The CO of the top scoring Buk [Nato designation SA-11 Gadfly] battery in the PSU did an interview ~2 years ago (early 2023).
He said they used their own Mavic drones to check that their camouflage and
Zoltan Dani & A2/AD doctrine🧵 1/
...that their battery concealment was good enough to fool Russian drones.
So, the PSU does a drone quality assurance check on its camo during the "hide" phase of the hide-shoot-scoot cycle, AKA you have to survive in order to have the opportunity to shoot enough to become the highest scoring SAM battery.
In contrast, the Russian VKS parks their missile TELARs in the middle of a field to get maximum obstacle clearance and range. Then they are shocked when hit by deep strike assault drone or GMLRS rocket.
During Operation Allied Force, Col. Zoltan Dani's SA-3 Battery's survival forced _EVERY_ NATO air mission to require a SEAD package, fly high degrading dumb bomb accuracy, and trade bomb payload for ECM pods and addition fuel tanks to try and fly around suspected SAM sites.
Making air power limit itself to high altitudes in strike packages scaled to available SEAD assets (Jamming planes and radar hunting sensor equipped HARM missile shooters) or to "platinum bullet" standoff munitions that can be defeated by electronic warfare, decoys and multispectral smoke, denies airpower the ability to achieve local air superiority, let alone uncontested air supremacy.
6/
Ukraine's PSU - remembering Serb Col. Zoltan Dani's 1999 tactics - knows air defense survival is the first step accomplishing its mission of preventing Russian air power from doing its mission.
Air Defense survival is the real heart of Anti-Area Access denial (A2/AD) doctrine used by Russia, China and Ukraine.
[We know Ukrainian doctrine, we can infer PLA doctrine, Russian A2/AD doctrine, as executed in Ukraine, seems non-existent in practice or ad hoc at best via local ADA leadership.
Soviet Cold War A2/AD doctrine is the ancestor of all three A2/AD doctrines in any case.]
8/
A2/AD is about denying the enemy the use of a volume of airspace, preferably on a persistent basis.
This is done by convincing enemy AF leaders that the risk of entering that airspace is "too high" and that losses of several percent are inevitable.
9/
NB, what is the 'half life' of your strike jet fleet if you are taking daily 1%, 2%, 5% or even 10% losses on average per sortie?
USAF leaders have refused to publicly use exponential decay loss curve graphs for strike jet fleets since the end of the Cold War.🤢🤮
10/
This of course applies both ways - if your US$500M SAM/ABM battery is lost due to incompetence, how long will your IADS last?"
When you concentrate on killing planes like the VKS does, you die.
Lanchester's attrition warfare equations cut both ways in air wars and Russia's catastrophic losses in IADS components from SHORADS up to S-300V4s, S-350s, S-400s, and even S-500s are proof of this.
12/
The AFU has hunted these assets with the full range of tools available from drones, AGM-88s, through Neptun GLCMs, Storm Shadow ALCMs, and ATACMS.
Conversely PSU IADS losses have been remarkably low due to concealment, decoys, movements, and disciplined EMCON."
13/
Ukraine took the Soviet era IADS doctrine that the Col Zoltan Dani used so well, and supercharged it with technique, tactics and technological improvements.
Conversely Putin's VKS mostly threw-out the Soviet IADS manual, believing that their SAMs were invincible and therefore invulnerable because, Putin era "Russian exceptionalism."
It is a measure of the institutional and professional decay of the US military air services leadership that, while they talk a good show about "A2/AD," they studiously ignore that Col. Zolton Dani's missile battery "hide-shoot-scoot with emissions control cycle" is at the heart of it.
16/
A 1% daily attrition rate of the F-35 fleet in a peer to peer conflict will see a year's production (150) lost in about a month.
However, spending money on reconnaissance & SEAD drones to take losses, and not F-35's, is bad for US flag rank post retirement employment.
17/17 End
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In 2005, the Strategypage -dot- com web site had the following on the downing of an F-117 over Serbia.
These tactic are the heart of Ukrainian IADS doctrine.
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How to Take Down an F-117
November 21, 2005: The Serbian battery commander, whose missiles downed an American F-16, and, most impressively, an F-117, in 1999, has retired, as a colonel, and revealed many of the techniques he used to achieve all this. Colonel Dani Zoltan, in 1999, commanded the 3rd battery of the 250th Missile Brigade. He had search and control radars, as well as a TV tracking unit.
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The battery had four quad launchers for the 21 foot long, 880 pound SA-3 missiles. The SA-3 entered service in 1961 and, while it had undergone some upgrades, was considered a minor threat to NATO aircraft. Zoltan was an example of how an imaginative and energetic leader can make a big difference. While Zoltan’s peers and superiors were pretty demoralized with the electronic countermeasures NATO (especially American) aircraft used to support their bombing missions, he believed he could still turn his ancient missiles into lethal weapons
2/
The list of measures he took, and the results he got, should be warning to any who believe that superior technology alone will provide a decisive edge in combat. People still make a big difference. In addition to shooting down two aircraft, Zoltan’s battery caused dozens of others to abort their bombing missions to escape his unexpectedly accurate missiles. This is how he did it.
The problem for this USN-Taiwan "hellscape strategy" is it's obsolete given that the Chinese have access to Russia's newest generation of FPV interceptor drones to counter it, via using China's "5 times bigger than the rest of the world combined" drone industry & sea militia.
One of the 'benefits' of being a 33 year 3 month vet of the US military procurement enterprise is you are around when the bodies are buried, directly or through people you know.
Such was the case with US Army anti-drone procurement.
This is an email correspondent of mine talking about US Army anti-drone kit testing, prior to 2010, about a competition between two anti-drone contractors --
"The toughest part of detecting drones is figuring out if they're drones or birds.
2/
That was actually the big 'step' they managed.
But, no, the directed pulse did not interfere with their radar. And the test they did they took down seven drones in less than seven seconds at range. 3/
ISIS was using small drones on the 82nd Airborne in Mosul Iraq in 2017.
Pablo Chovil wrote an article for War on the Rocks about his combat experience under ISIS small drone attacks.
2/
About the time Pablo Chovil's article, I was briefing DCMA officials about how a sub-national militant organization printed a 13 drone swarm for less than the cost of a single Hellfire missile and disabled seven jet strike fighters and a helicopter gunship of the VKS. 3/3
A Flight III Burke has the SPY-6(V)1 radar with four active electronically steered antennas (AESA) with 37 RMA radiating elements per face, or 147 RMA elements covering 360 degrees of azimuth.
It has over 6-times the radiated power of the previous generation Aegis radar.
2/
The FFG-62 Constellation has three EASR SPY-6(V)2 radars originally designed for amphibious assault ships and Nimitz-class carriers.