(1/10) 🧵
My latest analysis on CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong’s Possible Downfall, published by @ChinaBriefJT:
He Weidong’s Possible Downfall and Xi’s Trust Deficit with the PLA
I analyze the possible reasons behind He Weidong’s investigation and provide examples of key generals who were promoted during his tenure as CMC Vice Chairman but were later investigated and removed from their positions.
I argue that Xi Jinping may have lost trust in He Weidong’s ability to continue managing the PLA's personnel. I also compare the situation regarding the removal of Central Organization Department head Li Ganjie, which indicates Xi Jinping’s dissatisfaction with personnel management in the Party, government, and military.
jamestown.org/program/he-wei…
My latest analysis on CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong’s Possible Downfall, published by @ChinaBriefJT:
He Weidong’s Possible Downfall and Xi’s Trust Deficit with the PLA
I analyze the possible reasons behind He Weidong’s investigation and provide examples of key generals who were promoted during his tenure as CMC Vice Chairman but were later investigated and removed from their positions.
I argue that Xi Jinping may have lost trust in He Weidong’s ability to continue managing the PLA's personnel. I also compare the situation regarding the removal of Central Organization Department head Li Ganjie, which indicates Xi Jinping’s dissatisfaction with personnel management in the Party, government, and military.
jamestown.org/program/he-wei…
(2/10)
As reported by @Dimi on @FT, He Weidong was removed from his post, according to five sources familiar with the matter.
ft.com/content/8226e1…
One public signal of his removal was his absence from the Central Conference on Work Related to Neighboring Countries (中央周边工作会议), where all other Politburo members and Central Military Commission (CMC) members were present.
As reported by @Dimi on @FT, He Weidong was removed from his post, according to five sources familiar with the matter.
ft.com/content/8226e1…
One public signal of his removal was his absence from the Central Conference on Work Related to Neighboring Countries (中央周边工作会议), where all other Politburo members and Central Military Commission (CMC) members were present.
(3/10)
Two details make the alleged investigation into He Weidong seem unusual.
The first is his apparent loyalty to Xi Jinping. His loyalty can be inferred from public statements he has made, particularly his references to the "CMC Chairperson Responsibility System" (军委主席负责制)—a slogan emphasizing Xi’s total control over the military—during his remarks at the Two Sessions. He Weidong has consistently used this phrase since joining the CMC in 2023, but other CMC members have not invoked this phrase as frequently as he has.
This sets He apart from many other senior generals on the CMC and demonstrates a high degree of public loyalty to Xi, a loyalty that likely led Xi to trust him enough to promote him to his current position.
Two details make the alleged investigation into He Weidong seem unusual.
The first is his apparent loyalty to Xi Jinping. His loyalty can be inferred from public statements he has made, particularly his references to the "CMC Chairperson Responsibility System" (军委主席负责制)—a slogan emphasizing Xi’s total control over the military—during his remarks at the Two Sessions. He Weidong has consistently used this phrase since joining the CMC in 2023, but other CMC members have not invoked this phrase as frequently as he has.
This sets He apart from many other senior generals on the CMC and demonstrates a high degree of public loyalty to Xi, a loyalty that likely led Xi to trust him enough to promote him to his current position.
(4/10)
The second unusual detail is the severity of He Weidong’s suspected investigation, which appears to surpass that of Li Shangfu and Miao Hua.
For example, part of Li Shangfu’s investigation was conducted publicly, including a public call for leads. Miao Hua, despite missing the Two Sessions, reappeared to participate in an annual tree planting event on April 1, 2024, before being suspended later that year.
In contrast, there has been no public information regarding He’s case, and he was absent from this year’s tree planting event.
The second unusual detail is the severity of He Weidong’s suspected investigation, which appears to surpass that of Li Shangfu and Miao Hua.
For example, part of Li Shangfu’s investigation was conducted publicly, including a public call for leads. Miao Hua, despite missing the Two Sessions, reappeared to participate in an annual tree planting event on April 1, 2024, before being suspended later that year.
In contrast, there has been no public information regarding He’s case, and he was absent from this year’s tree planting event.
(5/10)
A loss of trust in He Weidong’s ability to manage the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) generals is the primary reason Xi may have removed him. He Weidong’s responsibilities likely included overseeing political affairs and discipline. However, under his management, the number of PLA generals investigated or removed for disciplinary violations or other legal breaches since the 20th Party Congress has been notably high.
Many of the affected generals were promoted to key positions during He’s tenure, raising concerns about the personnel management and promotion system he oversaw. For example, Deputy Commander of the Central Theater Command, Li Zhizhong (李志忠), and Commander of the Southern Theater Command Navy, Li Pengcheng (李鹏程), were both promoted to lieutenant general or vice admiral during He’s tenure. However, both were later removed from their posts and are under investigation.
A loss of trust in He Weidong’s ability to manage the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) generals is the primary reason Xi may have removed him. He Weidong’s responsibilities likely included overseeing political affairs and discipline. However, under his management, the number of PLA generals investigated or removed for disciplinary violations or other legal breaches since the 20th Party Congress has been notably high.
Many of the affected generals were promoted to key positions during He’s tenure, raising concerns about the personnel management and promotion system he oversaw. For example, Deputy Commander of the Central Theater Command, Li Zhizhong (李志忠), and Commander of the Southern Theater Command Navy, Li Pengcheng (李鹏程), were both promoted to lieutenant general or vice admiral during He’s tenure. However, both were later removed from their posts and are under investigation.
(6/10)
The most serious case may be that of Tang Yong (唐勇). Like He Weidong (and the recently purged Miao Hua), Tang served in the Nanjing Military Region from the 1990s to the 2000s. In December 2023, Tang was promoted to lieutenant general and became the Deputy Secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission. His appointment raised suspicions due to the unusual treatment of his predecessor, Chen Guoqiang (陈国强). The subsequent promotion of Tang Yong could be seen as an attempt to place a trusted ally in charge of a key position within the military discipline apparatus. This appearance of factionalism and favoritism—whether valid or not—may have caused Xi Jinping to lose trust in He Weidong.
The most serious case may be that of Tang Yong (唐勇). Like He Weidong (and the recently purged Miao Hua), Tang served in the Nanjing Military Region from the 1990s to the 2000s. In December 2023, Tang was promoted to lieutenant general and became the Deputy Secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission. His appointment raised suspicions due to the unusual treatment of his predecessor, Chen Guoqiang (陈国强). The subsequent promotion of Tang Yong could be seen as an attempt to place a trusted ally in charge of a key position within the military discipline apparatus. This appearance of factionalism and favoritism—whether valid or not—may have caused Xi Jinping to lose trust in He Weidong.
(7/10)
The revocation of Tang’s membership in the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the PRC’s top political advisory body, could be one indication of this. Tang has likely been removed from his position, as another lieutenant general, Zhou Jianxin (周建新), recently attended a National Inspection Work Conference (全国巡视工作会议) that Tang had previously attended.
The revocation of Tang’s membership in the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the PRC’s top political advisory body, could be one indication of this. Tang has likely been removed from his position, as another lieutenant general, Zhou Jianxin (周建新), recently attended a National Inspection Work Conference (全国巡视工作会议) that Tang had previously attended.
(8/10)
Xi Jinping's dissatisfaction with high-ranking officials in charge of personnel management extends beyond the PLA. On April 2, reports surfaced that the former head of the Central Organization Department, Li Ganjie (李干杰), and the former head of the United Front Work Department, Shi Taifeng (石泰峰), were publicly reassigned to each other’s positions. This change occurred amid ongoing corruption issues across the Party and government, suggesting that the switch may have been driven by Li Ganjie’s inability to effectively manage personnel.
The announcement on April 8 that Li Gang (李刚), the head of the Central Organization Department’s Discipline Inspection and Supervision Group, is under investigation further supports this theory—Li Gang has only been in this role since January 2024. Disciplinary oversight in the Central Organization Department is an enormously sensitive portfolio, yet it was assigned to someone with a corruption issue under Li Ganjie’s leadership.
Xi Jinping's dissatisfaction with high-ranking officials in charge of personnel management extends beyond the PLA. On April 2, reports surfaced that the former head of the Central Organization Department, Li Ganjie (李干杰), and the former head of the United Front Work Department, Shi Taifeng (石泰峰), were publicly reassigned to each other’s positions. This change occurred amid ongoing corruption issues across the Party and government, suggesting that the switch may have been driven by Li Ganjie’s inability to effectively manage personnel.
The announcement on April 8 that Li Gang (李刚), the head of the Central Organization Department’s Discipline Inspection and Supervision Group, is under investigation further supports this theory—Li Gang has only been in this role since January 2024. Disciplinary oversight in the Central Organization Department is an enormously sensitive portfolio, yet it was assigned to someone with a corruption issue under Li Ganjie’s leadership.
(9/10)
Why did the purge of personnel managers only occur after the 20th Party Congress, and not before?
During the 18th Party Congress, Xi’s control over personnel was limited. After the 19th Party Congress in 2017, his confidants took on key roles, including Chen Xi (陈希) as head of the Organization Department and Zhang Youxia as the vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission in charge of politics. This likely led Xi to treat them with particular favor. However, it was only after the 20th Party Congress that all members of the Politburo Standing Committee came from Xi Jinping’s faction.
With no non-Xi figures such as Li Keqiang (李克强) remaining in the top leadership, Xi likely felt that personnel arrangements could be made without resistance, avoiding compromises that could lead to lingering issues. Therefore, Xi Jinping may view the ongoing personnel management problems within the Party, government, and military systems after the 20th Party Congress as stemming from what he perceives as incompetence from He Weidong and Li Ganjie. Additionally, He and Li do not share the same special relationship with Xi Jinping as Chen Xi and Zhang Youxia, allowing Xi to remove them from their positions without concerns about personal ties.
Why did the purge of personnel managers only occur after the 20th Party Congress, and not before?
During the 18th Party Congress, Xi’s control over personnel was limited. After the 19th Party Congress in 2017, his confidants took on key roles, including Chen Xi (陈希) as head of the Organization Department and Zhang Youxia as the vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission in charge of politics. This likely led Xi to treat them with particular favor. However, it was only after the 20th Party Congress that all members of the Politburo Standing Committee came from Xi Jinping’s faction.
With no non-Xi figures such as Li Keqiang (李克强) remaining in the top leadership, Xi likely felt that personnel arrangements could be made without resistance, avoiding compromises that could lead to lingering issues. Therefore, Xi Jinping may view the ongoing personnel management problems within the Party, government, and military systems after the 20th Party Congress as stemming from what he perceives as incompetence from He Weidong and Li Ganjie. Additionally, He and Li do not share the same special relationship with Xi Jinping as Chen Xi and Zhang Youxia, allowing Xi to remove them from their positions without concerns about personal ties.
(10/10)
He Weidong’s likely downfall poses a deeper personnel problem for Xi, however. Within the PLA, only Zhang Youxia shares He Weidong’s rank; Miao Hua is under investigation; and Zhang Shengmin does not hold a Central Committee position. No one else would likely have the sufficient rank and experience to take on He’s role and manage PLA personnel effectively.
He Weidong’s likely downfall poses a deeper personnel problem for Xi, however. Within the PLA, only Zhang Youxia shares He Weidong’s rank; Miao Hua is under investigation; and Zhang Shengmin does not hold a Central Committee position. No one else would likely have the sufficient rank and experience to take on He’s role and manage PLA personnel effectively.
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