Through the Optics of War: An analysis of leaked confidential data from Russia’s military-industrial complex by Frontelligence Insight — from thermal scopes and laser anti-UAV programs to Chinese import schemes and production bottlenecks in the optoelectronic sector. 🧵Thread:
2/ Rostec is a state-owned conglomerate that includes much of Russia’s military-industrial complex. One of its key holdings, Shvabe, specializes in optical-electronic technologies for military and dual-use applications. The original files were obtained by the @256CyberAssault
3/ In February 2024, Polyus Scientific Research Institute, part of Shvabe Holding, was tasked with advancing laser technologies to counter UAVs. This includes developing materials like active elements under a program focused on high-power lasers, running through 2033.
4/ Similarly, in 2022, JSC High-Precision Systems and JSC Research Institute "Polyus" were assigned to propose the development of a counter-UAV laser system, potentially integrated with the Pantsir-S1.
5/ In May 2024, company VOMZ, in collaboration with Shvabe, were tasked with assessing the integration of UAVs into tank fire control systems. The goal is to improve reconnaissance and target engagement at extended ranges (up to 15 km), including from concealed firing positions
6/ Concealed/Closed-position firing allows a tank to engage targets without direct line of sight, using its main gun similarly to artillery. This enables fire support at extended ranges while keeping the tank hidden from view and out of reach of conventional anti-tank weapons.
7/ Our team assumes that Russia will continue attempts to integrate various UAV systems in fire control systems across various platforms – not just tanks, in future modernization efforts aiming to increase both the range and accuracy.
8/ Military plant Krasnogorsky Zavod (KMZ) was participating in OPS-28M production: an electro-optical surveillance and targeting system used on Mi-28NM helicopters. However, an August 2024 report noted that the quality of the supplied OPS-28M units was unsatisfactory.
9/ JSC State Institute of Applied Optics was tasked with import substitution of the Catherine-XP-PCS thermal imaging camera in the T-90M fire control system. But how is Russia handling import substitution? Achieving this appears difficult — if not impossible — without China
10/ According to data from the 256th Cyber Assault Unit shared by @InformNapalm, the company “YUMAK” supplied CNC machines from Chinese firms Push Ningjiang Machine Tool Co and Tianjin No.1 Machine Tool Works to “Zenit-Investprom,” a part of Shvabe holding
11/ One internal company document, which included a detailed task list, also contained a roster of various firms within the holding, along with their assigned task. Among them, one name stood out: Shvabe Opto-Electronics, based in Shenzhen, China.
12/ According to Trademo export-import data, Shvabe in Shenzhen has consistently supplied components to the Ural Optical and Mechanical Plant and JSC Novosibirsk Instrument-Making Plant—both sanctioned by the West, including the US
13/ Last but not least is the issue of production expansion. As previously mentioned, the company from Shvabe Holding called “Zenit-Investprom” has acquired Chinese industrial equipment to support manufacturing efforts of Rostec.
14/ Further investigation into Zenit-Investprom revealed extensive correspondence with Zavod No. 9—which can be translated as “Factory No. 9” — a facility known for producing towed artillery pieces such as the D-30 howitzers, as well as tank guns, including the newer T-90 models
15/ Given that some requested equipment for expansion —like the laser heat-strengthening system—is designed for metalwork, and considering the factory produces barrels for tanks and artillery, Russia likely tries to expand its barrel production
16/ While the deadline for Zenit-Investprom’s part of the project was 2023/12/31, in April 2024 Zavod#9 sent a letter demanding proof of completed work. The letter stated that no documentation had been received and called for comprehensive action within three days
17/ Despite production delays, quality issues, and sanctions, Russia is making a certain progress in manufacturing and deploying updated technologies. The key shift since the pre-war period is integrating battlefield experience into mass production plans
18/ Barring severe economic collapse or major defeat, if Russia spends several years building and stockpiling equipment while leveraging Chinese industry and Western parts, its future military will be more modern and technologically advanced than during the 2022 invasion.
19/ The full investigation, containing extensive data, is available on our website. Please follow the link for more information and access to the files referenced in this report
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Ukrainian drone strikes in Izhevsk: Russia’s arms heart, and Luhansk using rocket-drone "Peklo" demonstrates Kyiv’s growing technological abilities. The message to Putin is clear: Ukraine’s strike range and warhead size will only continue to expand as the war continues:
2/ Air defense drones are emerging as a promising counter to Russia’s expanding Shahed (Geran) drone output - no longer just a concept, but an increasingly likely solution that could help offset Moscow’s production surge with scalable and relatively cheap response
3/ Russia’s consistent failure to break Ukrainian front, despite a manpower edge, and mounting economic issues, admitted even by Putin, nullify their bravado shown during the latest Istanbul. Achieving Moscow’s stated goals would require far more resources than it's deploying
Our team has been tracking Russia’s recruitment efforts abroad, with a focus on West Africa and Cuba. Some revealing insights follow in this short thread🧵:
1. While some foreign POWs claim they were misled, documents suggest they joined Russia’s military knowingly
2. The reality is quite prosaic: Moscow offers steady pay that far surpasses local wages, along with the lure of adventure - an exciting offer for young men in economically strained countries. In some cases, recruits receive upfront bonuses as high as $20,000 and more
3. The contracts - often written in languages such as Spanish or French - clearly outline terms, including compensation for injury or death, and explicitly mention “Special Military Operation” zone. This makes claims of recruits being unaware highly implausible
Stories of undercover operatives who stay behind enemy lines and later fight in special ops units, through some of the war’s toughest battles, are usually found in movies or games. But this isn’t fiction. Here are key points from our interview with Artem "Skhidnyi" Karyakin 🧵:
2/ Artem, a native of Donbas, says he witnessed signs of Russian influence long before 2014. In his hometown of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov), a mining city in Luhansk Oblast with no historical ties to the Don Cossacks, a so-called “Don Cossack” group appeared in the early 2000s
3/ By 2014, the same “Cossacks” were seizing government buildings in Kadiivka - this time armed and operating under Russian flags. Many weren’t local; they had come from the Russian Federation, as had others who helped take control by force during the spring occupation efforts.
Bohdan Krotevych, former Chief of Staff of the 12th Brigade, notes that in some areas, a unit is spread across a stretch of more than five kilometers with just 10 to 12 soldiers. Only 25% of the battalion's original personnel remain.
🧵Few important points to add here:
2/ One of the first things people assume is that Ukraine isn’t recruiting or mobilizing, but this isn’t true. We estimate that 17,000 to 24,000 people are being called up each month. That’s still below Russia’s numbers, but far above what Russians want people to think
3/ At the tactical level, some units with capable leadership have adapted to the situation, partially offsetting personnel shortages through the effective use of drones, well-prepared positions, and, if possible, minefields. Yet, these are not the result of a systematic effort
You might find this picture morbid or eerie- odd in its own way, with unsettling details. Why is there a body on a door? Why is there no casket? And why is this happening in a lawn? It's a short story - one that makes the distant, abstract feeling of war suddenly tangible:
2/ Another summer in the Shakhtarskyi District of Pokrovsk. But things have changed. The air...
The heavy, putrid air of decomposing flesh punches you right in your nose, says Yana - a young Ukrainian volunteer who is trying to help those in city. Pure Nightmare - she adds
3/ “You feel it in many apartment blocks the moment you step into the stairwell,” she adds
That day, a small portable drone scanner kept alerting to the presence of Russian drones, ominously circling above the town. It didn’t take long before a dull thud echoed on the streets
I have yet to meet a single soldier who served on the front lines and agrees with General Syrski's opinion on this. His stance has been widely criticized by service members. Yet somehow, it's being presented as a success to English-speaking audiences.
No, foxholes are not some kind of tactical advantage to brag about. Quite often, they’re the result of poor organization and the failure of both civil and military administrations to coordinate and build proper defenses, as well as shortage of functional engineering equipment
To elaborate: foxholes are not effective protection against drones. The downsizing of fortifications is driven by a lack of personnel, the inability to dig near the front lines due to drone threats, and the failure to construct proper defenses in the rear due to poor organization