While this @Tatarigami_UA 🧵concentrates on the modernization of pieces of the Russian military-industrial base as a cautionary tale.
It leaves a throw away line about economic collapse that leaves out the reality of Russian industrial/infrastructure disinvestment which will
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It leaves a throw away line about economic collapse that leaves out the reality of Russian industrial/infrastructure disinvestment which will
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https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1924540835745693993
...continue for years even if the fighting stops tomorrow.
The rundown of Russian stocks of western railway bearing will continue for years because the specialty steel supply chain feeding western bearing manufacturers has shut down unused capacity after 3-years of war.
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The rundown of Russian stocks of western railway bearing will continue for years because the specialty steel supply chain feeding western bearing manufacturers has shut down unused capacity after 3-years of war.
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It will take years to "turn on" the specialty steel pipeline to even begin to make new bearings for the Russian railways.
Compounding the matter is the extreme age of the Russian rolling stock fleet of 1.1 million freight cars/wagons at the beginning of the war.
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Compounding the matter is the extreme age of the Russian rolling stock fleet of 1.1 million freight cars/wagons at the beginning of the war.
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The International Railway Journal reported the following in 2018:
"There are 1.1 million freight wagons currently in operation in Russia, with gondolas accounting for the greatest proportion of the fleet - 47%, or 509,000 units. Other major types of freight wagons include tank-wagons with a share of 248,000 (23%), flat wagons with 128,000 (12%), hoppers with 108,000 units (10%) and covered car wagons with 55,000 units (5%)."
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"There are 1.1 million freight wagons currently in operation in Russia, with gondolas accounting for the greatest proportion of the fleet - 47%, or 509,000 units. Other major types of freight wagons include tank-wagons with a share of 248,000 (23%), flat wagons with 128,000 (12%), hoppers with 108,000 units (10%) and covered car wagons with 55,000 units (5%)."
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Russia's 1.1 million pieces of non-engine rolling stock (about 1/2 of which is Cold War vintage) have been the bone of contention between Putin's cronies, who have been gouging everyone and not maintaining their rail wagons for at least a decade, and the Russian Railway.
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The Russian railway monopoly has been complaining about this publicly since at least March 2010⬇️
"Every year, Russian Railways invests huge amounts of money in the repair of rolling stock, the purchase of new cars and the maintenance of the infrastructure of the industry (1.1 trillion rubles in the last six years alone). At the expense of Russian Railways, and not at the expense of private companies that have no obligations in this regard, 700 km of new lines and second tracks were laid, more than 900 locomotives and 4 thousand passenger cars were purchased. Willingly or unwittingly, but in this way the interests of private companies are served at the expense of the state - should this be the goal of the reform?"
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"Every year, Russian Railways invests huge amounts of money in the repair of rolling stock, the purchase of new cars and the maintenance of the infrastructure of the industry (1.1 trillion rubles in the last six years alone). At the expense of Russian Railways, and not at the expense of private companies that have no obligations in this regard, 700 km of new lines and second tracks were laid, more than 900 locomotives and 4 thousand passenger cars were purchased. Willingly or unwittingly, but in this way the interests of private companies are served at the expense of the state - should this be the goal of the reform?"
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The Russian railways reported that there were 150,000 "inactive wagons" on its rail lines on April 14, 2022 out of those 1.1 million wagons that reportedly existed in 2018.
That is 13.6% of the available rolling stock which was "inactive."
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That is 13.6% of the available rolling stock which was "inactive."
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It's unclear what "inactive" means.
There were major Russian tax changes in the last quarter of 2021 and many rail wagon loads were abandoned to the Russian railways as the Russian military build up pig went down the trans Siberian railway.
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There were major Russian tax changes in the last quarter of 2021 and many rail wagon loads were abandoned to the Russian railways as the Russian military build up pig went down the trans Siberian railway.
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Short form:
There was railway administrative chaos.
Chaos that never really stopped as western economic sanctions altered trading patterns causing Chinese goods to replace Western ones by rail not sea.
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There was railway administrative chaos.
Chaos that never really stopped as western economic sanctions altered trading patterns causing Chinese goods to replace Western ones by rail not sea.
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What is interesting is that Russia mentioned publicly that same "150,000 inactive wagons" figure from April 2022 as inactive in March 2025 with a total wagon fleet of _400,000_ wagons instead of 1.1 million of 2018.
(Clip H/T @Prune602)
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(Clip H/T @Prune602)
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Then the Russian article mentioning the 400,000 rail wagon/car fleet was deleted from the web.
I _DON'T_ think that means 600K russian railway wagon/cars are out of service in 2025 compared to 2018.
It does mean Russia now considers railway wagon data a state secret.
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I _DON'T_ think that means 600K russian railway wagon/cars are out of service in 2025 compared to 2018.
It does mean Russia now considers railway wagon data a state secret.
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Given that the Russian Army is following the time honored logistical mistake of using local rail rolling stock as mobile warehouse storage.
There are good reasons for Russia to make that data a state secret.
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There are good reasons for Russia to make that data a state secret.
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https://x.com/TrentTelenko/status/1909019330387534288
Before the "cone of silence" dropped on Russian railway data, we did get some useful datums for how Western sanctions are affecting Russian rail engine availability.
There were 42,600 trains delayed by engine unavailability in 2023, up from 17,750 in 2022.
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There were 42,600 trains delayed by engine unavailability in 2023, up from 17,750 in 2022.
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Trains delayed by locomotive maintenance going up by 24,850 in 2023 is a significant increase.
We don't know what 2024 and 2025 train delay data is, but 'much worse' is reasonable.
There were reportedly 13,741 locomotives on the Russian railways in 2020.
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We don't know what 2024 and 2025 train delay data is, but 'much worse' is reasonable.
There were reportedly 13,741 locomotives on the Russian railways in 2020.
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The planning factor of how many Russian trains are delayed for each locomotive out of service isn't knowable.
If we best case at 75 trains per engine and worse case as 25 trains per engine and divide by the reported delays.
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If we best case at 75 trains per engine and worse case as 25 trains per engine and divide by the reported delays.
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...we get the following locomotive out of service numbers:
17,150/75= 710
17,150/25=2,130
42,600/75=1,704
42,600/25=5,112
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17,150/75= 710
17,150/25=2,130
42,600/75=1,704
42,600/25=5,112
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Having 5,112 engines down in 2023 out of a fleet of 13,741 locomotives doesn't match historical Russian railway performance.
So 75 or more Russian trains delayed per engine down for unplanned maintenance is a reasonable first order approximation.
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So 75 or more Russian trains delayed per engine down for unplanned maintenance is a reasonable first order approximation.
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Using those numbers for engine down percentages yields the following:
2022 710/13,741 engines = 5.1% down for repairs
2023 1,704/13,741 engines = 12.4% down for repairs
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2022 710/13,741 engines = 5.1% down for repairs
2023 1,704/13,741 engines = 12.4% down for repairs
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The August 2024 Ukrainian Kursk offensive gave us all some very hard data that the engine situation was far worse.
Russians were shooting individual Ukrainian tanks with ballistic missiles due to a shortage of artillery tubes and shells.
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Russians were shooting individual Ukrainian tanks with ballistic missiles due to a shortage of artillery tubes and shells.
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https://x.com/TrentTelenko/status/1824162614529667262
...9 days into offensive.
Russia trickle fed large numbers of troops via road march into a new generation of Ukrainian fixed wing loitering munitions for a several weeks w/o tube & rocket artillery.
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Russia trickle fed large numbers of troops via road march into a new generation of Ukrainian fixed wing loitering munitions for a several weeks w/o tube & rocket artillery.
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https://x.com/Schizointel/status/1824180034552086538
I went into great detail in an August 2024 thread on the non-mechanized logistical evolutions of Russia having to relocate combat troops, artillery supply chains and the three layer cake motor transport to Kursk for supporting the Army.
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https://x.com/TrentTelenko/status/1824510358838473080
Whatever you care to say about how bad Russian Railway logistics were in August 2024.
They are worse in 2025 because the inertia of industrial disinvestment means least 1/5 of Russian engines & rail wagons are out of service & likely much more.
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They are worse in 2025 because the inertia of industrial disinvestment means least 1/5 of Russian engines & rail wagons are out of service & likely much more.
22/22
https://x.com/TrentTelenko/status/1824510385686557012
@threadreaderapp unroll please
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