I think the new tariffs on China are 30% on about 1.2 pp of US trade, & 20% (the fentanyl IEEPA case) on 0.3 pp of US trade, so a "just pay it" cost of just over 0.4 pp of US GDP (more than the first 301 case, which applied to a bigger base)
1/
I think the 30% tariff "stacks" with the legacy section 301 tariff, so for a number of goods (~0.5 pp of current US trade) the tariff will be around 55%, and I think the 20% tariff stacks with the 232 tariffs -- which will matter for chips
2/
The 10% base tariff on US trade (except oil, and except USMCA compliant trade) covers roughly 5.5 pp of imports once China is netted out -- so a just pay it cost of 55 bp of GDP ...
3/
The 232 tariffs (now mostly at 25%, but new ones coming from chips, pharma and now, gulp, planes & perhaps movies) don't stack on the 10% base tariff, and look set to cover 3-4% of GDP (but some of the coverage will only be partial -- non US content for Canadian autos ...)
4/
Conservatively, I will estimate a just pay it cost of 75 bps (still working on the actual calculation), and some of that is + 15 pp in tariffs v the base, so call it a net increase of 0.5 pp of GDP (with lots of uncertainty)
5/
So I am getting a just pay it cost of ~ 1.5 pp of GDP; and I tend to think the just pay it cost is a decent estimate of the impact on CPI and the overall economy in the short-run (unless consumers reduce savings, and absent offsetting fiscal policy changes).
6/
the long-run estimates of the impact on the economy are usually lower than the just pay it cost, so the slowdown risk is really from the immediate impact --
7/
Enough to noticeably slow the economy -- Absolutely.
Enough to tip the economy into a recession? Maybe, but not not a given with the recent fall in the price of oil (helps offset lost consumer purchasing power).
8/8
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With an assist from @Mike_Weilandt, I tried get a more refined estimate of the Trump term 2 tariffs.
Bottom line upfront: I think the tariffs now in place have a "just pay it" cost of about 1 pp of US GDP, which could rise toward 1.5 pp of GDP if all the 232s end up at 25%
1/
First, the China tariffs -- the 20% fentanyl tariff (which stacks with the 232 sectors) has a just pay it cost of about 0.3 pp of GDP. The 10% base tariff (which doesn't apply to 232 sectors) adds another 10 bps of GDP.
2/
Measured imports from China are 1.5 pp of GDP (and true imports are higher), so these are easy numbers to check ... and the 40 bps of GDP estimate while WAY less than before the Geneva deal, is still more than the term 1 China tariffs
3/
There were a lot of forecasts that the Chinese auto export wave would peak in 2024. It hasn't quite happened though. Dollar exports have plateaued. But actual exports of cars continue to creep up -- April 2025 was very strong
1/
Passenger exports should reach 6m cars in 2025 (net exports of 5m cars)
And most exports will be cars with conventional engines, not EVs
2/
Of course, the capacity for massive EV exports exists (and BYD plans to sell as many cars outside China as inside China in a few years). Total EV capacity should approach 25m cars by the end of the year -- enough to meet all domestic car demand.
Expect to hear a lot of wildly inflated claims about future Saudi investment in the US over the next few days.
Don't tho expect to hear any details about how the Saudis will pay for these investments.
1/
The simple reality is that the Saudis cannot fund their current levels of domestic spending and investment out of their current oil proceeds. As the chart below shows, the Saudi external (current account) break even is around $90 a barrel, way above spot oil
2/
So the Saudis have to borrow from abroad (or sell down existing assets) to cover their domestic needs/ build out the line -- any additional investment in the US would have to come from selling off their stock of non US assets (or or borrowing more)
May 12th is a special day for me. I can not imagine getting more meaningful (to me) professional recognition than I received exactly two years ago from Paul Krugman.
What's more, it was for an issue that is now much more prominent: pharmaceutical tax avoidance! 1/
The underlying issue is simple -- after the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, America's major pharmaceutical companies (the top 6, aka "Big Pharma") have more or less stopped paying any US tax on the current earnings
How do they do it? My manipulating their internal transfer pricing so that they report earning all their money abroad (even tho drug prices are much lower abroad than in the US; ask DJT)
Wonder if rural Americans really appreciate being used to sell a set of tax changes that benefit Big Pharma, Apple and Microsoft (keeping GILTI at 10.5%)* and Google, Meta and Nvidia (keeping FDII at 13.125%)
The push to extend tax provisions that reward offshoring both intellectual property and jobs -- pharma imports soared after the TCJA -- highlights the absolute incoherence of the Administration's current legislative agenda.
2/
The incentive to offshore isn't just impacted pharma -- it also has encouraged the producers of the equipment used to make semiconductors to move offshore (and the chip industry is clearly strategic)
China has reported a $165b billion ($600b plus annualized) current account surplus for q1 -- its third large quarterly surplus in a row.
The reported surplus is still too low (it should be $800-900b) but something has changed
1/
China's reported goods surplus in the balance of payments is still knocking about $200b off the goods surplus relative to the methodology China used in the past, and I don't think the new adjustments are warranted ...
2/
But, for whatever reason, China has adjusted its methodology a bit -- the bigger current account surplus now reflects a rise in China's trade surplus v last year, but also a smaller downward adjustment to the goods surplus in the BoP