Through the Optics of War: An analysis of leaked confidential data from Russia’s military-industrial complex by Frontelligence Insight — from thermal scopes and laser anti-UAV programs to Chinese import schemes and production bottlenecks in the optoelectronic sector. 🧵Thread:
2/ Rostec is a state-owned conglomerate that includes much of Russia’s military-industrial complex. One of its key holdings, Shvabe, specializes in optical-electronic technologies for military and dual-use applications. The original files were obtained by the @256CyberAssault
3/ In February 2024, Polyus Scientific Research Institute, part of Shvabe Holding, was tasked with advancing laser technologies to counter UAVs. This includes developing materials like active elements under a program focused on high-power lasers, running through 2033.
4/ Similarly, in 2022, JSC High-Precision Systems and JSC Research Institute "Polyus" were assigned to propose the development of a counter-UAV laser system, potentially integrated with the Pantsir-S1.
5/ In May 2024, company VOMZ, in collaboration with Shvabe, were tasked with assessing the integration of UAVs into tank fire control systems. The goal is to improve reconnaissance and target engagement at extended ranges (up to 15 km), including from concealed firing positions
6/ Concealed/Closed-position firing allows a tank to engage targets without direct line of sight, using its main gun similarly to artillery. This enables fire support at extended ranges while keeping the tank hidden from view and out of reach of conventional anti-tank weapons.
7/ Our team assumes that Russia will continue attempts to integrate various UAV systems in fire control systems across various platforms – not just tanks, in future modernization efforts aiming to increase both the range and accuracy.
8/ Military plant Krasnogorsky Zavod (KMZ) was participating in OPS-28M production: an electro-optical surveillance and targeting system used on Mi-28NM helicopters. However, an August 2024 report noted that the quality of the supplied OPS-28M units was unsatisfactory.
9/ JSC State Institute of Applied Optics was tasked with import substitution of the Catherine-XP-PCS thermal imaging camera in the T-90M fire control system. But how is Russia handling import substitution? Achieving this appears difficult — if not impossible — without China
10/ According to data from the 256th Cyber Assault Unit shared by @InformNapalm, the company “YUMAK” supplied CNC machines from Chinese firms Push Ningjiang Machine Tool Co and Tianjin No.1 Machine Tool Works to “Zenit-Investprom,” a part of Shvabe holding
11/ One internal company document, which included a detailed task list, also contained a roster of various firms within the holding, along with their assigned task. Among them, one name stood out: Shvabe Opto-Electronics, based in Shenzhen, China.
12/ According to Trademo export-import data, Shvabe in Shenzhen has consistently supplied components to the Ural Optical and Mechanical Plant and JSC Novosibirsk Instrument-Making Plant—both sanctioned by the West, including the US
13/ Last but not least is the issue of production expansion. As previously mentioned, the company from Shvabe Holding called “Zenit-Investprom” has acquired Chinese industrial equipment to support manufacturing efforts of Rostec.
14/ Further investigation into Zenit-Investprom revealed extensive correspondence with Zavod No. 9—which can be translated as “Factory No. 9” — a facility known for producing towed artillery pieces such as the D-30 howitzers, as well as tank guns, including the newer T-90 models
15/ Given that some requested equipment for expansion —like the laser heat-strengthening system—is designed for metalwork, and considering the factory produces barrels for tanks and artillery, Russia likely tries to expand its barrel production
16/ While the deadline for Zenit-Investprom’s part of the project was 2023/12/31, in April 2024 Zavod#9 sent a letter demanding proof of completed work. The letter stated that no documentation had been received and called for comprehensive action within three days
17/ Despite production delays, quality issues, and sanctions, Russia is making a certain progress in manufacturing and deploying updated technologies. The key shift since the pre-war period is integrating battlefield experience into mass production plans
18/ Barring severe economic collapse or major defeat, if Russia spends several years building and stockpiling equipment while leveraging Chinese industry and Western parts, its future military will be more modern and technologically advanced than during the 2022 invasion.
19/ The full investigation, containing extensive data, is available on our website. Please follow the link for more information and access to the files referenced in this report
Thank you for reading. It takes considerable time and effort to sift through tens of thousands of records to find and interpret valuable data. We haven’t asked for support in a while, so we kindly invite you to consider financially supporting our work
How bad is Russia’s war chest? Has the country entered stagflation? Why does it fear falling oil prices, but not a crash? And how is the tariff war hurting Russia?
These questions — and more — are explored in a special interview with Russian economist Vladimir Milov.
🧵Thread:
2/ Tariff wars:
China’s economic slowdown has closed its market to many Russian products, hitting major industries hard. The China-focused Russian coal industry is struggling, and Russian non-energy and non-commodity exports are down by about a quarter compared to pre-2022 levels
3/ Tariff war will obviously exacerbate the Chinese slowdown. The slower Chinese growth, the less market for Russian goods. Share of China in the total Russian exports is as high as a third now - we're heavily dependent on this market and its well-being.
1/ The exhaustion of Russia’s vehicle fleet is becoming increasingly evident. The reduced use of armored vehicles and the growing reliance on civilian: including motorcycles, golf carts, and vans, continues to signal a degradation in Russian maneuvering capabilities.
2/ During the winter, outside of Kursk, Russia achieved mostly tactical gains, notably in Kharkiv Oblast, the Chasiv Yar area and Kurakhove–Velyka Novosilka axis. While these advances have been troubling for Ukraine, Russia has so far failed to capitalize on them strategically.
3/ Despite slow progress, Russia still retains the resources and capability to conduct active offensive operations through the summer and fall of 2025. However, as I noted in my analysis last year, the diminishing returns will determine whether Russia will continue this war
While our team continues working on the latest updates, here are a few updates on the current state of the frontline:
1/ Despite holding the advantage along much of the frontline, Russia’s winter campaign yielded limited results - indicating Ukraine’s situation is not dire
2/ The Pokrovsk area now appears more stable than in February. At that time, Russian forces had established a foothold in Zvirove, with deeper advances into Pokrovsk looking imminent. Since then, not only have the Russians stalled, but they have actually lost some ground.
3/ The overall composition and number of Russian forces near Sumy oblast currently seem insufficient to support a large-scale offensive operation deep into the region.
One of the biggest problems of this war is that Ukraine and the West haven’t clearly defined what "winning" looks like. This has allowed the Russians to present the "Istanbul Agreements" as the only viable negotiation framework, due to the absence of a well-defined alternative.
2/ The "Victory Plan" presented by Zelensky is not a true negotiation framework, and it didn’t resonate with the previous administration, let alone the current White House administration. Of course, there are alternative options, such as Russia retreating to 1991 borders
3/ The problem is that Russia won't do that, and there is no realistic enforcement mechanism, short of intervention. The United States isn’t going to bomb Russia. This raises the question: what does a "desired outcome," based on the realities on the ground, actually look like?
Almost every day, we hear about strikes against targets inside Russia, but we rarely get the full picture of their actual impact on the war. Radio Liberty and Frontelligence Insight have joined efforts to analyze hundreds of data points to answer this question.
🧵Thread
2/ Our research covered the period from September 2024 to February 2025, divided into two sections: strikes on military targets, infrastructure, and on the energy sector. We found that strikes on Russia’s energy sector caused at least $658 million in damage over ~6 months
3/ The real damage to the Russian energy sector and the economy as a whole may be higher. In at least 67 out of 100 cases, Ukrainian strikes were successful, while in another 33 cases the result of the attacks remains unknown or it is impossible to prove Ukraine's involvement.
Kursk Offensive: A Preliminary Assessment by Frontelligence Insight.
A condensed version of report for X. 🧵Thread:
1/ With Ukrainian forces withdrawing from Sudzha, the operation is clearly approaching its conclusion though it is not yet entirely over.
2/ To assess the operation, not in isolation, but within the broader context of the war, we broke down the Kursk operation into 3 key questions: whether its geopolitical objectives were met, whether the attrition rate was favorable, and whether it achieved battlefield success
3/ To determine equipment attrition, we analyzed data from OSINT analyst @naalsio26, who tracks losses across multiple frontlines. Our graphs show losses from August to March but are not exhaustive, as they exclude some retreat-related losses. The cut-off date was March 10.