Thread by @ChrisO_wiki

1/ THE SINKING OF MOSKVA, PART 6: The Russian missile cruiser Moskva participated in Russia's invasion of Ukraine for only 48 days before being sunk. Her logbook, published here in English for the first time, gives a granular account of her activities. ⬇️

2/ This is the final instalment of a 6-part series of threads. For the first part, describing events leading up to the missile strikes that sunk Moskva on 13 April 2022, see below.

https://x.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1918190255271715122

3/ Part 2 describes how the crew tried to save the ship after two Ukrainian Neptune missiles struck it amidships and in the stern, setting it on fire.

https://x.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1918371539558515002

4/ Part 3 describes the ship's final hours on 14 April, and the immediate aftermath:

https://x.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1918592097138962917

5/ Part 4, evaluating lessons and conclusions from the sinking, is here:

https://x.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1918958776779960349

6/ Part 5 covers how Moskva was nearly decommissioned before being hastily reinstated – while still in a state of disrepair – in time for the invasion of Ukraine:

https://x.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1919377039674450148

7/ Moskva went to sea undermanned, with about a quarter of her professional crew replaced at the last minute by barely trained conscripts. Her 1970s-era weapons systems, radars and engines were malfunctioning and in a poor state of repair.

8/ After she was sunk on 13-14 April 2022, the father of one of the conscripts killed in the sinking compiled a dossier with the aid of other members of the ship's crew to expose the Russian navy's unique failings. It includes extracts and scans from the ship's log.

9/ Dmitry Shkrebets' dossier gives a unique insight into one of the most famous episodes in the war in Ukraine – the capture of Snake Island off the coast of Ukraine's Odesa region on the first day of the full-scale invasion, 24 February 2022.

10/ The ship's captain, Anton Kuprin, had been issued with secret orders in advance of the invasion. When Moskva left Sevastopol on 20 February 2022, she headed to an area of the north-west Black Sea roughly 90 km south of Odesa.

11/ Moskva was part of an operational group that comprised the patrol vessels Dmitry Rogachev and Vasily Bykov (pictured), the frigate Admiral Makarov (pictured), the captured Ukrainian sea rescue tug Sapphire, the tug Shakhter (pictured) and the reconnaissance vessel Khurs.

12/ Some time between 20 and 24 February, Moskva and Vasily Bykov were ordered to capture the strategically located Snake Island, 35 km off the Ukrainian coast near the Danube delta. It was held by a small garrison comprised mostly of Ukrainian State Border Guards.

13/ Shkrebets reproduces the log book entries for 24 February to 8 March, with a few redactions of personal names. In translation:

14/ From Sevastopol Bay

24 February, Wednesday, Black Sea

⏵ 00:00
The ship is on patrol line W-44° 24' 1" N = L-31° 26' 7" E. The ship is in combat readiness No. 2. ASW, PKO, AA Defense No. 2. In action: MD No. 1, 3; NPM No. 2; GTG No. 1, 2, 4; EPZHN No. 2.

15/ The YASS and RLO codes were changed....

The senior commander on board of the 30th DNA [30th division of surface ships of the Black Sea Fleet] is Captain 1st Rank [redacted].

16/ ⏵ 05:59
According to the radio intelligence post, a radio intercept was received by the 07th installation, target "Moscow". "Combat alert" was declared, the ship is ready for battle.

[This matches Putin's announcement of the invasion at 05:52 Moscow time.]

17/ ⏵ 07:35
Permission was received from the Black Sea Fleet commander to destroy the UAV [apparently a Bayraktar TB2 drone. According to Shkrebets, Moskva shot down several of these].

18/ ⏵ 09:08
In radio network 801 [Command Tube VHF Radio Station] received signal bugler circular 01594 AUTHORITY 5409 6068 signal reliable. Meaning: [redacted]
Begin hostilities immediately.

19/ ⏵ 10:15
NTs [surface target] detected by P-245 at D=38 km.
We are making an appeal on all communication channels to Snake Island with the aim of laying down arms.

20/ [This was the iconic broadcast in which the Ukrainian border guards on the island replied, "go fuck yourself".]


⏵ 11:08
W-45° 03' 1" N = D-30° 90' 2" E. The ship entered the territorial waters of Ukraine.

⏵ 13:37
A combat alert has been declared.

21/ ⏵ 13:42
The order was conveyed to "Vasiliy Bykov" from the commander of the 30th DNA. Escort the Ukrainian vessel SAR-2 [captured search & rescue vessel], heading 294/20.

Escort to Snake Island, do not approach within 10 [nautical] miles [i.e. 18.5 km]

22/ ⏵ 14:05
New surface target SAR-06 detected, heading to Snake Island.

⏵ 14:30
A group of surface targets was detected at bearing 356/95. We are calling you to contact us. [This was possibly civilian commercial vessels off Odesa.]

23/ ⏵ 14:40
Used 1 red RSP to force the ships to stop.

⏵ 15.20
SAR-02 approached the pier to evacuate people from Snake Island. [Russian media claimed that 82 people had been taken captive – 13 according to Ukraine]

24/ ⏵ 16:00
Received an order from the commander of the 30th DNA, captain 1st rank [redacted], prepare the AK-630 AU [anti-aircraft gun] complex for firing at the shore.

⏵ 16.02
The fleet commander gave the order to open fire on Snake Island.

25/ ⏵ 16.05
Started firing with the AK-630 UG complex (from the left side). Used: 100/30 mm.

[This moment was captured on video by one of the Ukrainians on the island. The shots appear to have been aimed overhead.]

26/ ⏵ 16.12
An order was received from the commander of the 30th DNA to retreat from Snake Island to a distance of over 10 km.

⏵ 16:45
Received an order from the commander of the 30th DNA to take up a position from Snake Island D=5 km to the south

27/ ⏵ 17:00
We took up a position relative to Snake Island.

⏵ 17:20
An order was received from the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet to use AU AK-130 [130 mm naval cannon, to bombard Snake Island].

28/ ⏵ 17:30
We observe the work of Russian aviation [bombing] Snake Island.

⏵ 17.32
We are observing repeated work by Russian aviation on Snake Island.

⏵ 17:36
We started shooting at Snake Island with AK-130 AU.

29/ ⏵ 17:40
Finished firing AK-130, speed 6 knots.

⏵ 18:32
The patrol line assigned to the FCP [flagship command post] is W-44° 54' N = D-30° 31' E [48 km from Snake Island]. Order to drive away targets heading north.

30/ ⏵ 18:55
Speed 12 knots. Started moving to the patrol line W-44° 37' 1" N = L-30° 29' 0" E - W-44º 29' 1" = W-31º 10' 0

⏵ 19:15
Order received to proceed to point W-45°33' N, D-30°33 E. Accept a convoy from the frigate Admiral Makarov and then proceed to the patrol line.

31/ ⏵ 21:07
W - 45°21'0" N D - 30°27'1" E
The ship left the territorial waters of Ukraine.

32/ Later that evening, according to Shkrebets, Russian special forces landed and captured the garrison on Snake Island. The prisoners were taken to Sevastopol on the tugboat Shakhter.

33/ ⏵ 25 February
Moskva continued to patrol along a line off the Ukrainian coast in the vicinity of Snake Island. She detected a UAV, declared combat alerts three times during the day, and was targeted by Ukrainian jamming.

34/ Notably, the ship was alerted to possible Ukrainian missile attacks – though from aircraft, not cruise missiles. The risk of cruise missile attacks seems to have been discounted by the Russian Navy – Shkrebets criticises this harshly.

35/ Moskva spent the evening in the Odesa Gas Field west of Crimea – where she would be sunk on 13/14 April.

36/ ⏵ 26 February
Moskva returned to the vicinity of Snake Island. She was ordered to stop a number of commercial vessels, which were sent back to Odesa, and survey ships in the area.

37/ The cruiser again declared combat alerts for possible air and missile attacks, but none materialised.

⏵ 27 February
Moskva patrolled the waters around Snake Island.

38/ ⏵ 28 February
Moskva was ordered to blockade the mouth of the Danube, sailing as close as 12 nm (22.2 km) from the Ukrainian coast.

39/ This was well within Ukrainian rocket artillery range (the Uragan system has a range of 35 km), but was before Ukraine had received HIMARS from the US. The extreme proximity was a sign of how confident the Russians were that the Ukrainians would not be able to retaliate.

40/ More alerts were declared via the VHF radio channel: POLAR LIGHT, indicating a risk of air attack, followed by GREY SURF, meaning the danger was over. None of the alerts resulted in weapons being fired.

41/ ⏵ 1-2 March
Moskva patrolled the waters around Snake Island and along the Ukrainian coast.

42/ ⏵ 3 March
Moskva was ordered not to open fire on aerial targets between 01:30 and 01:40, likely to facilitate Russian aerial activity. The ship's onboard PK-2 electronic warfare system was charged for operations (though it had known faults).

43/ Later that morning, the cruiser was ordered to refuel and take on 40 tons of fresh water from the small refuelling tanker VTN-73.

⏵ 4-5 March
More littoral patrols in Ukraine's territorial waters.

44/ ⏵ 6 March
Moskva's patrol group came under direct attack for the first time:

20:46
We observe the use of the patrol vessel "Dmitry Rogachev" weapon. Shells exploding in the air (Ukrainian naval rocket artillery strike).

45/ 20:59
The AU-630 complex was used. D-6 km. Consumption: 60 (30 mm) UFZS.

21:16
According to the report from "Bykov" and "Rogachev", no surface or air targets are observed.

(The Ukrainians claimed erroneously to have sunk Vasily Bykov with an MLRS salvo on 6 March.)

46/ ⏵ 7 March
More coastal patrolling. Rocket artillery attack on Dmitry Rogachev reported at 00:42. Flashes sighted from Moskva on the port side at 00:52 and 00:57. At 00:58 the OSA-M2 radar detected a target (probably a UAV) only 7 km from Moskva's starboard side.

47/ Shkrebets observes that "this was the real distance for detecting small and fast-flying air targets for the cruiser Moskva, taking into account characteristics and technical condition of the air defense systems and the OSA-MA2 air defense missile system, including 7 km."

48/ Both OSA-MA2s on Moskva had previously been rated as faulty in Captain Kuprin's report. If their effective range was only 7 km, this meant Moskva had at most only about 26 seconds to detect and respond to an incoming missile.

49/ At 07:30, the Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet prohibited naval vessels from approaching within 30 km of the coast following the MLRS attacks on the two Russian patrol vessels.

⏵ 8 March
More coastal patrolling; leaving Ukrainian coastal waters at 18:37.

50/ ⏵ 9 March
Moskva returned to Sevastopol.

The ship then carried out two more combat patrols on 14 to 22 March, and 26 March to 6 April. Shkrebets does not reproduce the logbook for these periods, but it's likely that they comprised more coastal patrolling.

51/ Moskva's objectives during the first two months of the war appear to have focused on blockading the shipping route from Odesa, where many commercial ships were trapped before Ukrainian sea drones were eventually able to drive the Russian navy out of the area.

52/ Captain Kuprin seems to have been well aware of the deficiencies of his crew and ship. Shkrebets reports that he continued to schedule training exercises right up to the morning of the Ukrainian missile attack.

53/ According to Shkrebets, Kuprin was particularly worries about Moskva's ability to detect and repel aerial attacks. The late detection of a target on 7 March had shown the ship's poor performance in air defence and exposed his crew's lack of training.

54/ "Realising that the conscripts had neither the knowledge nor the experience to repel possible air attacks, the captain assigned officers to the sighting columns (a backup system for targeting, tracking, issuing target designation, and controlling fire).

55/ "In the hope that the officers would work more effectively when detecting threats from the air... They were there around the clock (on shifts)."

56/ Seen at anchor in Sevastopol by an American commercial imaging satellite on 7 April, Moskva departed from her anchorage for the last time on 10 April. Four days later, she was on the bottom of the Black Sea. /end

Sources:
🔹 vk.com/wall601245129_…
🔹 navalnews.com/naval-news/202…
🔹 hisutton.com/Russian-Navy-M…
🔹 facebook.com/watch/?v=10856…
🔹 davisenterprise.com/forum/cartoons…

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