How bad is Russia’s war chest? Has the country entered stagflation? Why does it fear falling oil prices, but not a crash? And how is the tariff war hurting Russia?
These questions — and more — are explored in a special interview with Russian economist Vladimir Milov.
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2/ Tariff wars:
China’s economic slowdown has closed its market to many Russian products, hitting major industries hard. The China-focused Russian coal industry is struggling, and Russian non-energy and non-commodity exports are down by about a quarter compared to pre-2022 levels
3/ Tariff war will obviously exacerbate the Chinese slowdown. The slower Chinese growth, the less market for Russian goods. Share of China in the total Russian exports is as high as a third now - we're heavily dependent on this market and its well-being.
4/Oil prices:
The biggest loser from the falling oil prices is not Russia, and not OPEC - it's the U.S. shale oil industry. Oil production costs in the U.S. are higher. This means that, if global oil prices fall below $50, part of the U.S. oil production will be wiped off
5/ Russian oil companies can manage under $30-40, but the state budget will suffer. Putin and his allies believe they can endure low prices, anticipating a recovery. If oil stays at or below $50, it would likely be short-lived, which would please Putin.
6/ In these circumstances, I'd say the best scenario is if the international oil prices stay somewhere around $60. Given the sanctions-driven discounts, that means Russian oil is cheaper than $50. These are the prices that will significantly hurt Russia
7/ Employment:
Russia continues to face high hidden unemployment, with many workers nominally employed but on unpaid leave or downtime. Rosstat estimated hidden unemployment at 4.7 million in Q4 2024, or over 6% of the workforce. This brings the total to about 9%
8/ National Wealth Fund (NWF)
As of April 1st, the liquidity portion of NWF was $39 billion, lower than the 2024 federal budget deficit of RUR 3.5 trillion. The 2025 deficit is expected to be higher, with rising costs and declining revenues due to falling oil prices and slowdown
9/ Already now, non-oil revenue in Q1 2025 grew only by 11% year-on-year, against 26% growth in 2024, and 18% planned growth for 2025. Of which VAT, by just 9%, as opposed to 22% in 2024 and 17% planned for 2025. A slowing economy generates fewer taxes
10/ Inflation:
Nothing is working except monetary emission — printing money. The government can’t borrow, as it’s cut off from international markets. Domestically, with OFZ bond yields above 16%, Russia spends more on debt servicing than it raises from the domestic market.
11/ Authorities appear to tolerate inflation, with some State Duma members during the April 9th debate saying - "We're not Turkey or Argentina, so what difference does it make if inflation is 12-13% instead of 10%? Let’s print a couple of trillion rubles; no one will notice."
12/ No question that filling the budgetary gap with printed money will lead to even higher inflation, which will destroy any prospect for economic recovery. So, basically, the Western sanctions are working - albeit not as fast as we hoped, but still.
13/ Lifting sanctions:
The U.S. alone won’t be able to reverse sanctions. Before the 2022 invasion, Europe was Russia’s key investor and trade partner: over 67% of the accumulated FDI stock came from Europe, and around 50% of Russian exports went there. For the US, 1% and 4%
14/ Russia could benefit from U.S. sanctions being lifted, which may help sustain Putin’s struggling economy for a while. This includes access to U.S. technology and the lack of a comparable and effective global sanctions enforcement mechanism in European countries
15/ Thank you for reading. This is a brief summary with key points from the full interview, available via the link below. Please consider liking and sharing this thread to help increase visibility
A special thanks to @v_milov for his insightful analysis
1/ The exhaustion of Russia’s vehicle fleet is becoming increasingly evident. The reduced use of armored vehicles and the growing reliance on civilian: including motorcycles, golf carts, and vans, continues to signal a degradation in Russian maneuvering capabilities.
2/ During the winter, outside of Kursk, Russia achieved mostly tactical gains, notably in Kharkiv Oblast, the Chasiv Yar area and Kurakhove–Velyka Novosilka axis. While these advances have been troubling for Ukraine, Russia has so far failed to capitalize on them strategically.
3/ Despite slow progress, Russia still retains the resources and capability to conduct active offensive operations through the summer and fall of 2025. However, as I noted in my analysis last year, the diminishing returns will determine whether Russia will continue this war
While our team continues working on the latest updates, here are a few updates on the current state of the frontline:
1/ Despite holding the advantage along much of the frontline, Russia’s winter campaign yielded limited results - indicating Ukraine’s situation is not dire
2/ The Pokrovsk area now appears more stable than in February. At that time, Russian forces had established a foothold in Zvirove, with deeper advances into Pokrovsk looking imminent. Since then, not only have the Russians stalled, but they have actually lost some ground.
3/ The overall composition and number of Russian forces near Sumy oblast currently seem insufficient to support a large-scale offensive operation deep into the region.
One of the biggest problems of this war is that Ukraine and the West haven’t clearly defined what "winning" looks like. This has allowed the Russians to present the "Istanbul Agreements" as the only viable negotiation framework, due to the absence of a well-defined alternative.
2/ The "Victory Plan" presented by Zelensky is not a true negotiation framework, and it didn’t resonate with the previous administration, let alone the current White House administration. Of course, there are alternative options, such as Russia retreating to 1991 borders
3/ The problem is that Russia won't do that, and there is no realistic enforcement mechanism, short of intervention. The United States isn’t going to bomb Russia. This raises the question: what does a "desired outcome," based on the realities on the ground, actually look like?
Almost every day, we hear about strikes against targets inside Russia, but we rarely get the full picture of their actual impact on the war. Radio Liberty and Frontelligence Insight have joined efforts to analyze hundreds of data points to answer this question.
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2/ Our research covered the period from September 2024 to February 2025, divided into two sections: strikes on military targets, infrastructure, and on the energy sector. We found that strikes on Russia’s energy sector caused at least $658 million in damage over ~6 months
3/ The real damage to the Russian energy sector and the economy as a whole may be higher. In at least 67 out of 100 cases, Ukrainian strikes were successful, while in another 33 cases the result of the attacks remains unknown or it is impossible to prove Ukraine's involvement.
Kursk Offensive: A Preliminary Assessment by Frontelligence Insight.
A condensed version of report for X. 🧵Thread:
1/ With Ukrainian forces withdrawing from Sudzha, the operation is clearly approaching its conclusion though it is not yet entirely over.
2/ To assess the operation, not in isolation, but within the broader context of the war, we broke down the Kursk operation into 3 key questions: whether its geopolitical objectives were met, whether the attrition rate was favorable, and whether it achieved battlefield success
3/ To determine equipment attrition, we analyzed data from OSINT analyst @naalsio26, who tracks losses across multiple frontlines. Our graphs show losses from August to March but are not exhaustive, as they exclude some retreat-related losses. The cut-off date was March 10.
Frontelligence Insight Special Report: AWOL Trends and Casualty Ratios in Russia and Ukraine
In assessing overall manpower casualty ratios, we analyzed Russian AWOL figures alongside Ukrainian estimates, factoring in KIA, MIA, and recruitment rates to assess the war’s prospects
2/ Thanks to @InformNapalm, a Ukrainian OSINT community, we analyzed a screenshot of a Russian presentation slide detailing desertion numbers. The percentage and corresponding figures allowed us to calculate the total number of AWOL cases across all Russian military districts.
3/ As shown in the translated graph, the Southern MD has the highest number of desertion cases. This is unsurprising, as it includes the former 1st and 2nd Army Corps (now the 51st and 3rd CAAs), which are largely composed of forcibly mobilized residents from occupied territories