the moment, according to my information, the breakthrough is packed full of Russian foot infantry, who are accumulating, we can easily guess, without any type of Ukrainian resistance, and then, with the same amount of resistance, simply walking or having a motorcycle ride to new positions further north.