Russian 🇷🇺 armed forces started their first strategically important maneuver of 2025.
After months of preparation, Russian army is trying to cut the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka frontline, breaching the Donbass 🇺🇦 front in the middle.
🧵THREAD🧵1/16⬇️
After months of struggle west of Pokrovsk and in Toretsk, russian army switched its offensive potential to the Ocheretyne frontline.
After a striking progress of nearly 10km 3 weeks ago, they are now pushing north, farther than the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka highway.
Russian army captured in a few days Myrolyubivka, Malynivka, Nova Poltavka, Novoolenivka and Oleksandropil. This fast advance allowed them to get through an important fortified line on the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka highway.
Russian army entrance into Myrolyubivka also shows they want to continue north to Novoekonomichne to further enter Myrnorhod or encircle Pokrovsk from the west.
This long waited manoeuver by russian forces may be strategically important at the scale of the battle in Donbass.
They could continue north to Droujkivka, significantly cutting Pokrovsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblast from Kostiantynivka and Kramatorsk. (map @UAControlMap )
After this progress, multiple hypothesis could happen. The most evident would be an offensive from the heigh ground to Droujkivka and Kostiantynivka, forcing a large ukrainian retreat from central Donbass and preparing the battle for Kramatorsk.
Alternatively or at the same time, russian forces could try to encircle Pokrovsk or taking Dobropilla, a significant supply hub in western Donetsk oblast.
This particular progress could be followed by an infiltration in Pokrovsk after an isolation from the west.
What about fortifications ?
We can still find approximately two lines of anti-tank ditches and multiple trenches, however not enough. The western and northern Pokrovsk axis are more defended.
Anyway, russia will soon have to deal with larger fortifications, especially barbed wire and big ditches against infantry.
Ukrainian engineering units are switching from large to small and more numerous trenches. It is too early to see any result.
In parallel, russian army is set to enter Dnipropetrovsk oblast in the coming weeks, after a long delaying operation on the Novopavlivka frontline.
Also, on the Vovotcha frontline, russian forces are consolidating their positions in Bahatyr and will face only two last towns, Komar and Odradne before reaching the rivers junction.
The most recent russian progression between the towns of Kostiantynivka and Pokrovsk also allows drone teams to target the Dobropilla-Kramatorsk highway, threatening supplies to the "capital city" of ukrainian controlled donbass.
One year ago, russian forces seyzed Ocheretyne and made large progress between Pokrovsk and Kourakhove during the summer until december.
This year, Russia will try to do it again, this time in the north, and faster, if they want to conquer a city this time.
Now, lets get to a more general overview.
Russian army has a superior manpower (some say more than 30 000 recruits a month allowing them to wage the trench war.
Ukrainian forces lack men and switch to a more flexible defense.
On a larger scale, the war is extending to the long ukrainian-russian border at full scale, meaning both sides nead to move more troops there. The advantage is russian everywhere and ukrainian defense is mainly done by drones, obstacles and trench warfare.
The negociations are not advancing because Russia does not want to negociate. They showed what they wanted in Istanbul, nothing changed since 2022, while they control less territory.
I will soon analyse those negociations. Thanks for following !
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Alors que se tient le 12ème sommet de l'organisation des Etats Turciques 🇹🇷 en Azerbaïdjan, les pays centrasiatiques prouvent une fois de plus leur éloignement avec la Russie.
🧵THREAD🧵1/15 ⬇️
Depuis 2022, l’Asie centrale amorce un tournant géopolitique majeur.
Longtemps dans le giron russe, la région s’émancipe progressivement de Moscou. Cet éloignement n’est ni brutal ni uniforme, mais il est désormais irréversible.
La guerre en Ukraine a agi comme un catalyseur.
Pour les dirigeants centrasiatiques de l'ex URSS, la Russie n’est plus un garant de stabilité, mais un facteur d’incertitude.
Dès lors, la priorité devient l’autonomie stratégique et la diversification des partenariats.
*123 000 russian 🇷🇺 soldiers got killed in 2025 in Ukraine 🇺🇦, more than the french 🇫🇷 ground forces.
In total, 281 550 russian soldiers were lost in 2025 as per leaked report. It includes 123 000 killed and missing and 158 529 wounded.
🧵THREAD🧵1/25 ⬇️
These leaked documents were initially shared by this account @hochuzhit_com which provided these two pictures.
*I don't know about the source which seems controversial but the data seems veracious since it is close to other data collected by Mediazona, the Ukrainian General Staff and independent analysts.
There is high possibility this can be a propaganda operation, but the data can still be used.
The document is giving few interesting insights on the state of russian forces. With 83 000 killed, it's close to the Mediazona count (54 000 in August with verified data).
It is also giving data on particular units and different sectors.
Depuis que je cartographie les frappes aériennes russes, j'ai pu en localiser environ 65% (principalement à Pokrovsk, Soumy et Pokrovsk'e).
Le reste non cartographié est probablement à Kherson, Zaporizhia, Kramatorsk, Koupiansk ou Kharkiv.
Hier, j'ai publié cette carte des plus de 6 000 frappes aériennes russes entre Pokrovsk et Kostiantynivka sur les 5 derniers mois, avec différents codes couleurs.
Since few weeks, russian forces started again to push for Drujkivka, while hundreds of russians are still isolated.
I mapped all airstrikes there and at the same time, Ukraine 🇺🇦 is preparing the 3rd Donbass line🧑🔧.
🧵THREAD🧵1/25 ⬇️
Since two months, there have been a massive split between analysts. Pro-ukrainian or pro-russian sources are divided to understand how much km2 fell this month to Russia.
Many fail to understand the new logics of war.
For example :
-Some will map an area as russian because a ukrainian drone striked russian soldiers there or a russian was seen with a flag.
-Some will map a large grey zone
I would myself map the grey zone for one main reason :
C'était le titre d'une conférence à laquelle j'avais assisté en 2022 auprès de la communauté arménienne en France. A l'époque, l'Azerbaïdjan🇦🇿 avait envahit 300km2 d'Arménie.
Pourtant, le contexte a changé et les enjeux aussi
🧵THREAD🧵1/19⬇️
J'ai terminé de cartographier l'ensemble des positions militaires arméniennes et azerbaïdjanaises le long de leur frontière bilatérale.
En tout, ce sont plus de 1 400 positions arméniennes et 1 000 positions azerbaïdjanaises recensées.
Ces positions nous permettent de voir la vulnérabilité arménienne, encerclée de deux côté, notamment au sud, par l'Azerbaïdjan.
On remarque également les quelques 300 km2 de terres arméniennes (frontière de 1991) occupés par l'Azerbaïdjan, ici à Vardenis.