*On the zionist occupation’s prisons as a meeting ground for various Palestinian factions: a short thread*
(image from Tarek Hamoud, “Evaluating the Structural Political Developments in the Islamic Palestinian Resistance Movement as a Ruling Authority Between 2006-2017”, 2023) In its earliest stages, the zionist occupation’s prisons served as a crucial setting for fostering interaction between Hamas and other Palestinian factions. The origins of Hamas’s concept of national partnership are generally believed to have emerged within zionist prisons during

@DougLain @JacktheFate @ccutrone1970 @compactmag_ To claim that Hamas took Gaza by force and has held it by force is historically inaccurate. Hamas prevented the PA, trained by Keith Dayton and bolstered by Condoleezza Rice, from exacting a coup. Hamas has not repressed the PFLP or socialist organizations, which do enjoy a base @DougLain @JacktheFate @ccutrone1970 @compactmag_ and do not “tail” Hamas. In fact, Hamas and PFLP, DFLP, and other socialist organizations have enjoyed good relations, despite some debates and disagreements, since George Habash, secretary general of the PFLP, spoke with notable enthusiasm about Hamas in the publication

THE PRE-HISTORY OF HAMAS' AL-QASSAM BRIGADES FORMATION: A SHORT THREAD ON THE FORMATION OF “THE PALESTINIAN MUJAHIDUN" & AL-MAJD

(photo from the First Intifada, graffiti reading "Against Conferences for the Sale of Our Land", Musa Allush Collection) In 1985, Sheikh Yassin was released after 11 months in prison, due to a prisoner exchange between the zionist entity and Ahmed Jibril’s PFLP-General Command. After his release, Yassin went back to work; in 1985, he helped set up a new armed organization called al-Majd (Glory), an

*On Hamas’ Unique Nationalist-Islamic Code of Conduct, its Approach to Education During the First Intifada, and the PA’s Repressive Response Thereafter*

During the years 1987 - 1993, Hamas differed from the PLO-affiliated Unified National Leadership of the Intifada on the
subject of declaring general strikes affecting schools; while the latter insisted on the participation of all students in the general strike, leading to the closing down of schools, Hamas exempted educational establishments from general strikes and called on students to attend

@TLAVagabond @ResistancePoppy @TheLemming5 @mbeez__ @ProtectPal I would argue that Hroub, Tamimi and especially Seurat do (and I am glad you are familiar with Seurat, whose recent book goes in depth about the issue of the Great March of Return 2018-19 negotiations); Tamimi especially is instructive re: the Zakat-based funding and how the x.com/mujammaharaket… @TLAVagabond @ResistancePoppy @TheLemming5 @mbeez__ @ProtectPal licenses were distributed during the entity’s occupation of Gaza in particular (whether it be Fatah’s Shabiba clubs in 1981 or the Palestinian Ikhwan’s al-Mujamma). Regardless of whether I have convinced you, however, I would aver that the matter is no by no means obvious—

* Hamas, Iran, and the 1991 International Conference to Support the Palestinian People’s Islamic Revolution: A Short Thread on the Nascent Beginning of Iran-Hamas Relations*

PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat had landed in Tehran in 1979 as the first official visitor to the capital
under the revolutionary government of Iran and was given a triumphal welcome befitting mujahidin. The visit resulted in the opening of a Palestine embassy in place of what used to be the Israeli mission under the Shah. The first few months witnessed the flowering of fraternal

*Hamas’ Relationship with Other Resistance Factions During the First Intifada: A Short Thread*

As Hamas was established as the First Intifada began and was organically part and parcel of this uprising, it was politically necessary and organic for it to form alliances with other Palestinian resistance organizations, which were also involved in the Intifada. Notably, these relationships were contextualized by the then accelerating pace of the so-called “peace process”, which picked up in parallel with the Intifada as a Palestinian state was declared at

*Hamas, Collaborators and the death penalty: a short history* Part 2.

On 10 May 2010, a public campaign against collaborators is launched by Hamas.  The Ministry of Internal National Security website launched a widely advertised campaign to combat collaboration.

https://twitter.com/MujammaHaraket/status/1937750133757587525

A two-month grace period was declared where informers who turned themselves in voluntarily would benefit from amnesty. The campaign employed billboards and transmission of thousands of SMS texts to the mobile telephones of Gaza residents.

*Hamas, Collaborators and the death penalty: a short history*

With the exception of Yezid Sayigh's excellent book, "We Serve the People: Hams Policing in Gaza" (Waltham, MA: Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University), little has been written on the issue of Hamas' legal code following its governance as of June 2007 "hâsim" (the term Hamas prefers to “inqilâb” (coup).

[pictured: new cadets with wooden rifle ceremony, 2019, Palestinian Interior Ministry]

*On Beverley Milton-Edwards: the West's Favorite Putative Hamas Scholar*

Beverley Milton-Edwards is a nonresident senior fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs who has published several books and articles on Hamas including, most recently, the co-authored "HAMAS: The Quest for Power" with Stephen Farrell (published in 2024 by Wiley). She is also the chief popularizer of the false narrative that Hamas's existence can be attributed to the witting role of Israel.

*How Hamas' "Amn al-haraka" unit, i.e. Hamas' internal unit for internal security, audited and suspended al-Qassam Brigades fighters who became Salafis in 2010. A thread*

In 2010, to combat the Saudi-funded rise in Salafism in Gaza, Hamas undertook a number of measures. This included putting membership applications to the al-Qassam brigades on hold whilst members who engaged in suspicious behavior like using Takfiris language were scrutinized.

How did Hamas Handle the rise of Salafism? A thread?

In approximately 2011, Salafism was exported to Gaza by Saudi-funded personalities including individual was Nizar al-Rayan, Mohammed Talib, and Khaled Banat. Notably, it was not an organic phenomena to Palestine. In 2011, increasing access to the internet made contact with radical clerics in other parts of the world possible. Questions would be put to online clerics whose answers were taken as fatwas to be followed word for word.

*A short thread on the Executive Force (al-qiwa al-tanfîdîyâ)*
April 2006: creation of Hamas’ Executive Force (al-qiwa al-tanfîdîyâ) by Said Siam as Fatah security forces refused to cooperate with the new Hamas interior minister. Comprising 5,800 men, it was Hamas’ police.

https://twitter.com/cherinoblossom/status/1919044990447034692

This was a response to Fatah's security forces—where, notably, the Palestinian security forces consisted of the Presidential Guard, National Security, General Intelligence and Preventative Security organizations—who worked closely with Israeli counterparts to detain Hamas members

“Dispelling the Myth, propagated by Abu Mazen’s wing of Fatah and liberal zionists, that Israel Funded Hamas: A Thread”

This is an old Fatah lie, anchored in, during the Israeli occupation of Gaza, Israel permitting Sheikh Yassin’s Islamic Society to open in 1967 and then the 1976 Islamic Center to engage in food pantry, orphanage, and religious civil services.

Indeed, in 1967, the al-Jam'iyah al-Islamiyah (the Islamic Society) received permits for the educational activities run in al-Shati (beach) Mosque.

@NotZionist44 @RealScottRitter @thopelep No, that’s a narrative I have seen popularized recently. But it betrays ignorance about Hamas’ political bureau—both its history and how it operates. Meshal has long made such statements but he is part of the “diaspora” wing.

Hamas' Political Bureau is called the maktab @NotZionist44 @RealScottRitter @thopelep al-siyâsî and the internal groups are spread out in four locations: 1) the Gaza Strip, 2) the West Bank, 3) Israeli prisons in which some of its members are jailed and, lastly, 4) the outside.