Brad Setser Profile picture
May 4, 2025 20 tweets 7 min read Read on X
A bit of background on Taiwan ahead of what may be an eventful week. Certainly there will be a lot attention on the action to Taiwan's central bank after Friday's TWD move.

Key context: the TWD is incredibly weak

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That weakness is obvious from the 15% of GDP current account surplus or any examination of purchasing power parity. In real effective terms, the Taiwan dollar is down 25% from its pre-Asian financial crisis level (i.e. the mid 90s)

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While the currency slid (after 1996) the current account surplus soared ... so there is a pretty link. TSMC's very real success should have pulled the currency up but it didn't, in part because Taiwan's central bank hasn't been shy about intervention

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The main counterpart to the sustained surplus has been reserve growth and the purchase of foreign bonds by Taiwanese financial institutions -- holdings of foreign bonds are now something like 170% of Taiwan's GDP

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And specifically a huge share of the life insurers $1.1 to $1.2 trillion in assets has been invested abroad -- and a significant amount of that investment is unhedged (more on that later)

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Data center demand for chips made by TSMC (+ Taiwan's role as connector country that helps Chinese made parts get around the tariffs) + a very high domestic savings rate has pushed Taiwan's surplus up to $120b or so (lower oil will help in 25 ...)

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The basic equilibrium condition for maintaining a weak TWD in the face of flow pressure from a massive current account surplus is that a set of the major players in Taiwan's economy have to add to their external assets --

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Before COVID that was mostly the lifers -- but the lifer flow recently has been more modest (big stock position, some wounds from the rise in US rates and associated valuation losses).

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in 2022 (after Russia invaded Ukraine, and with rising tensions across the straight) foreigners selling TSMC generated the needed outflow -- but in 23 and 24 it has mostly come from the banks (intermediating fx deposits I think) and TSMC investing abroad

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In periods of stress (which for Taiwan comes when the Taiwan dollar appreciations, creating a mismatch between fx assts and TWD liabilities), stability has requires heavy fx accumulation by the central bank (~ 10% of GDP in the period before 2016, and again in 2020)

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This matters for the lifers in particular, as they have an estimated open position (see my piece in the FT with Josh Younger) or around $200b/ between 15% and 20% of their asset base --

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ft.com/content/972c54…
So a 1% move in the Taiwan dollar all else equal generates mark to market losses (tho not necessarily accounting losses) of around $2b/ a 10% move losses of more like $20b -- big sums

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The insurers though do have "fx volatility reserves" of at least $10b (and maybe more ... tho some of that was the unrealized gain on TWD appreciation I suspect) so there are buffers ...

13/

taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archi…
But the lifers probably do need to increase their hedge ratios in the current context, and that could put appreciation pressure on the TWD (and regional proxies)

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ft.com/content/88e0c3…
So there will be a lot of attention on when and how Taiwan's central bank the (CBC) intervenes on Monday -- it allowed a bit larger move than expected last Friday, which got everyone's attention --

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Now in the past the CBC has generally smoothed market moves (more so than on Friday) and generally started to resist appreciation more firmly as the TWD through 30 to 29 and then 28. They absolutely defended 28 with hefty intervention back in 2020 and 21

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The other policy tool available to the CBC is to use its massive reserves to help the lifers hedge, and open up an onshore swaps facility (there aren't other sources of a $100-200b in hedges, the CBC has $600b or so in fx

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I note that, thanks to the Fed's FIMA repo facility, the CBC could get dollar liquidity from the Fed without selling its Treasuries or Agencies. I advocated for FIMA repo with this kind of contingency in mind (I was obsessed with Asian insurer hedging needs back in 19/20)

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The other new variable of course is the trade negotiations with the US -- if the US is serious about bringing down its bilateral deficit, undervalued Asian currencies (like the TWD) do need to appreciate and the US cannot make it too easy for the CBC to protect the lifers

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Makes for an interesting set up -- politics, economics, finance (bond flows, lifer balance sheets), currencies all in play.

And the underlying financial exposure for Taiwan is massive

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More from @Brad_Setser

Feb 3
The Treasury has indicated that it will look at the activities of China's state banks in its next assessment of China's currency policies--

It is hard to see how this doesn't become a bit of an issue ... unless of course summitry gets in the way of analysis 1/ Image
It is quite clear that state bank purchases (and in 23/ early 24 sales) of fx have replaced PBOC purchases and sales and the core technique China uses to manage the band around the daily fx -- i.e. settlement looks like an intervention variable

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My latest blog looks both at how fx settlement (a measure that includes the state banks) has displaced the PBOC's own reported reserves as the best metric for Chinese intervention & lat some of SAFE's balance sheet mysteries

3/

cfr.org/articles/the-p…
Read 10 tweets
Feb 3
A new blog on China's hidden fx intervention, which reached staggering scale in December 2025

1/

cfr.org/articles/the-p…
The blog is detailed and technical -- and thus probably best read by those with a real interest in central bank balance sheets, the balance of payments and how to assess backdoor foreign currency intervention

2/ Image
Drawing on historical data, I propose that the gap between fx settlement and the foreign assets on the PBOC's balance sheet (fx reserves + other f. assets) is a good indicator of hidden intervention --

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Read 10 tweets
Jan 30
Obviously overshadowed by the news about a Fed nomination, but the Treasury released its delated October 2025 FX report today and it is worth reading -- not the least b/c of a clear warning to SAFE.

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This seems clear

"An economy that fails to publish intervention data or whose data are incomplete will not be given any benefit of the doubt in Treasury’s assessment of intervention practices."

2/

home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…
This report only covers the period between July 24 and June 25, so it misses the bulk of the 2025 surge in fx settlement (December = $100b plus). But this chart suggests the use of more sophisticated analytical techniques than those used in past reports --

3/ Image
Read 21 tweets
Jan 27
Can a country artificially weaken its currency by changing how it regulates its life insurance industry?

I think the answer is yes.

A new blog, one certain to increase my popularity with the Central Bank of China (Taipei)

1/

cfr.org/articles/taiwa…
A bit of background. Taiwan's lifers hold $700 billion in foreign currency assets abroad (more counting their holdings of local ETFs that invest heavily in foreign bonds) v ~ $200 billion in domestic fx policies -- so fx gap (pre hedging) of $500 billion

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Taiwan's regulator (perhaps the most complicit regulator on earth) not allows the lifers NOT to mark their fx holdings to the fx market -- so the lifers are incentivized not to hedge (and they are rapidly reducing their hedge ratio)

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Read 13 tweets
Jan 26
Japan is an interesting case in a lot of ways. It has a ton of domestic debt (and significant domestic financial assets) which generates heated concerns about its solvency/ ability to manage higher rates. But it is also a massive global creditor --

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Japan's net holdings of bonds (net of foreign holdings of JGBs) is close to 50% of its GDP (a creditor position as big v GDP as the US net det position). That includes $1 trillion in bonds held in Japan's $1.175 trillion in reserves, + over $2 trillion in other holdings

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That translates into big holdings of US debt -- the MoF's Treasuries all show up in the US TIC data, but the corporate bonds held by the lifers, postbank and the GPIF are only partially captured in the US data b/c of third party management/ the use of EU custodians

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Read 14 tweets
Jan 23
More pressure to export?

Monthly exports of passenger cars increased from a 6m cars a year pace to 10m car a year pace over the course of 2025 ...

Project that would at exports will reach 14m cars at the end of next year! Image
14m cars would be roughly 1/4th of the global market for cars outside China (the Chinese market is ~ 25m cars) ... no way that doesn't have a disruptive impact.

China would go from 6 to 14m cars in a two year period if 2025 isn't an outlier ...

2/
Not clear that German/ European politics can caught up to the scale of China's export tsunami. And some European firms think they can profit from China's subsidies and strong local supply chain by producing in China for the European market

3/

ft.com/content/02a52b…
Read 4 tweets

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