A bit of background on Taiwan ahead of what may be an eventful week. Certainly there will be a lot attention on the action to Taiwan's central bank after Friday's TWD move.
Key context: the TWD is incredibly weak
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That weakness is obvious from the 15% of GDP current account surplus or any examination of purchasing power parity. In real effective terms, the Taiwan dollar is down 25% from its pre-Asian financial crisis level (i.e. the mid 90s)
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While the currency slid (after 1996) the current account surplus soared ... so there is a pretty link. TSMC's very real success should have pulled the currency up but it didn't, in part because Taiwan's central bank hasn't been shy about intervention
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The main counterpart to the sustained surplus has been reserve growth and the purchase of foreign bonds by Taiwanese financial institutions -- holdings of foreign bonds are now something like 170% of Taiwan's GDP
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And specifically a huge share of the life insurers $1.1 to $1.2 trillion in assets has been invested abroad -- and a significant amount of that investment is unhedged (more on that later)
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Data center demand for chips made by TSMC (+ Taiwan's role as connector country that helps Chinese made parts get around the tariffs) + a very high domestic savings rate has pushed Taiwan's surplus up to $120b or so (lower oil will help in 25 ...)
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The basic equilibrium condition for maintaining a weak TWD in the face of flow pressure from a massive current account surplus is that a set of the major players in Taiwan's economy have to add to their external assets --
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Before COVID that was mostly the lifers -- but the lifer flow recently has been more modest (big stock position, some wounds from the rise in US rates and associated valuation losses).
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in 2022 (after Russia invaded Ukraine, and with rising tensions across the straight) foreigners selling TSMC generated the needed outflow -- but in 23 and 24 it has mostly come from the banks (intermediating fx deposits I think) and TSMC investing abroad
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In periods of stress (which for Taiwan comes when the Taiwan dollar appreciations, creating a mismatch between fx assts and TWD liabilities), stability has requires heavy fx accumulation by the central bank (~ 10% of GDP in the period before 2016, and again in 2020)
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This matters for the lifers in particular, as they have an estimated open position (see my piece in the FT with Josh Younger) or around $200b/ between 15% and 20% of their asset base --
So a 1% move in the Taiwan dollar all else equal generates mark to market losses (tho not necessarily accounting losses) of around $2b/ a 10% move losses of more like $20b -- big sums
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The insurers though do have "fx volatility reserves" of at least $10b (and maybe more ... tho some of that was the unrealized gain on TWD appreciation I suspect) so there are buffers ...
But the lifers probably do need to increase their hedge ratios in the current context, and that could put appreciation pressure on the TWD (and regional proxies)
So there will be a lot of attention on when and how Taiwan's central bank the (CBC) intervenes on Monday -- it allowed a bit larger move than expected last Friday, which got everyone's attention --
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Now in the past the CBC has generally smoothed market moves (more so than on Friday) and generally started to resist appreciation more firmly as the TWD through 30 to 29 and then 28. They absolutely defended 28 with hefty intervention back in 2020 and 21
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The other policy tool available to the CBC is to use its massive reserves to help the lifers hedge, and open up an onshore swaps facility (there aren't other sources of a $100-200b in hedges, the CBC has $600b or so in fx
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I note that, thanks to the Fed's FIMA repo facility, the CBC could get dollar liquidity from the Fed without selling its Treasuries or Agencies. I advocated for FIMA repo with this kind of contingency in mind (I was obsessed with Asian insurer hedging needs back in 19/20)
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The other new variable of course is the trade negotiations with the US -- if the US is serious about bringing down its bilateral deficit, undervalued Asian currencies (like the TWD) do need to appreciate and the US cannot make it too easy for the CBC to protect the lifers
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Makes for an interesting set up -- politics, economics, finance (bond flows, lifer balance sheets), currencies all in play.
And the underlying financial exposure for Taiwan is massive
20/20
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The most important thing to know about the international financial system right now is that the dollar's share of a global equity market index is higher than the dollar's share of official fx reserves
One manifestation of the "profit dollar" and a global financial system built around the hope that US will deliver exceptional returns (not safety or necessarily liquidity): an unusual share of the US external deficit has been funded by return seeking flows
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state asset accumulation hasn't disappeared -- I estimate $600b in flows from reserve managers/ Chinese state banks and global SWFs into dollar assets.
But most of the flow is into institutions that seek return not just safety and liquidity
"This economic logic is flawed—China is suffering a property bust similar to Japan’s all on its own, without Plaza-like constraints"
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Despite the protests from the Global Times and its echo chamber on this and other sites, I am a bit more optimistic about the possibility that China may agree to allow the CNY to appreciate than the Economist
China won't agree to a "Plaza" deal (any deal will certainly have a different name) but it has allowed its currency to appreciate in the past. The CNY depreciation from 01 to 06 was a big reason for the first China shock & its 07 to 13 appreciation a big part of the solution
Adam Tooze has highlighted work from the CF40 that attributes the shift in China's trade balance with Germany entirely to autos. Using the Chinese data I get a different result (autos are big, but only ~ 1/3 the change)
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The detailed data shows that most of China's surplus categories (let by electronics -- a broad category that includes phones and car batteries and chips) are growing, while most of Germany's surplus categories are shrinking. Machinery flipped into a deficit last year
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For the EU as a whole, autos are a bit more than a third of the swing (Germany imports relatively few autos from China, so for Germany it is mostly an export swing) and transportation equipment is about half the swing
The first error is that it is an unreasonable ask from uncompetitive economies. That uncompetitiveness is a function in part of price, and China is the one actively intervening in the market to hold the yuan down. the settlement numbers should this clearly
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nominal and real appreciation was also part of the solution to the first China shock -- if China doesn't want a negotiated deal, fine ... the PBoC already knows how to manage the yuan stronger on its own and China doesn't need big surpluses to generate fx reserves these days
Trade diplomats the world over tend not to be the best macroeconomist --
"It [Chinese state media] said Chinese companies were no longer as concerned about the European market because they now had options such as south-east Asia or the Middle East."
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As the FT notes, China's surplus with SE Asia is a derivative of US tariffs/ low cost assembly of components in SE Asia ... basically it is a reflection of US demand
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in the Chinese data, the US, ASEAN and the EU general bilateral surpluses equal to about three quarters of China's global surplus (with some Asian netting of HK)
-- So the real statement is that the US market is still an alternative to the EU market right now
The jump in China's surplus since the start of 2024 is actually understated in dollar terms -- as Chinese export prices have fallen/ volume metrics show a bigger rise. But there has been a huge shift since 2018
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I do think I was among the first to talk of a second China shock -- I was among the first to notice the acceleration in China's auto exports, and I also observed that the rise in China's surplus in manufacturing after 19 was as big as the rise after WTO accession