Thread by @MujammaHaraket

*How Hamas' "Amn al-haraka" unit, i.e. Hamas' internal unit for internal security, audited and suspended al-Qassam Brigades fighters who became Salafis in 2010. A thread*

In 2010, to combat the Saudi-funded rise in Salafism in Gaza, Hamas undertook a number of measures.

This included putting membership applications to the al-Qassam brigades on hold whilst members who engaged in suspicious behavior like using Takfiris language were scrutinized.

The Hamas government also appointed a fact-finding commission consisting of respected religious scholars and psychologists, from within as well as outside its own movement. Its mission was to investigate the roots of the Salafi-Jihadi phenomenon in Gaza and determine how it

could be dealt with more successfully. The commission’s final report described the present member base of Hamas, profiled the kind of recruits it should be seeking and recommended constructive ways of addressing radicalisation when it occurred.

The report became the basis for a new approach to the Salafi-Jihadis. Through innovative means such as monitoring, respectful treatment, dialogue and religious debate, the Hamas government opted for a containment of the Salafi-Jihadi problem and possibly even the rehabilitation

of the individuals involved. The commission found that the majority of Salafi-Jihadis were found to be young Ghazzawis who were seeking alternative ways of channelling their despair and lack of hope in the future.

One cornerstone of the Hamas government's new approach included the new powers given by the government to its Ministry of Religious Endowments over Gaza’s Islamic infrastructure.

The activities of mosques, religious charities and other Islamic associations were thoroughly scrutinised. Employees were audited and mosques under Salafi influence were either shut down or had their imams replaced by people trained by Hamas.

This auditing process was relatively aggressive. Little distinction was made between Salafi and Salafi-Jihadi congregations. Peaceful Salafi associations such as Dar al-Kitab wal-Sunna felt that their work was becoming difficult as a result of the government’s imposition of

new restrictions and the withdrawal of some its licences to carry out dawa. One of their mosques in Jabaliya was stormed and closed by the government (but later reopened). Hizb ut-Tahrir in Gaza, the Islamic Salvation Party, which had a stronger political profile than the other

Salafi associations, was dealt with in an even harsher manner. Financial inducements were used as an effective instrument to control the once-Salafi mosques. By offering the board overseeing the congregation more money if it accepted a certain cleric as its imam, the Hamas

government effectively influenced these mosques' agendas and messaging. While this approach was not completely new, it now became broadly applied to all of Gaza’s Islamic associations.

As part of the new approach, religious re-education was offered to those Qassam fighters who had fallen to Salafism. Following the re-education process, if they were deemed ready to be accepted as members again, they were offered re-employment.

In the past, when fighters had been dismissed, they had usually been left to face their families and friends on their own with all the humiliation that entailed.112 Among Gazans, suspension from the Qassam Brigades was commonly understood to mean that the individuals concerned

had failed to follow the Brigades’ Islamic principles. It was therefore especially shameful for those affected, and it is not surprising that ex-Qassam fighters had for the past few years been a major source of recruitment for the Salafi-Jihadi groups.

These ex-Qassam fighters were particularly vulnerable and receptive to the recruitment attempts of new groups, as they were strongly motivated to prove themselves to society, both to demonstrate their religious credentials and to show their willingness to continue to fight the

occupation. Based on the various figures given in interviews in Björn Brenner's "Gaza Under Hamas: From Islamic Democracy to Islamist Governance" (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), the number of suspended Qassam fighters is estimated to have been 30 –50.

Upon being suspected of Salafi-Jihadi sympathies, a Qassam fighter's membership would be frozen and they would be Hamas' "Amn al-haraka", the movement’s own unit for internal security. Revocation of membership from Qassam meant being banned from participation in any of

Hamas’s activities. For those ex-Qassam members who succeeded in passing Hamas’s audit, obligatory courses in Islamic morals and ethics were also on the table. These courses were part of the education component of Hamas' new approach, aimed at strengthening members’ religious

knowledge. For both the excluded fighters and those who remained, the rigorous audit process was followed up by Islamic re-education.

By seizing these Salafi groups' arms and arresting their leaders, Hamas sought to remove the elements necessary for the Salafi-Jihadis to

continue their militant activities. They were then also forbidden to appear in the media or to give interviews. Moreover, the Salafi-Jihadis were forbidden from taking part in any violent resistance against Israel, and at times were confined to their homes – in effect house

arrest. However, there was an additional, softer, element to the government’s handling of these Salafi dissidents. Unless they had been arrested for involvement in a particular incident, their detention periods were shortened to less than a week at a time and they were given

special treatment in jail. There were no human rights abuses and these detainees were held in a separate detention centre with high standards, separate from the Gaza strip’s ordinary prison facilities.

The shorter detention periods to which these men were subject included educational sessions aimed at improving the Salafi-Jihadis’ interpretations of Islam. These education sessions were followed up, on release, by regular home visits from religious teachers and parole officers

from the security forces. Hamas' adoption of an approach based on containment and rehabilitation was an important part of its response, which was eventually quite successful.

Ministry of the Interior assigned its permanent department, the Political and Moral Guidance Commission (PMGC), to draft a comprehensive package of measures for deradicalisation – Hamas’s own version of a prison-based deradicalisation programme. The PMGC had originally been

placed under the direction of Hamas’s security forces. However, when Siad Siam was minister of the interior, the department was given the task of overseeing the introduction of Islamic values into Gazan society. As a result, it was subordinated directly to the Ministry of the

Interior. Siam’s successor Fathi Hamad (Siam was killed during Operation Cast Lead) continued to develop the new role given to the PMGC, adding new tasks and expanding its organisation.The restructured department was directed by Anwar al-Baraawi and its mission became

increasingly wide in scope, ranging from traditional ministerial tasks such as developing behavioural and ethical guidelines for the police and security forces to arranging religious and cultural events. The PMGC was tasked with designing the deradicalisation programme, with the

practical work being delegated to the commission’s two organisational units for counselling and for religious guidance.The first part of the Hamas government’s programme consisted of a three-month curriculum of religious-based counselling. Hamas’s deradicalisation programme was

not merely a local product designed in Gaza and carried out in isolation from the movement’s politburo in exile. On the contrary, politburo members shared local concerns about the threat posed by the Salafi-Jihadi phenomenon (see: Luay Ammar, 'Tens of detainees released while

lectures are organised to raise awareness of others, "Filisteen al-Muslima" Vol. 27, p. 49.). Izzat al-Rishaq, for instance, expressed concern over the situation and explained what was being done: "We try to treat their way of thinking, to convince them to leave the al-Qaeda

thoughts, by discussion and arguments" (Izzat al-Rishiq quoted in Are Hovdenak, 'Al-Qaida – a challenge for Hamas?', FFI Report 2009/00092 (2009), p. 32.)
In 2009, the Hamas administration also began the construction of five new detention centres for Gaza’s 1,200 security

detainees, a number which remained relatively stable until 2012. The new detention centres were located in Gaza City (2), Khan Younis (1), Nuseirat (1), and Jabaliya (1). In 2011, there were approximately 1,800 detainees held in the West Bank and 1,200 in Gaza.

The basic process of detention for such Salafi-Jihadi prisoners consisted of two phases. The first phase involved a period of detention with the security forces for information-gathering purposes. This was then followed by transfer to a rehabilitation center.

During the second phase, the detainee was usually bound to stand trial. However, Salafi-Jihadis prisoners were arrested and released on a regular basis, commonly without standing trial. When a detainee had completed his period of interrogation by the security forces in the

central al-Ansar facility (or sometimes in smaller field offices), he was passed on to one of the detention centre. The Gazan Salafi-Jihadis were not introduced to the programme on a voluntary basis: counselling sessions were an obligatory part of detention. Refusal to

participate in the sessions was punished with solitary confinement. Hamas’s deradicalisation programme included all detainees and was delivered in three main curricular blocks, two of which were taught inside prison while the third block was delivered following the detainees’

release. The first block of the programme consisted of a series of counselling sessions. These sessions were led by local senior religious scholars, highly respected in the community and across the political spectrum.

The Hamas government selected scholars who were either affiliated with the movement, such as Shaykh Sulayman al-Daya, or Salafi and affiliated with the Dawa salafiyya (the non-violent Salafi movement), such as Salma Dias and Omar Hams.

Some of them had lengthy service records with the Qassam Brigades. The most prominent scholars were used by the Hamas government for sensitive, religiously based mediation work with detainees.

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