The war 🇺🇦/🇷🇺 of 2025 has nothing to do anymore with the war of 2022.
The tactics used in 2022 and 2023 are now completely obsolete on the Ukrainian front and new lessons have been learnt.
🧵THREAD🧵1/20 ⬇️
2022 have been the year of large mechanized assaults on big cities, on roads or in the countryside.
After that, the strategy changed to large infantry or mechanized assaults on big trench networks, especially in 2023.
But today, this entire strategy is obsolete. Major defensive systems are being abandoned one after the other.
The immense trench networks have become untenable if they are not properly equipped with covered trenches and dugouts.
The war of 2025 is first a drone war. Without drones, a unit is blind, ineffective, and unable to hold the front.
The drone replaces soldiers in many cases. It is primarily used for two tasks: reconnaissance (which avoids sending soldiers) and multi-level air strikes.
Thus, the drone is a short- and medium-range bomber or a kamikaze, sometimes capable of flying thousands of kilometers, replacing missiles.
Drone production by both armies is immense; we are talking about millions of FPV (kamikaze) drones, with as much munitions used.
It should be noted that to hit a target, several drones are generally required due to electronic jamming.
Each drone is equipped with an RPG-type munition, which is abundant in Eastern Europe. The aerial drone (there are also naval and land versions) has become key on the battlefield.
Now, drones are used individually, to hit every soldier, making them a deadly weapon (more than half, if not more, of WIA/KIA), replacing artillery.
Drones can therefore support or halt an offensive. Any man who isn't hidden is a target.
As we have seen, drones can land on the side of a road and wait for their target, or penetrate confined spaces or houses.
Soldiers must now hide in the foliage or in the basements of houses. Any large enough group of soldiers is quickly spotted, as is a concentration of armored vehicles.
The Russian army has thus switched to 'maximum attrition' mode, recruiting more soldiers and sending small waves of scattered troops to attack Ukrainian positions, often on motorcycles (a form of modern cavalry).
Here between Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka (local breakthrough).
The Ukrainians cannot hold the large defensive works of 2022-2024 and are now building small trenches, more numerous, better camouflaged, and offering a more attractive strategy.
Here is a 2024 trench, 800 meters long and large, no covered positions, no hidden trench in the trees...
Literally useless (it was abandonned).
Compared to 2023, a similar trench was useful because artillery was the main threat and was largely imprecise.
(well known trench near Bakhmut, known for the most difficult battles between Wagner and ukrainian troups).
The priority now is to dig small concealed positions in forest strips : thus, the Russian army will have to clear them all and with the summer folliage, they are hidden.
Only few soldiers can hide inside each, making it more difficult to spot and destroy them.
Here is the new type of fortifications : those trenches will be invisible in few months.
@Playfra0 managed to find some screenshots of those new positions.
Let's analyse each side new strategy :
Russia 🇷🇺 :
-Large mechanized/motorized/civilian vehicle assaults on strongpoints.
-Fast attack layers (bike...)
-More and more attacks, more and more men used.
-Large airstrikes on cities, artillery and drone barrage on positions.
-Less use of armoured vehicles and tanks.
-Fixed artillery position hidden in folliage.
Fast, numerous, supported by bombings
Ukraine 🇺🇦 :
-Massive drone strikes against ennemy
-Artillery and air-strikes in support
-New defensive organisations
-More anti-vehicle obstacles, ditches barbed wire...
-Smaller and more numerous positions
-Small scale counter-attacks
Thus the war of 2025 require new tactics that were not used in 2022. Large mechanized assaults during the day would be unthinkable today (even if it was already the case in 2022-2023).
Both sides changed, and we can see the difference.
Russian forces managed to breakthrough ukrainian positions between Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka, advancing in the undefended territory with bikes and entering the main defensive line.
This could be an important blow if they manage to consolidate their positions.
Thanks for following, i will continue to map ukrainian trench work which is very interesting to understand frontline dynamics and strategies.
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Ukraine's 🇺🇦 mid-range strike campaign against Russian 🇷🇺 logistics continues, with more than 1 350 strikes on trucks and vehicles since early may
Railways, air-defense systems and energy infrastructure is also being hit on a daily basis.
🧵THREAD🧵1/16 ⬇️
Yesterday, @414magyarbirds posted an update about strikes on the key R-280 highway, so called "Novorossia" road between Rostov and Crimea.
On this road alone, I have around 175 geolocalized trucks and vehicles hit since early may.
It is highly likely that the number of trucks and vehicles hit by Ukrainian drones this month will be higher than the previous one, especially since video compilations are much more centralised by the USF.
We should expect a large number of videos for the end of the month.
During the first week of July, Ukraine 🇺🇦 continued to target Russian 🇷🇺 trucks and logistics, hitting more than 240 vehicles, 34 per day.
Despite fewer coverage, these strikes continue to be a very big problem for Russian forces across occupied territories.
🧵THREAD🧵1/8 ⬇️
The number of strikes continue to increase, with nearly 600 trucks and vehicles hit in june 2026 (around 20 per day) and already 240 for the 1st week of july (34 per day).
All these strikes are only the confirmed ones from ukrainian videos, I do not count videos from the ground.
Today, the Ukrainian army of drones () published a compilation of nearly 200 strikes on trucks and vehicles near Crimea.
This video covers multiple units work for the 1st week of July. The good point ? Everything is proven. t.me/robert_magyar/…
Recently, new videos emerged of Russian soldiers showing their flag far behind the frontline.
What is important about that is the aim of these operations : to show to the Russian command.
1/9 ⬇️
Russian flag videos are almost always the same. One or two Russian soldiers walk along the front line for weeks, evading Ukrainian detection.
Upon reaching the rear, they spend a day wandering through an entire village with their flag, while a drone overhead films them.
They are often not armed and will stay in the village for a long time, hidden in a basement, most of the time being found and captured/killed and sometimes go back to their lines.
These soldiers are not meant to disrupt Ukrainian rear but to create the illusion Russia controls an area.
In June 2026, Russia 🇷🇺 launched 8 284 airstrikes, of which I managed to map 49%
This airstrike campaign is at the heart of Russian offensive strategy and one of the biggest challenge to the Ukrainian 🇺🇦 armed forces.
🧵THREAD🧵1/20 ⬇️
With artillery and drones, airstrikes are the third phase of the Russian strike campaign.
These unguided bombs—the FAB-250, -500, -1000, and -1500—are fitted with a UMPK guidance kit and dropped from more than 50 km behind the front line.
Here you can see the results of those :
The use of these guided bombs is steadily increasing, reaching a record high this month.
The accuracy of the FABs, which ranged from 10% to 30% last year (with "accuracy" defined as hitting something, such as a hedgerow, a village, or a forest), now stands at between 40% and 90%.
In June, Russia occupied 28 km2 and continued offensive operations in 7 directions out of 12. Russian forces took control of some neighbourhoods inside Kostiantynivka and advanced near Sloviansk.
My analysis :
🧵THREAD🧵1/13 ⬇️
Data above is from @Pouletvolant3 who has a strong regularity, using @Majakovsk73 data.
Below, Maps bases are from @M0nstas, with @Deepstate_UA and @AndrewPerpetua data.
The battle for Kostiantynivka has been ongoing for over 8 months.
Russian forces have been infiltrating the city's eastern, southern, and western sectors for several months; in recent weeks, they have—for the first time—managed to seize control of several neighborhoods, particularly in the west, and secure certain access routes to the city center.
Concurrently, Russian forces have launched a major propaganda campaign, showing flags across nearly the entire city and releasing videos showing their infiltration into most areas of Kostiantynivka.
Ukrainian forces maintain a presence throughout almost the entire city, although their hold on the southeastern and southwestern neighborhoods is increasingly threatened by the Russian advance into their rear. Fighting within the neighborhoods continues, and the Russian objective remains to seize control of the two roads supplying the city.
While the majority of Ukrainian assets—including drones and artillery—were evacuated in early June, the battle for the city (much like the earlier battle for Toretsk to the south) could drag on for weeks or even months until Russian forces achieve total control, enabling them to use the city as a hub for a northward push toward Drujkivka and Kramatorsk.
Overall, the battle for the city is lost, even though the Ukrainians still control more than a quarter of it—specifically the northeastern districts. It is important to understand that it is too early for Russian forces to use the city as a launch point for artillery or drone strikes; however, the initial drone units arriving in the coming weeks could intensify the threat to the northern supply routes leading to Drujkivka.