Through the Optics of War: An analysis of leaked confidential data from Russia’s military-industrial complex by Frontelligence Insight — from thermal scopes and laser anti-UAV programs to Chinese import schemes and production bottlenecks in the optoelectronic sector. 🧵Thread:
2/ Rostec is a state-owned conglomerate that includes much of Russia’s military-industrial complex. One of its key holdings, Shvabe, specializes in optical-electronic technologies for military and dual-use applications. The original files were obtained by the @256CyberAssault
3/ In February 2024, Polyus Scientific Research Institute, part of Shvabe Holding, was tasked with advancing laser technologies to counter UAVs. This includes developing materials like active elements under a program focused on high-power lasers, running through 2033.
4/ Similarly, in 2022, JSC High-Precision Systems and JSC Research Institute "Polyus" were assigned to propose the development of a counter-UAV laser system, potentially integrated with the Pantsir-S1.
5/ In May 2024, company VOMZ, in collaboration with Shvabe, were tasked with assessing the integration of UAVs into tank fire control systems. The goal is to improve reconnaissance and target engagement at extended ranges (up to 15 km), including from concealed firing positions
6/ Concealed/Closed-position firing allows a tank to engage targets without direct line of sight, using its main gun similarly to artillery. This enables fire support at extended ranges while keeping the tank hidden from view and out of reach of conventional anti-tank weapons.
7/ Our team assumes that Russia will continue attempts to integrate various UAV systems in fire control systems across various platforms – not just tanks, in future modernization efforts aiming to increase both the range and accuracy.
8/ Military plant Krasnogorsky Zavod (KMZ) was participating in OPS-28M production: an electro-optical surveillance and targeting system used on Mi-28NM helicopters. However, an August 2024 report noted that the quality of the supplied OPS-28M units was unsatisfactory.
9/ JSC State Institute of Applied Optics was tasked with import substitution of the Catherine-XP-PCS thermal imaging camera in the T-90M fire control system. But how is Russia handling import substitution? Achieving this appears difficult — if not impossible — without China
10/ According to data from the 256th Cyber Assault Unit shared by @InformNapalm, the company “YUMAK” supplied CNC machines from Chinese firms Push Ningjiang Machine Tool Co and Tianjin No.1 Machine Tool Works to “Zenit-Investprom,” a part of Shvabe holding
11/ One internal company document, which included a detailed task list, also contained a roster of various firms within the holding, along with their assigned task. Among them, one name stood out: Shvabe Opto-Electronics, based in Shenzhen, China.
12/ According to Trademo export-import data, Shvabe in Shenzhen has consistently supplied components to the Ural Optical and Mechanical Plant and JSC Novosibirsk Instrument-Making Plant—both sanctioned by the West, including the US
13/ Last but not least is the issue of production expansion. As previously mentioned, the company from Shvabe Holding called “Zenit-Investprom” has acquired Chinese industrial equipment to support manufacturing efforts of Rostec.
14/ Further investigation into Zenit-Investprom revealed extensive correspondence with Zavod No. 9—which can be translated as “Factory No. 9” — a facility known for producing towed artillery pieces such as the D-30 howitzers, as well as tank guns, including the newer T-90 models
15/ Given that some requested equipment for expansion —like the laser heat-strengthening system—is designed for metalwork, and considering the factory produces barrels for tanks and artillery, Russia likely tries to expand its barrel production
16/ While the deadline for Zenit-Investprom’s part of the project was 2023/12/31, in April 2024 Zavod#9 sent a letter demanding proof of completed work. The letter stated that no documentation had been received and called for comprehensive action within three days
17/ Despite production delays, quality issues, and sanctions, Russia is making a certain progress in manufacturing and deploying updated technologies. The key shift since the pre-war period is integrating battlefield experience into mass production plans
18/ Barring severe economic collapse or major defeat, if Russia spends several years building and stockpiling equipment while leveraging Chinese industry and Western parts, its future military will be more modern and technologically advanced than during the 2022 invasion.
19/ The full investigation, containing extensive data, is available on our website. Please follow the link for more information and access to the files referenced in this report
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There’s been a lot of discussion about the potential threat FPV drones could pose to US forces on the ground, with some going as far as claiming that American troops would suffer heavy casualties from FPV drones. That’s possible, but it’s also worth questioning the assumptions:
2/ First, it’s not clear to what extent Iran has actually trained and prepared its ground forces for large-scale use of small drones. Even relatively decentralized militaries still operate within ORBAT and logistics. So far, there isn’t strong evidence of systemic changes within the Iranian army to support widespread FPV deployment.
3/ Second, we’ve seen relatively little FPV usage from Iran-supported groups like Hamas or Hezbollah, despite continuous war with Israel. A few examples have emerged from Iraq, but we’re talking about a handful of videos at most. That’s not a level of a large-scale implementation
With an uncertain battlefield position, Russia has intensified hybrid operations to shape European public opinion. A key element is the spread of narratives portraying Ukraine as using “energy blackmail” against Europe, often echoed by politically sympathetic actors. 🧵Thread:
2/ Since the full-scale invasion began, Russian missile and drone strikes have targeted Ukraine’s energy system, damaging power plants, gas facilities, and transmission networks nationwide. Ukraine has lost about 11.5 GW of capacity, with damage reportedly exceeding $24.8 billion
3/ The war has also affected energy transport infrastructure. Ukrainian oil facilities have been attacked more than 400 times since the invasion began. On 27 January 2026, a strike damaged equipment working for the Druzhba pipeline near Brody in western Ukraine.
Leaked internal files from Moscow reveal that Russia’s ruling party, United Russia, keeps intelligence-style dossiers on its own politicians. They document corruption facts, criminal ties, and personal vulnerabilities, information used to manage Russia’s politics
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2/ United Russia is the political party that dominates Russia’s parliament and regional governments and serves as the main political vehicle of Putin.
Leaked documents from the party, published by @dallasparkua and @256CyberAssault, reveal details of an internal vetting process
3/ Meet Evgeniy Gnedov, who oversees the vetting of candidates for various lawmaking bodies - from local assemblies to the federal parliament.
A longtime security official, he spent decades inside the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia, eventually rising to a senior role
Russia’s war in Ukraine has increasingly become a war of drones, but artillery still plays a key role on the battlefield. Newly obtained documents from 2014 to 2025 show that Russia continues to modernize its artillery production using industrial machinery from Europe. 🧵Thread:
2/ In a joint analysis, Frontelligence Insight and the @dallasparkua company reviewed hundreds of internal documents from Russian defense contractor Zenit-Investprom and found that Plant No. 9, a maker of artillery barrels and tank guns, went through major upgrades in 2025
3/ Six facilities within the Uralmash industrial zone were found to be undergoing modernization, including planned delivery of industrial machinery from several European countries. Several workshops were dedicated to work on the Armata project and the Koalitsiya SPG.
As we approach a point marking the beginning of the war’s 5th year, it is time to discuss how we assess the war’s overall dynamics, strictly from a military standpoint. One method many analysts use is the pace of territory capture. However, this methodology has a serious issue🧵:
2/ Generally, this is not a bad method of analyzing battlefield dynamics, as the history of wars shows far more cases of states advancing along frontlines or into enemy territory before a war ends in their favor than the opposite. The devil, however, lies in the details
3/ Putting aside other domains of war, such as economics and socio-politics, battlefield dynamics are often judged by metrics like casualty rates and square kilometers of controlled territory. This can produce a distorted picture, a problem I informally term the “Sahara Fallacy”