Brad Setser Profile picture
May 21 12 tweets 3 min read Read on X
In Japan's low for long era (with a flat curve out to 10ys, thanks to yield curve control), the Japanese banks loaded up on ultra long bonds & probably are looking to lighten up.

But there are natural buyers long-dated JGBs too

1/ Image
The low for long era (with a different shaped curve in Japan and the US/ Europe) pushed the insurers into foreign bonds & big Japanese institutions like Post bank and Nochu as well. These institutions have yen liabilities, and thus naturally would match with yen bonds

2/
The main constraint I suspect is that many of the insurers took large mark to market losses on their foreign bonds in 22 and 23 (hence the fall in the market value of their portfolio) and selling the bonds may mean realizing losses

3/ Image
The insurers also reduced their ratio (now only ~ 40% hedged per the BoJ) as hedging costs rose

With $500b in bonds and $300b or so unhedged, they have a lot of firepower -- and a 20y JGB is a great match for their liabilities.

4/
Post bank and Nochu are massive, with $700-800b in foreign bonds (mostly hedged) on the asset side and only yen liabilities -- they were forced by the flat curve abroad (and into the ultralongs) but could come home

5/ Image
The big players were mostly hedged (tho maybe the held funds in third party managers who played some games) so this repatriation would not necessarily be a yen positive flow. But at some stage they can lock in a lot of flow profits by doing what they were set up to do .... 6/
Nochu and Postbank show up in the "other financial investors" category of the IMF portfolio survey b/c of their heavy use of external fund managers. So does the GPIF ...

7/ Image
Japanese friends and close watchers of its markets tell me that GPIF isn't nimble and it cannot easily adjust its portfolio allocation ...

8/
But it is huge, and its portfolio now is only 1/4 domestic bonds (1/4 is foreign bonds, 1/4 is foreign equities). Selling foreign equities (at a very attractive valuation) to buy long-dated JGBs (with a nice real yield) would be a good trade imo ...

9/
Point being that Japan's massive (50% of GDP) foreign bond holdings and the fact that most of these bonds are held by a small set of public or quasi public institutions gives Japan a unique set of options --

10/ Image
There are constraints on a reallocation back to Japan (probably ones other than those I identified) -- and such a flow would mostly be a yen positive flow, which creates another problem for the lifers and others with open positions ...

11/
But at the end of the day there is a strong potential domestic bid for long-dated JGBs other than the BoJ ... Japan isn't the US, it is a big net creditor, and a lot of institutions were forced into foreign bonds by YCC. That flow could reverse ...

12/12

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More from @Brad_Setser

May 21
After a couple of months of weak flows, foreign demand for US bonds (in the great valuation adjusted Bertaut Judson data set) was strong in March.

March tho is stale -- it is pre liberation data, and before the dollar/ bond sell off in April.

1/ Image
One of the reasons for relatively strong flows in March (and q1) was, well, Japan. but it is stale data. Japanese sales of Treasuries in 2024 were driven by MoF intervention.

2/ Image
Official (foreign central bank) sales also tapered off.

this is counter intuitive, but official sales are correlated with dollar strength not dollar weakness (my friends over @ExanteData identified Brazil and India as likely sellers then ... )

3/ Image
Read 9 tweets
May 21
One of my pet peeves is a dated understanding of how China impacts global bond markets.

From 2000 to 2010, China's surplus was all channeled into reserves and US bonds.

That was only partially true from 2010 to 14.

And for the last 10ys?

1/ Image
Chinese flows really did distort US markets from 2003 to 2012 (the decade of manipulation, to use a C. Fred Bergsten term). But the visible flows have stopped over the last 10ys (even taking into account custodial holdings)

2/ Image
There are a lot of ways that China's now massive surplus (and the offshore dollars of Chinese exporters) do impact US markets -- but direct flows through SAFE just aren't the mechanism any more.

3/ Image
Read 7 tweets
May 18
Lots of signs that the trade negotiations with US allies aren't going especially smoothly (the Japanese signaled through the FT that any deal was unlikely before their elections).

This shouldn't be a surprise -- the Trump "offer" isn't particularly appealing

1/
The offer, as I understand it, is that other countries should come forward with concessions to rebalance trade, and in return the US wouldn't raise the "base" tariff (10%) to the "reciprocal" tariff (20% for Europe, 24% for Japan) -- and would keep the 232s (likely at 25%)

2/
So allies are expected:

a) not to retaliate for the 10% base quota or the 25% sectoral quotas; and
b) make additional concessions simply to avoid even higher tariffs ...

they don't view that as a great deal

3/

wsj.com/economy/trade/…
Read 12 tweets
May 17
China's surplus has increased a lot -- but it still should be a bit higher ...

A new blog, one with important implications for the IMF

1/

cfr.org/blog/somewhat-…
The core point -- China's current account surplus has jumped in a real way, to around $600-700b a quarter (well above the absordly low $200b a quarter of last year)

2/ Image
The jump reflects an increase in China's trade surplus over the last year, but it is actually a bit bigger than can be explained by the rise in the trade surplus

3/ Image
Read 7 tweets
May 16
Interesting data release. Technically, China's holdings of long-term Treasuries did fall, even after adjusting for Belgium/ Euroclear (adding in Luxembourg/ Clearstream wouldn't change the story)

But March holdings are above January holdings - the fall is only v the February riseImage
And there is a discrepancy between total holdings of Treasuries and holdings of long-term Treasuries (notes); bill holdings reached $85b -- v under $20b at this time last year

I still more of a move to reduce duration than any real move out of the dollar

2/ Image
The custodial adjustment really matters now, which adds a lot of uncertainty to the estimates -- they are just that estimates, as they hinge on assumptions about the right custodial adjustment

3/ Image
Read 7 tweets
May 14
What happened to the Taiwan dollar on May 2nd, and what does it mean for Taiwan and the global economy?

And what should Taiwan do to limit the risks that any future move causes trouble in its huge life insurance industry?

1/ Image
These are all topics covered in my new piece in FT Alphaville --

2/

ft.com/content/d71c34…
One point I make is that the financial outflows needed to offset a $100 billion plus current account surplus can no longer just come from the lifers -- they can only put the majority of their assets in foreign bonds once so to speak

3/ Image
Read 11 tweets

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