A bit of background on Taiwan ahead of what may be an eventful week. Certainly there will be a lot attention on the action to Taiwan's central bank after Friday's TWD move.
Key context: the TWD is incredibly weak
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That weakness is obvious from the 15% of GDP current account surplus or any examination of purchasing power parity. In real effective terms, the Taiwan dollar is down 25% from its pre-Asian financial crisis level (i.e. the mid 90s)
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While the currency slid (after 1996) the current account surplus soared ... so there is a pretty link. TSMC's very real success should have pulled the currency up but it didn't, in part because Taiwan's central bank hasn't been shy about intervention
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The main counterpart to the sustained surplus has been reserve growth and the purchase of foreign bonds by Taiwanese financial institutions -- holdings of foreign bonds are now something like 170% of Taiwan's GDP
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And specifically a huge share of the life insurers $1.1 to $1.2 trillion in assets has been invested abroad -- and a significant amount of that investment is unhedged (more on that later)
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Data center demand for chips made by TSMC (+ Taiwan's role as connector country that helps Chinese made parts get around the tariffs) + a very high domestic savings rate has pushed Taiwan's surplus up to $120b or so (lower oil will help in 25 ...)
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The basic equilibrium condition for maintaining a weak TWD in the face of flow pressure from a massive current account surplus is that a set of the major players in Taiwan's economy have to add to their external assets --
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Before COVID that was mostly the lifers -- but the lifer flow recently has been more modest (big stock position, some wounds from the rise in US rates and associated valuation losses).
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in 2022 (after Russia invaded Ukraine, and with rising tensions across the straight) foreigners selling TSMC generated the needed outflow -- but in 23 and 24 it has mostly come from the banks (intermediating fx deposits I think) and TSMC investing abroad
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In periods of stress (which for Taiwan comes when the Taiwan dollar appreciations, creating a mismatch between fx assts and TWD liabilities), stability has requires heavy fx accumulation by the central bank (~ 10% of GDP in the period before 2016, and again in 2020)
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This matters for the lifers in particular, as they have an estimated open position (see my piece in the FT with Josh Younger) or around $200b/ between 15% and 20% of their asset base --
So a 1% move in the Taiwan dollar all else equal generates mark to market losses (tho not necessarily accounting losses) of around $2b/ a 10% move losses of more like $20b -- big sums
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The insurers though do have "fx volatility reserves" of at least $10b (and maybe more ... tho some of that was the unrealized gain on TWD appreciation I suspect) so there are buffers ...
But the lifers probably do need to increase their hedge ratios in the current context, and that could put appreciation pressure on the TWD (and regional proxies)
So there will be a lot of attention on when and how Taiwan's central bank the (CBC) intervenes on Monday -- it allowed a bit larger move than expected last Friday, which got everyone's attention --
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Now in the past the CBC has generally smoothed market moves (more so than on Friday) and generally started to resist appreciation more firmly as the TWD through 30 to 29 and then 28. They absolutely defended 28 with hefty intervention back in 2020 and 21
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The other policy tool available to the CBC is to use its massive reserves to help the lifers hedge, and open up an onshore swaps facility (there aren't other sources of a $100-200b in hedges, the CBC has $600b or so in fx
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I note that, thanks to the Fed's FIMA repo facility, the CBC could get dollar liquidity from the Fed without selling its Treasuries or Agencies. I advocated for FIMA repo with this kind of contingency in mind (I was obsessed with Asian insurer hedging needs back in 19/20)
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The other new variable of course is the trade negotiations with the US -- if the US is serious about bringing down its bilateral deficit, undervalued Asian currencies (like the TWD) do need to appreciate and the US cannot make it too easy for the CBC to protect the lifers
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Makes for an interesting set up -- politics, economics, finance (bond flows, lifer balance sheets), currencies all in play.
And the underlying financial exposure for Taiwan is massive
20/20
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One feature of today's global economy: the incredible concentration of the global goods surplus in East Asia (using customs data). Way more so than in Trump one
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Implicit in the chart is the observation that the rest of oil-importing East Asia has maintained its goods surplus even as China's surplus has soared (helped by demand for Korean and Taiwanese chips)
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There is another point here -- one relevant for both @imfnews and France as they think about global trace and macro imbalances -- the current account surplus of East Asia ex China far exceeds their customs goods surplus ....
I am (obviously) a part of the "East Coast" think tank establishment Mr. Balding criticizes, & also served in the Biden Administration. But I would encourage Mr. Balding to read some of the work that I and my colleagues have done, as he paints with far too broad a brush
I would be the first to say that not enough was/ is being done on active pharmaceutical ingredients. But inside and outside of government I advocated for the 301 tariffs to be extended to rare earths/ magnets ... which was in the end done as part of the 301 review
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So if Mr. Balding's standard is forward progress, a bit was done there (tho not enough)
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The Treasury International Capital Data for September is now out -- China's Treasury holdings were constant during the data that was missed during the shutdown. Japan is up. UK and France are down a bit -- with a rise in the smaller EU custodial centers
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The runup in foreign holdings of Treasuries has all been "private" -- tho note that funds that China holds in private custodians in Europe register as private, so the split is imprecise
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The Treasuries that China holds in US custodians is clearly on a structural decline -- so estimating China's true holdings requires making a guess about China's holdings in custodians outside the US/ funds handed over to private managers
Crazy current account numbers for Taiwan in q3 -- a 20% quarterly surplus, and q4 looks like it will be bigger. That pushed the trailing 4q surplus up to 16% of GDP -- a record.
(and yet the TWD is weak, after hefty intervention in q3 changed the BoP dynamics)
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Taiwan's soaring surplus though hasn't translated into soaring demand for bonds in the last 4 quarters -- bond purchases picked up in q3, but no longer are on the scale needed to match the huge current account surplus
A big new report from @AidData sheds insight into one of the mysteries of global capital flows, namely how does China's large/ growing current account surplus fund the US external deficit. The answer, in part, is lending by the state banks
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The disaggregated data shows that China isn't just funding publicly guaranteed infrastructure projects in frontier economies/ Africa. Its state banks also do a lot of lending to "private" firms, including loans that back Chinese firms going out
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That includes funding a lot of China's strategic acquisitions -- Kuka in Germany, Nexperia in the Netherlands, Nexperia's (subsequently reversed) purchase of a chip wafer facility in the UK, etc