The war 🇺🇦/🇷🇺 of 2025 has nothing to do anymore with the war of 2022.
The tactics used in 2022 and 2023 are now completely obsolete on the Ukrainian front and new lessons have been learnt.
🧵THREAD🧵1/20 ⬇️
2022 have been the year of large mechanized assaults on big cities, on roads or in the countryside.
After that, the strategy changed to large infantry or mechanized assaults on big trench networks, especially in 2023.
But today, this entire strategy is obsolete. Major defensive systems are being abandoned one after the other.
The immense trench networks have become untenable if they are not properly equipped with covered trenches and dugouts.
The war of 2025 is first a drone war. Without drones, a unit is blind, ineffective, and unable to hold the front.
The drone replaces soldiers in many cases. It is primarily used for two tasks: reconnaissance (which avoids sending soldiers) and multi-level air strikes.
Thus, the drone is a short- and medium-range bomber or a kamikaze, sometimes capable of flying thousands of kilometers, replacing missiles.
Drone production by both armies is immense; we are talking about millions of FPV (kamikaze) drones, with as much munitions used.
It should be noted that to hit a target, several drones are generally required due to electronic jamming.
Each drone is equipped with an RPG-type munition, which is abundant in Eastern Europe. The aerial drone (there are also naval and land versions) has become key on the battlefield.
Now, drones are used individually, to hit every soldier, making them a deadly weapon (more than half, if not more, of WIA/KIA), replacing artillery.
Drones can therefore support or halt an offensive. Any man who isn't hidden is a target.
As we have seen, drones can land on the side of a road and wait for their target, or penetrate confined spaces or houses.
Soldiers must now hide in the foliage or in the basements of houses. Any large enough group of soldiers is quickly spotted, as is a concentration of armored vehicles.
The Russian army has thus switched to 'maximum attrition' mode, recruiting more soldiers and sending small waves of scattered troops to attack Ukrainian positions, often on motorcycles (a form of modern cavalry).
Here between Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka (local breakthrough).
The Ukrainians cannot hold the large defensive works of 2022-2024 and are now building small trenches, more numerous, better camouflaged, and offering a more attractive strategy.
Here is a 2024 trench, 800 meters long and large, no covered positions, no hidden trench in the trees...
Literally useless (it was abandonned).
Compared to 2023, a similar trench was useful because artillery was the main threat and was largely imprecise.
(well known trench near Bakhmut, known for the most difficult battles between Wagner and ukrainian troups).
The priority now is to dig small concealed positions in forest strips : thus, the Russian army will have to clear them all and with the summer folliage, they are hidden.
Only few soldiers can hide inside each, making it more difficult to spot and destroy them.
Here is the new type of fortifications : those trenches will be invisible in few months.
@Playfra0 managed to find some screenshots of those new positions.
Let's analyse each side new strategy :
Russia 🇷🇺 :
-Large mechanized/motorized/civilian vehicle assaults on strongpoints.
-Fast attack layers (bike...)
-More and more attacks, more and more men used.
-Large airstrikes on cities, artillery and drone barrage on positions.
-Less use of armoured vehicles and tanks.
-Fixed artillery position hidden in folliage.
Fast, numerous, supported by bombings
Ukraine 🇺🇦 :
-Massive drone strikes against ennemy
-Artillery and air-strikes in support
-New defensive organisations
-More anti-vehicle obstacles, ditches barbed wire...
-Smaller and more numerous positions
-Small scale counter-attacks
Thus the war of 2025 require new tactics that were not used in 2022. Large mechanized assaults during the day would be unthinkable today (even if it was already the case in 2022-2023).
Both sides changed, and we can see the difference.
Russian forces managed to breakthrough ukrainian positions between Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka, advancing in the undefended territory with bikes and entering the main defensive line.
This could be an important blow if they manage to consolidate their positions.
Thanks for following, i will continue to map ukrainian trench work which is very interesting to understand frontline dynamics and strategies.
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Le Mali 🇲🇱 va-t-il s'effondrer face à l'offensive du JNIM ?
Le blocus de la capitale Bamako, ne fait que s'intensifier depuis plusieurs semaines.
La poussée vers le sud des djihadistes fait craindre un effondrement, même s'ils ne contrôlent aucune ville.
🧵THREAD🧵1/17 ⬇️
Il y a 2 mois, l'une des meilleures source cartographique sur le Mali (@criticalthreats) a publié cette carte du blocus de Bamako et des principales villes du pays par le JNIM (groupe de soutien à l'Islam et aux musulmans, liés à Al Qaïda).
Depuis ma dernière actualisation cartographique à la fin de l'été, le JNIM a progressé, principalement vers le centre et le sud du pays.
Celui-ci opère désormais dans la majorité du pays, même s'il ne met pas en place de contrôle direct du territoire.
L'armée russe 🇷🇺 a conquis la majeure partie de Pokrovsk, plus grande ville prise depuis mai 2023.
Les infiltrations russes au sud du chemin de fer ont été consolidées, l'armée russe pousse désormais vers la périphérie nord. Myrnohrad est quasi encerclée.
🧵THREAD🧵1/15 ⬇️
En septembre 2024, l'armée russe arrivait pour la première fois aux portes est de la ville après la prise de Novohrodivka.
Il aura fallu un an et deux mois pour contourner les défenses de Pokrovsk par le sud puis le nord-est avant de prendre la ville. (carte de @Deepstate_UA)
Il est indéniable que la bataille pour la ville aura été centrale dans la stratégie défensive ukrainienne.
La progression de 40km à l'ouest d'Avdiivka a été stoppée aux portes de la ville. Il aura fallu un long contournement et beaucoup de temps pour parvenir à isoler la ville.
The core of ukrainian strategy in 2022 was to retreat from the countrysides into large cities, this happened in the north, Nyzhin, Chernihiv, Konotop, Romny...
During the movement warfare, cities were the base of the defense, and Ukraine tryied to keep it later.
In 2023, Ukraine also based its defense on major cities, the main example is Bakhmut, for which the urban battle was one of the biggest and longest (talking about fightings inside, not in the flanks).
-> Bakhmut was the last battle fought during long time inside a city
Most maps of the war in Ukraine are showing the same perspective and the same informations. Here, you will see rivers, railways, fortifications, forests...
20 surprising maps on the war in Ukraine
🧵THREAD🧵1/23 ⬇️⬇️⬇️
1- The frontline in december 2022
Days after the end of the Kharkiv and Kherson counter-offensive, russian army was controling less than 50% of the Donetsk region. The battle for Bakhmut just started and Donetsk was still threatened.
This map may seem old or out of context, but it actually helps to better understand the evolution of the Russian offensives in the Donbas.
One must put oneself in the shoes of the political and military decision-makers in Moscow: they had failed to take Kyiv, Kharkiv, or Odessa, to force Ukraine to capitulate, they had been humiliated in Kharkiv, and had to retreat from Kherson. It was therefore the full force of Soviet firepower that was deployed in the east of the country and became ruthless in the ensuing battles, sometimes at the cost of very heavy losses, as at Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
2- Three years in Donbas
The last 3 years of war have mainly been fought in Donbass.
After very slow and costly advances for the Russian army in Bakhmut and Avdiivka in 2023, the offensive towards Pokrovsk accelerated in 2024, with the Ukrainian army surrendering the best fortifications in the Donetsk suburbs.
The main Russian victory took place in South Donetsk, now completely under Russian control, but many months of campaigning remain, at the current pace, between one and two years to capture the last strongholds in North Donetsk. These three years have seen a constant offensive, the gradual depletion of Ukrainian reserves, and the deaths of hundreds of thousands of soldiers in a relentless war of attrition. On paper, the Ukrainian army has held its ground and not yielded, despite local setbacks. It remains to be seen whether it will maintain its endurance.
L'Armée Soudanaise 🇸🇩 continue d'offrir une base arrière pour les rebelles Tigréens 🔴🟡en réaction au soutien Ethiopien 🇪🇹 aux FSR.
Sur cette vidéo, 500 recrues de l'Armée 70 du TPLF participent à une cérémonie de remise des diplômes dans l'est du Soudan.
🧵THREAD🧵1/8⬇️
En tout, l'Armée 70 compterai plus de 5 000 hommes basés dans l'Etat du Gédaref, à l'est du Soudan.
Ces hommes ont fuit le Tigré en 2020, lorsque l'Ethiopie, l'Erythrée et les forces de l'Amhara avaient coupé la rébellion Tigréenne de la frontière soudanaise.
La région de Welkait, à l'ouest du Tigré (annexée par la région tigréenne à l'Amhara dans les années 1990) a été prise et annexée par l'amhara en 2020, coupant l'accès au Soudan, crucial pour les tigréens.
With two months to go before the end of 2025, the Russian army continues to lay the groundwork for major battles in 2026.
With Pokrovsk falling, Putin will not stop his war before conquering Kramatorsk.
🧵THREAD🧵1/21 ⬇️
The capture of Pokrovsk is drawing closer, culminating a two-year offensive to first clear the outskirts of Donetsk and then assault this strategic city.
Situated on a hilltop and boasting a significant rail and road network, Pokrovsk will give the russians a major advantage.
The capture of Pokrovsk is not yet a done deal, and I estimate that the battle, particularly in the suburbs, will continue for several more months.
The Ukrainian army still holds the strongholds of Udachne and Rodynske, preventing any overrun on its flanks.