(1/10) 🧵
My latest analysis on CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong’s Possible Downfall, published by @ChinaBriefJT:
He Weidong’s Possible Downfall and Xi’s Trust Deficit with the PLA

I analyze the possible reasons behind He Weidong’s investigation and provide examples of key generals who were promoted during his tenure as CMC Vice Chairman but were later investigated and removed from their positions.

I argue that Xi Jinping may have lost trust in He Weidong’s ability to continue managing the PLA's personnel. I also compare the situation regarding the removal of Central Organization Department head Li Ganjie, which indicates Xi Jinping’s dissatisfaction with personnel management in the Party, government, and military.

jamestown.org/program/he-wei… (2/10)
As reported by @Dimi on @FT, He Weidong was removed from his post, according to five sources familiar with the matter.
ft.com/content/8226e1…

One public signal of his removal was his absence from the Central Conference on Work Related to Neighboring Countries (中央周边工作会议), where all other Politburo members and Central Military Commission (CMC) members were present.

(1/5) My latest analysis for the @ChinaMaritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the U.S. @NavalWarCollege:

CMSI Note 13: PLA Navy Enhances Realistic Combat Training – Observations of PLA Navy Operations Around Taiwan

digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/13/

Chinese military activities around Taiwan in the first two months of 2025 indicate that the PLA is intensifying its realistic combat training in the region. This trend closely aligns with the PLA’s emphasis in recent years on leveraging peacetime interactions with foreign forces to achieve training objectives—a practice it refers to as “using the enemy to train the troops.”

Special thanks to @ChrisHSharman and @rdmartinson88 for helping elevate this analysis! @supbrow @OlliSuorsa @AUJ_Ang @BonnieGlaser @CollinSLKoh @AndrewSErickson @GordianKnotRay @michaelturton @BrianTHart @heguisen @brianhioe @peter_dutton @JaimeOcon1 @BassiJustin @DAlexBlumenthal @BethanyAllenEbr @_JakubJanda @jesusfroman @alessionaval @Julia_Famularo @WarintheFuture @ianellisjones @Ian_M_Easton @JosephHDempsey @MeiaNouwens @VeerleNouwens @R_Schulenburg @ZackCooper @mike_mazza @DefenceProf @DrMichaelJGreen @jacobstokes @DerekJGrossman @AlexLuck9 @WMatthewsChina @lylegoldstein @type36512 @Erik_Green8 @paramilipic @WilliamYang120 @OfficialBen_L @MasaNIDS @TangAnZhu @Dr_M_Davis @IBKardon @osmastro @LyleJMorris

(1/4) This is the 2nd time this year that the total number of detected PLA aircraft has exceeded 30, meeting @rcdatw's definition of a Peak Incursion. This trend is similar to the patterns observed in 2023 and 2024.

@OlliSuorsa @AUJ_Ang @AndrewSErickson @alessionaval @JaimeOcon1

https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1889117151702691863

(2/4) In @ChinaBriefJT's article, we pointed out that Peak Incursions place an unusually high level of pressure on Taiwan’s Air Force.

jamestown.org/program/milita…

(1/6) January 12, 2025
Weekly Update on PLA Activities in the Waters and Airspace Around Taiwan based on @MoNDefense's data.
Also, RCDA is expected to publish an analysis on the military implications of the 2024 trends in the coming days. @rcdatw (2/6)
RCDA's analysis of the PLA Navy and Air Force's joint combat readiness patrols around Taiwan in 2024, published on @Diplomat_APAC:
thediplomat.com/2024/12/the-ov…

(1/7) Did Joint Sword-2024C happen?

RCDA’s Director Chengkun Ma and I published an article on @ChinaBriefJT, titled: "Instead of Joint Sword-2024C, PLA Intensifies Winter Naval Training."
jamestown.org/program/instea… (2/7) The number of PLA aircraft sorties crossing the median line was significantly lower than during previous exercises, especially as the sorties approaching Taiwan's 24nm each day numbered only 1, 8, and 6, respectively.