...and logisticians required to operate a global supply chain of military equipment.
This shift was a geographic and technological artifact of the Post-Cold War world where DHL/FedEx/UPS operated wide body cargo jets...
2/
...from the USA & Europe allowing same-day and next day shipping with electronic inventory systems tracking weapons systems modules.
As long as there were enough modules/sub-systems for "plug & play" to cover usage, 2-level maintenance works.
3/
This kinda-sorta pretend worked in the 2010's, then reality caught up.
The DoD signed long term fixed contracts with defense contractors to support 2-level maintenance at expected levels of usage.
4/
Two level maintenance was the Defense Department contracting out of most military maintenance work to civilian contractors like Silicon Valley tech bros did with India.
The F-35 fighter jet is a two level maintenance weapons system like the Littoral Combat Ship.
5/
The killer issues that make two level maintenance non-viable in reality are forecast maintenance usage models and Congress.
The maintenance usage models Defense contractors use are never right, usually very low,
6/
...and Congress never funds long term contracts which makes any contractor forecast utter rubbish.
The longer the amount of time from when the contract was signed, the worse it gets.
This leaves the DoD without enough modules to operate equipment...
7/
...and without skilled maintainers who can scrounge together weapons systems from scrap like the USMC did with OV-10 Bronco aircraft in the Vietnam demobilization era.
8/
The Post-Cold War dysfunction of Western military procurement scares the heck out of me.
The primary issue with Western military acquisition is having far too many decision processes involved with fielding equipment in the age of 3D/AM drones.
9/
At its most speedy, it takes 11 months for the US Army to get to the RFP/IEP procurement stage.
Ukraine is fielding drones with improved E.W. updates at about a two week cycle rate since mid-2023.
Military defeat lives in that time difference.
10/10
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Since the Russian NWF has run out of stored Western hard currency.
This means that any hard currency Russia uses for its war effort, such as on Chinese high tech electronics for missiles, has to come from their sales of oil and natural gas.
These implications are issues about sharing with the gangster oligarchs forming Putin's regime, as Prigozhin's Wagner mercenary revolt underlined.
Russia's gangster oligarchs use violence to settle..."sharing disputes."
2/
The Russo-Ukrainian War is now very bad for the gangster oligarchs businesses as it involved sharing oil income where a Russian State Budget was planned for the _PROFITS_ from $70 a barrel oil with costs at $35-$40 a barrel.
In the skies over Afghanistan, air power migrated to persistent killbox interdiction model with B-1 and B-52 as orbiting platforms to get engagement cycle times under 5 minutes for laser & GPS guided bombs.
2/
Drones in Ukraine are producing similar persistent killbox interdiction effects, but are a tier down the firepower food chain, three tiers down in cost and five in terms of retail granularity, AKA hunting individual soldiers as targets.
US Army would have to shut down and merge part or all of the Field Artillery, Air Defense, Aviation, Military Intelligence and Signals branches into a new drone branch to organizationally adapt to drones.
Russian railway repair trains derailing was one of the major phase change events I've been looking for in the story of the collapse via the capital rundown of the Russian railways engines & rolling stock.
In particular, the downstream from the cut off of Western cassette rail bearings that last ~2 million km % (5.25 years of normal service) in April 2022 from Russian engines and rolling stock should be showing up in increased derailments.