A bit of background on Taiwan ahead of what may be an eventful week. Certainly there will be a lot attention on the action to Taiwan's central bank after Friday's TWD move.
Key context: the TWD is incredibly weak
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That weakness is obvious from the 15% of GDP current account surplus or any examination of purchasing power parity. In real effective terms, the Taiwan dollar is down 25% from its pre-Asian financial crisis level (i.e. the mid 90s)
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While the currency slid (after 1996) the current account surplus soared ... so there is a pretty link. TSMC's very real success should have pulled the currency up but it didn't, in part because Taiwan's central bank hasn't been shy about intervention
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The main counterpart to the sustained surplus has been reserve growth and the purchase of foreign bonds by Taiwanese financial institutions -- holdings of foreign bonds are now something like 170% of Taiwan's GDP
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And specifically a huge share of the life insurers $1.1 to $1.2 trillion in assets has been invested abroad -- and a significant amount of that investment is unhedged (more on that later)
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Data center demand for chips made by TSMC (+ Taiwan's role as connector country that helps Chinese made parts get around the tariffs) + a very high domestic savings rate has pushed Taiwan's surplus up to $120b or so (lower oil will help in 25 ...)
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The basic equilibrium condition for maintaining a weak TWD in the face of flow pressure from a massive current account surplus is that a set of the major players in Taiwan's economy have to add to their external assets --
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Before COVID that was mostly the lifers -- but the lifer flow recently has been more modest (big stock position, some wounds from the rise in US rates and associated valuation losses).
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in 2022 (after Russia invaded Ukraine, and with rising tensions across the straight) foreigners selling TSMC generated the needed outflow -- but in 23 and 24 it has mostly come from the banks (intermediating fx deposits I think) and TSMC investing abroad
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In periods of stress (which for Taiwan comes when the Taiwan dollar appreciations, creating a mismatch between fx assts and TWD liabilities), stability has requires heavy fx accumulation by the central bank (~ 10% of GDP in the period before 2016, and again in 2020)
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This matters for the lifers in particular, as they have an estimated open position (see my piece in the FT with Josh Younger) or around $200b/ between 15% and 20% of their asset base --
So a 1% move in the Taiwan dollar all else equal generates mark to market losses (tho not necessarily accounting losses) of around $2b/ a 10% move losses of more like $20b -- big sums
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The insurers though do have "fx volatility reserves" of at least $10b (and maybe more ... tho some of that was the unrealized gain on TWD appreciation I suspect) so there are buffers ...
But the lifers probably do need to increase their hedge ratios in the current context, and that could put appreciation pressure on the TWD (and regional proxies)
So there will be a lot of attention on when and how Taiwan's central bank the (CBC) intervenes on Monday -- it allowed a bit larger move than expected last Friday, which got everyone's attention --
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Now in the past the CBC has generally smoothed market moves (more so than on Friday) and generally started to resist appreciation more firmly as the TWD through 30 to 29 and then 28. They absolutely defended 28 with hefty intervention back in 2020 and 21
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The other policy tool available to the CBC is to use its massive reserves to help the lifers hedge, and open up an onshore swaps facility (there aren't other sources of a $100-200b in hedges, the CBC has $600b or so in fx
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I note that, thanks to the Fed's FIMA repo facility, the CBC could get dollar liquidity from the Fed without selling its Treasuries or Agencies. I advocated for FIMA repo with this kind of contingency in mind (I was obsessed with Asian insurer hedging needs back in 19/20)
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The other new variable of course is the trade negotiations with the US -- if the US is serious about bringing down its bilateral deficit, undervalued Asian currencies (like the TWD) do need to appreciate and the US cannot make it too easy for the CBC to protect the lifers
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Makes for an interesting set up -- politics, economics, finance (bond flows, lifer balance sheets), currencies all in play.
And the underlying financial exposure for Taiwan is massive
20/20
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US imports of pharmaceuticals from the world's low tax jurisdictions have more than tripled since the (Pharma) Tax Cuts and (Irish) Jobs Act was passed ...
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The US trade deficit in pharmaceuticals has gone from $50b to around $200b (close to 0.7 pp of US GDP)
I liked Trump's term one trade policy a lot better than Trump's current trade policy.
Back then, the bulk of the tariff increase was on goods from China.
Now, not so much
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Gearing up for the May trade data release
In April, tariff revenue was around $20b, equally split between China and the rest of the world.
During Trump's first term the increase in monthly tariff revenue (to $5/6b) was essentially from tariffs on China going from $1b to $4b
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Tariff revenue from countries other than China, for future reference ...
Taiwan so far has gotten off relatively lightly, largely b/c of the semiconductor exclusion from the reciprocal/ base tariffs (expected future 232 sector)
Foreign demand for US bonds was a bit too strong in 2023 and 2024; it has pushed the dollar up to untenable levels.
But there is a some risk of a real reversal now
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Not sure that Trump's comments over the weekend about the future path of US rates (and issuing bills until he installs a compliant Fed chair) will increase global appetite for US bonds
Just a reminder that Saudi Arabia runs a current account deficit these days -- and its break even oil price (for the balance of payments) is around $90 a barrel ...
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The latest balance of payments data only runs though q1 -- but the difference between the oil price and Saudi's breakeven implies a much larger deficit in q2 than in the past few quarters
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Saudi external asset accumulation over the last 4 quarters has been financed by debt, not out of its oil proceeds
One of the surprises of the first half of the year was that China held the yuan stable even in the face of significant new US tariffs.
China's q1 BoP data helps explain why -- China was in a quite strong underlying position
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in the past few quarters, China's reported current account surplus jumped up to $150b a quarter (it is still understated, I think it is really ~ $200b a quarter) and the state banks have added $50-100b a quarter to their foreign assets.
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The balance of payments signal from China's state bank flows (plus PBOC flows) isn't as strongly as in 2020 and 2021, but it has been pretty consistent ...
Not sure the issue will come to a head on July 9th (it is always possible to provide more time for the negotiations) but have long thought that the "232" sectors would be the hardest part of the negotiations with the EU (and other allies)
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Pharma frankly should be easy -- as the US trade deficit in pharmaceuticals is made in America, as it stems from a flawed US tax policy. But that isn't how the Trump administration sees it ... and the real negotiations probably cannot start before the US case.
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And with autos, the Trump administration's push for a quick deal with the UK set a baseline (10% tariff and tariff rate quota for 2024 export levels) that all the big auto exporters now needs to match ...
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