1/ Ukrainians are scamming millions of rubles a day from Russians and directing the proceeds to fund the Ukrainian armed forces, according to Russian investigators. They accuse the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) of being behind the scam operations. ⬇️ 
2/ Russian journalist and warblogger Anastasia Kashevarova has posted on her Telegram channel the results of an investigation by SNOS Call Centre, a group which is dedicated to countering Ukrainian scam operations against Russian citizens.
3/ The scams are said to be organised like regular businesses, complete with offices, employees, HR managers and corporate policies. Kashevarova cites the example of a concern called Strongcall, which operates in Kyiv and several other Ukrainian cities.
4/ According to Kashevarova, employees' salaries depend on how much they manage to scam from Russians, and can reach up to 10,000 hryvnia daily ($239) daily – about half the average monthly salary in Ukraine. Bonuses are paid for the biggest scams.
5/ In one notable case of 'landing a whale', a former Moscow city prosecutor was reportedly scammed out of 20 million rubles ($240,000) by a 15-year-old boy from Zhitomir.
6/ Kashevarova notes that Ukrainians' familiarity with the Russian language – a legacy of 300 years of Russian occupation – is a great advantage for the scammers:
7/ "Often, victims of fraudsters tell our law enforcement officers that they did not suspect anything was wrong because the caller spoke without a Ukrainian accent and was extremely convincing.
8/ "Here again, unfortunately, the established stereotype of call centres as some kind of fly-by-night operations comes into play.
9/ "The same Strongcall regularly holds training sessions with employees: experts, psychologists, and speech therapists teach them to speak with a Russian accent and persuade people from a distance."
10/ According to Kashevarova, proceeds from the scams are sent weekly to support the Ukrainian armed forces. In one notable instance, the prominent 'Two Majors' Telegram channel was scammed out of $18,000 which went to the Ukrainian army instead.
https://x.com/PStyle0ne1/status/1826355152124825757
11/ She says that the scams are part of a wider "criminal syndicate organized under the control of the SBU [Security Service of Ukraine]", and writes:
"An official CRM system for fraud has been created and implemented in Ukraine."
"An official CRM system for fraud has been created and implemented in Ukraine."
12/ "This is a special program in the system of which Ukrainian cyberterrorists receive all the data on the victim, create false documents, know how to behave and what to say so that the victim does not get "off the hook".
13/ "All scripts for communicating with victims are written down to the smallest detail (screenshots 1, 2, [3 – at the top of this thread]).
14/ "By the way, fake subpoenas and other documents on the topic of the SBU are created in these same systems in order to destabilize the situation in the Russian Federation."
15/ Kashevarova likely refers here to incidents where Ukrainian scammers have contacted Russians while pretending to be members of the Russian security forces, and convinced them to carry out arson attacks for the sake of 'testing security'.
https://x.com/osint_69/status/1873254166573007107
16/ "The scripts are constantly changing. Call center employees constantly monitor the Russian information space. As soon as they see that one of their work schemes has been declassified, they change the scenario.
17/ "The most popular and advanced CRM system is called Monstrous. It was created by two Ukrainian citizens and an Indian citizen. They lease their development to call centres.
18/ "In the video (file 4 in the gallery), you can see the employee's personal account in this system, as well as the opportunities it offers to the user.
It keeps track of work calls, and a personal account is created for each "client", that is, a victim.
It keeps track of work calls, and a personal account is created for each "client", that is, a victim.
19/ "You can create a fake ID of an employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (for persuasiveness), a personal account with mobile operators, a check from any Russian bank right in the system. Everything looks very credible.
20/ "Everything is fully automated, very, as they say, user-friendly, you don't have to think at all.
The Chimera bot is attached to this system, which can automatically check almost any person living in the territory of the Russian Federation.
The Chimera bot is attached to this system, which can automatically check almost any person living in the territory of the Russian Federation.
21/ "Also, CRM systems are linked to the Karma bot, it is free for them and has the widest range of services. This is not just a “punch” by phone number, in fact, it is a search engine for Russians, through which you can get a huge layer of information.
22/ "Plus, it is possible to search by criteria, roughly speaking, you can find all men of a certain age with a certain name living in a certain locality. Or find everyone who was born on Friday the 13th.
23/ "Having such detailed information on the victim, Ukrainian cyber fraudsters easily gain trust, pretending to be law enforcement officers who have access to government databases."
24/ Although Kashevarova doesn't mention it, it's very likely that Ukrainian scammers are benefitting from the massive leaks of personal data that have happened in Russia in recent years, either as a result of hacking or of corrupt insiders selling databases.
25/ Kashevarova claims that a key figure in the Ukrainian cyber scam operations is Vladislav Horohorin, a Ukrainian from Donetsk who was imprisoned for cybercrimes in the US before being deported to Russia in February 2017.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladislav…
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladislav…
26/ However, Kashevarova writes, he fell out with the Russian authorities over a Tesla car:
27/ "When he returned to Moscow in 2017, it turned out that his car, a rare Tesla, had been stolen. Law enforcement officers were unable to return it to its owner, so Horohorin took offence at Russia and became a traitor to the Motherland, starting to work for the enemy.
28/ "Now he cooperates with the SBU and is hidden in Kyiv. In Russia, he is wanted under several counts.
He also created the Gorgon "stressor" for performing DDoS attacks against Russian Internet resources.
He also created the Gorgon "stressor" for performing DDoS attacks against Russian Internet resources.
29/ "Previously, it was available for download in the public domain, but after the download sources attracted attention and began to be taken down, they were moved to Tor." /end
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