Russian 🇷🇺 armed forces started their first strategically important maneuver of 2025.
After months of preparation, Russian army is trying to cut the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka frontline, breaching the Donbass 🇺🇦 front in the middle.
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After months of struggle west of Pokrovsk and in Toretsk, russian army switched its offensive potential to the Ocheretyne frontline.
After a striking progress of nearly 10km 3 weeks ago, they are now pushing north, farther than the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka highway.
Russian army captured in a few days Myrolyubivka, Malynivka, Nova Poltavka, Novoolenivka and Oleksandropil. This fast advance allowed them to get through an important fortified line on the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka highway.
Russian army entrance into Myrolyubivka also shows they want to continue north to Novoekonomichne to further enter Myrnorhod or encircle Pokrovsk from the west.
This long waited manoeuver by russian forces may be strategically important at the scale of the battle in Donbass.
They could continue north to Droujkivka, significantly cutting Pokrovsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblast from Kostiantynivka and Kramatorsk. (map @UAControlMap )
After this progress, multiple hypothesis could happen. The most evident would be an offensive from the heigh ground to Droujkivka and Kostiantynivka, forcing a large ukrainian retreat from central Donbass and preparing the battle for Kramatorsk.
Alternatively or at the same time, russian forces could try to encircle Pokrovsk or taking Dobropilla, a significant supply hub in western Donetsk oblast.
This particular progress could be followed by an infiltration in Pokrovsk after an isolation from the west.
What about fortifications ?
We can still find approximately two lines of anti-tank ditches and multiple trenches, however not enough. The western and northern Pokrovsk axis are more defended.
Anyway, russia will soon have to deal with larger fortifications, especially barbed wire and big ditches against infantry.
Ukrainian engineering units are switching from large to small and more numerous trenches. It is too early to see any result.
In parallel, russian army is set to enter Dnipropetrovsk oblast in the coming weeks, after a long delaying operation on the Novopavlivka frontline.
Also, on the Vovotcha frontline, russian forces are consolidating their positions in Bahatyr and will face only two last towns, Komar and Odradne before reaching the rivers junction.
The most recent russian progression between the towns of Kostiantynivka and Pokrovsk also allows drone teams to target the Dobropilla-Kramatorsk highway, threatening supplies to the "capital city" of ukrainian controlled donbass.
One year ago, russian forces seyzed Ocheretyne and made large progress between Pokrovsk and Kourakhove during the summer until december.
This year, Russia will try to do it again, this time in the north, and faster, if they want to conquer a city this time.
Now, lets get to a more general overview.
Russian army has a superior manpower (some say more than 30 000 recruits a month allowing them to wage the trench war.
Ukrainian forces lack men and switch to a more flexible defense.
On a larger scale, the war is extending to the long ukrainian-russian border at full scale, meaning both sides nead to move more troops there. The advantage is russian everywhere and ukrainian defense is mainly done by drones, obstacles and trench warfare.
The negociations are not advancing because Russia does not want to negociate. They showed what they wanted in Istanbul, nothing changed since 2022, while they control less territory.
I will soon analyse those negociations. Thanks for following !
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La question moldave est revenue dans l'actualité, comme très régulièrement depuis 4 ans, avec cette fois une déclaration choc de la président Maia Sandu, qui "voterait pour la réunification avec la Roumanie s'il y avait un référendum".
Si près de 85% de la population du pays se dit moldave ou roumaine (très similaires, histoire commune, les moldaves sont plus nombreux en roumanie), il y a environ 15% de minorités (ukrainiens, russes, gagaouzes, bulgares, allemands, roms...) et la réunification fait 50/50.
Turkiye 🇹🇷, Chad 🇹🇩, UAE 🇦🇪, Kenya 🇰🇪, Saudi Arabia 🇸🇦... who supports who in the Sudan war ?
The Sudan 🇸🇩 war opposing SAF and RSF is no longer a local war for power but rather a regional confrontation between multiple countries.
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Disclaimer : mapping which country supports the RSF and FSR does not mean everything is correct. Russia and Ukraine are not allied, Ethiopia is closed to Turkiye and Saudi Arabia and multiple countries are barely involved or neutral so I kept them in white.
The borders you can see is not the recognized border map but the actual control lines. In black stands djihadist groups, in green SAF allies and in red RSF allies.
Feel free to give me informations on the countries that I mapped as "neutral".
Countries supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces :
The SAF was during a long time without serious allies, but the situation recently changed after they liberated the capital Kharoum.
Here, we'll see the main SAF allies and foreign proxies :
They lost in Yemen during these last days, but it was previously a victory for the UAE :
-created a pseudo separatist state of South-Arabia
-took control of Aden city in 2018
-invaded and occupied the strategic and touristic Socotra island
-annexed other islands
Let's get back to the history of the UAE foreign policy :
After gaining independence in 1971, the UAE pursued a foreign policy that was:
▪️Discreet and defensive
▪️Closely aligned with Saudi Arabia and the United States
▪️Focused on the survival of the young federal state
C'est passé inaperçu mais l'Arabie Saoudite 🇸🇦 vient de mettre un coup à la stratégie séparatiste des EAU 🇦🇪 au Yémen 🇾🇪
En quelques jours, le gouvernement pro-saoudien a refoulé les séparatistes qui avaient atteint la frontière saoudienne en décembre.
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Les tensions entre l'Arabie Saoudite et les Emirats ne font que s'intensifier ces dernières années.
MBS et MBZ, jadis proche alliés, notamment lors du blocus du Qatar ou de l'intervention anti-houthiste au Yémen, sont désormais en pleine confrontation.
L'Arabie Saoudite désapprouve en plus haut point la stratégie séparatiste menée par les Emirats en Libye (soutien d'Haftar), au Soudan (soutien des FSR), en Somalie (soutien du Somaliland) et au Yémen (soutien du STC).
Les nouvelles lignes de défenses ukrainiennes 🇺🇦 sur une carte simplifiée :
Elles sont au cœur de la nouvelle stratégie défensive 🛡️ukrainienne, robustes, nombreuses et préparées devant les villes, elles devraient entrer en action cette année sur le front 🪖
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Je ne vous les présente plus, évidemment, les idiots utiles en commentaires vont continuer de les décrier alors même qu'on a déjà vu leurs résultats, ces lignes sont des lignes d'OBSTACLES, pas des lignes pour y mettre l'infanterie...
Par exemple à l'ouest de Pokrovsk, on compte 3 lignes de type New Donbass Line (NDL), en jaune, ainsi que d'autres lignes anciennes ou récentes en blanc (pas NDL).
Yemen 🇾🇪: South Arabia's Independence, the Saudi-UAE War, Anti-Houthi Bombardments
It had been on hiatus for several years, but the war in Yemen has resumed, within the Arab coalition.
In early December, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a pro-Emirati southern militia, launched a lightning offensive across southern Yemen. On January 2nd, the STC announced the start of the South Arabian independence process. At the same time, supported by significant Saudi reinforcements, the Yemeni National Army and pro-Saudi militias regained control of a large portion of the country that had fallen to the separatists, aided by an anti-Emirati coalition blockade in the Arabian Sea and substantial airstrikes.
In response, the United Arab Emirates withdrew its forces from Yemen, while tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE are escalating, particularly in Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia, where Abu Dhabi's pro-separatist stance is causing discontent.
For their part, the Houthi rebels have ceased their attacks on ships in the Gulf of Aden, although their movements are still being monitored by Israel, which regularly bombs them.