A bit of background on Taiwan ahead of what may be an eventful week. Certainly there will be a lot attention on the action to Taiwan's central bank after Friday's TWD move.
Key context: the TWD is incredibly weak
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That weakness is obvious from the 15% of GDP current account surplus or any examination of purchasing power parity. In real effective terms, the Taiwan dollar is down 25% from its pre-Asian financial crisis level (i.e. the mid 90s)
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While the currency slid (after 1996) the current account surplus soared ... so there is a pretty link. TSMC's very real success should have pulled the currency up but it didn't, in part because Taiwan's central bank hasn't been shy about intervention
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The main counterpart to the sustained surplus has been reserve growth and the purchase of foreign bonds by Taiwanese financial institutions -- holdings of foreign bonds are now something like 170% of Taiwan's GDP
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And specifically a huge share of the life insurers $1.1 to $1.2 trillion in assets has been invested abroad -- and a significant amount of that investment is unhedged (more on that later)
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Data center demand for chips made by TSMC (+ Taiwan's role as connector country that helps Chinese made parts get around the tariffs) + a very high domestic savings rate has pushed Taiwan's surplus up to $120b or so (lower oil will help in 25 ...)
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The basic equilibrium condition for maintaining a weak TWD in the face of flow pressure from a massive current account surplus is that a set of the major players in Taiwan's economy have to add to their external assets --
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Before COVID that was mostly the lifers -- but the lifer flow recently has been more modest (big stock position, some wounds from the rise in US rates and associated valuation losses).
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in 2022 (after Russia invaded Ukraine, and with rising tensions across the straight) foreigners selling TSMC generated the needed outflow -- but in 23 and 24 it has mostly come from the banks (intermediating fx deposits I think) and TSMC investing abroad
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In periods of stress (which for Taiwan comes when the Taiwan dollar appreciations, creating a mismatch between fx assts and TWD liabilities), stability has requires heavy fx accumulation by the central bank (~ 10% of GDP in the period before 2016, and again in 2020)
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This matters for the lifers in particular, as they have an estimated open position (see my piece in the FT with Josh Younger) or around $200b/ between 15% and 20% of their asset base --
So a 1% move in the Taiwan dollar all else equal generates mark to market losses (tho not necessarily accounting losses) of around $2b/ a 10% move losses of more like $20b -- big sums
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The insurers though do have "fx volatility reserves" of at least $10b (and maybe more ... tho some of that was the unrealized gain on TWD appreciation I suspect) so there are buffers ...
But the lifers probably do need to increase their hedge ratios in the current context, and that could put appreciation pressure on the TWD (and regional proxies)
So there will be a lot of attention on when and how Taiwan's central bank the (CBC) intervenes on Monday -- it allowed a bit larger move than expected last Friday, which got everyone's attention --
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Now in the past the CBC has generally smoothed market moves (more so than on Friday) and generally started to resist appreciation more firmly as the TWD through 30 to 29 and then 28. They absolutely defended 28 with hefty intervention back in 2020 and 21
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The other policy tool available to the CBC is to use its massive reserves to help the lifers hedge, and open up an onshore swaps facility (there aren't other sources of a $100-200b in hedges, the CBC has $600b or so in fx
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I note that, thanks to the Fed's FIMA repo facility, the CBC could get dollar liquidity from the Fed without selling its Treasuries or Agencies. I advocated for FIMA repo with this kind of contingency in mind (I was obsessed with Asian insurer hedging needs back in 19/20)
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The other new variable of course is the trade negotiations with the US -- if the US is serious about bringing down its bilateral deficit, undervalued Asian currencies (like the TWD) do need to appreciate and the US cannot make it too easy for the CBC to protect the lifers
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Makes for an interesting set up -- politics, economics, finance (bond flows, lifer balance sheets), currencies all in play.
And the underlying financial exposure for Taiwan is massive
20/20
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"The problem is there was never enough cash to fund all his [Crown Prince MBS] ambitious initiatives."
Indeed. That's why measures lie the balance of payments breakeven are useful. The Saudis needed $90 plus oil -- or near unlimited access to debt financing
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Going into the current conflict, the Saudis were borrowing $100b a year from the rest of the world (that's a form of reverse petrodollars so to speak)
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"The country’s projects ran into the trillions of dollars—far more than a government with a $300 billion annual budget could afford."
Imports of computers are up massively (tho not from China) and show no sign of slowing down -- that will mechanically pull the true trade deficit (setting gold flows aside) w/o a big sustained fall in other imports
Pharma/ Irish imports have been weak for a few months now -- probably unwinding front running but I also wonder if the tariff threat led some companies to "unbundle" pricing at the border, & lower their declared import price while charging more for the IP separately
A thread on the February 2026 trade data, with some answers and some questions --
Both nominal imports and nominal exports (ex petrol) are growing again -- with surprising strength in nominal exports and nominal imports back at their end Biden administration levels
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I think I know why nominal exports look so strong --
One clue is that "real" exports are much weaker (but to be clear still up; the Trump 2 trade war did not lead to retaliation and lower exports)
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And the obvious tell is that exports of gold (counting gold bars, which are hard to find in the raw data) were way up in January and February -- that isn't "real"
Saudi 2025 balance of payments data is out, and the Saudi "current account" break even oil price (based on ~ 7 mbd in exports of crude/ product) is still right around $100 a barrel
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the current account break even is the oil price where oil exports cover the rest of the current account -- so there is no deficit in the current account
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Now the Saudis are still buying foreign equities (MBS has scaled back but not entirely) even with a current account deficit ...
As I mentioned on Wednesday, there is a $3 trillion gap between China's accumulated current account surplus since the pandemic and China's unchanged reserves (and a corresponding gap in visible flows into the US)
Bank flows make up most of the difference
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That was true in q4 -- most of China's foreign bond purchases are done by the banks, so there was $170b or so outflow via the banks in q4 alone. That is about 2/3rds of China's reported q4 current account surplus
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The biggest components of that flow were outward deposits (likely funding for the global banks in dollars given the banking data) and purchases of foreign securities
Three big picture observations about the oil surplus (petrodollars/ petroeuros/ petroequities are all downstream of this) pre Hormuz
A) The oil surplus is modest relative to the surplus in Asia. Chinese state banks and offshore deposits of Chinese exporters are way bigger
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B) Most oil exporters are in deficit or run only modest surpluses with oil in the 60s or 70s. That importantly includes Saudi Arabia, which now has a BoP break even in the 90s
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C) The remaining surpluses are concentrated in Russia (tho its surplus has fallen), frugal Norway and the GCC countries with large SWFs -- who tend to invest most of their surplus in equities (Kuwait is a bit of an exception, recent bond inflows