Konrad Muzyka - Rochan Consulting Profile picture
May 25 4 tweets 3 min read Read on X
Here’s a brief update on the situation in Ukraine, focusing on Donbas and the air picture.

Over the past week, Russian elements from the 57th and 33rd Motor Rifle Regiments penetrated Ukrainian defensive positions along the TO504 road linking Pokrovsk and Konstantynivka. Although this line has long ceased to serve as a reliable GLOC, the tempo and vectors of Russian advances northward remain concerning. (Orange colour is fortifications - made by @Playfra0->give him a follow)Image
Russian forces are advancing along three primary axes toward Konstantynivka:

- The eastern axis from Chasiv Yar, which has seen limited gains over months;

- The southern axis via Toretsk, currently contested with Ukrainian forces holding firm;

- The eastern flank, which has gained operational momentum and now threatens Ukrainian rear areas, complicating sustainment and force disposition.

The rapid pace of the eastern push risks outflanking Ukrainian defensive lines and denies time for construction of new fortifications. Should Russian forces secure a breakthrough near Rusyn Yar, it would constitute a critical tactical gain, severely degrading Ukrainian defensive depth.

From a terrain perspective, movement from Novooolenivka toward Stepaniva affords the Russians dominant ground, enabling fire control over approaches to Konstantynivka and interdiction of Ukrainian reinforcement routes from Druzkivka.Image
Paradoxically, these territorial gains coincide with a reported overall reduction in Russian ground offensive operations across the front, including near Pokrovsk and Toretsk. This raises the question: Why is Russian forward momentum accelerating amid diminished ground attack activity?Image
Ukraine is also facing increased missile and drone strikes, including cruise and ballistic missiles and Shahed-type drones, aimed at overwhelming air defences. The reported shortage of PAC-3 interceptors further exacerbates the challenge. High-precision missile usage has surged to unprecedented levels, while drone deployments in early 2025 reached record highs. Ukraine needs cheaper solutions, especially for the Shahed-type threat. For missiles, there are no easy fixes. Russia is producing a lot more long-range precision missiles than the West is producing interceptors.

Russia’s strategy is one of cumulative attrition: continuous pressure through relentless missile/drone attacks very often aimed at civilian populations, sustained troop replacements enabled by ongoing recruitment, and increased production of precision munitions. After a brief pause earlier in the year, Ukraine again faces difficult weeks ahead.Image

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More from @konrad_muzyka

Dec 21, 2024
The past few weeks have shown relatively substantial Russian territorial gains both north and south of Kurakhove. Although, using Ukrainian parlance, the overall situation remains "difficult but manageable," we generally expect the continuation of Russian ground attacks and territorial gains in the area.

On 19DEC, Russian forces reportedly launched assaults on Ulakly and Konstiantynopil, both pivotal for Ukrainian efforts to maintain their defensive line near Dache and Kurakhove. While unverified Russian reports suggest progress near both villages, confirmation of these advances would significantly undermine Ukrainian positions. If these reports are accurate, Ukrainian forces in the salient could again face difficulties in conducting effective defensive operations and risk partial encirclement. Moreover, the loss of any built-up areas would degrade Ukraine's overall ability to defend more effectively.Image
Although the terrain in this region favors defensive operations due to the presence of waterways, the ongoing Ukrainian personnel shortage prevents full utilization of these natural features to stall Russian advances. Currently, Ukrainian units in the area are focused on static defense operations, leaving them vulnerable to drone, artillery, and glide bomb strikes. This lack of manpower also limits their ability to launch counterattacks, which could otherwise disrupt Russian momentum in the area.
On 14DEC, the commander of the OTUV Donetsk, Brig. Gen. Oleksandr Lutsenko, whose AOR span between Velyka Novosilka to the Toretsk area, was dismissed due to poor engineering preparations and quick Russian advances. Lutsenko has been replaced by Brig. Gen. Oleksandr Tarnavsky. Tarnavsky is an experienced commander, but his problems will take weeks and months to fix, let alone many issues (such as training and the quality of draftees) are beyond his control. As such, his impact on the frontline may take weeks to materialize.Image
Kurakhove remains a tactical target for Russian forces. Capturing it, which is now imminent, will open pathways for further advances westward. As Ukraine is currently in no position to halt Russian advances, we expect Russians to capture the terrain between Dache and Zelenivka over the coming couple of weeks.Image
Read 4 tweets
Aug 25, 2024
Here’s a brief overview of the situation. A few weeks ago, Belarusian forces began conducting various exercises that we believe are preparations for a large-scale bilateral drill involving one operational command against another. Although this concept isn’t new (the Russians first implemented it on a large scale in 2019), Minsk only conducted a drill of this magnitude for the first time last year, in September.Image
We closely monitored the drill and provided clear warnings and recommendations that it was purely an exercise. Our current assessment links the recent “build-up” near Ukraine to the 2024 iteration of the bilateral exercise. While many aspects of this year’s drill are similar to those in 2023, the concentration area has notably shifted. The deployment of forces into Gomel Oblast, which served as a staging area for Russian troops during the 2022 attack on Kyiv, is particularly concerning.Image
Image
While it is crucial to remain vigilant and closely monitor Minsk’s actions, intentions, methods, and their potential impact, we assess that it is unlikely Belarus is considering offensive action against Ukraine at this stage. Our long-term assessment is that the Belarusian Armed Forces primarily function as a mobilization force, which would require a significant increase in manpower through mobilization to conduct any offensive operations. Even then, their forces primarily rely on post-Soviet equipment that has seen minimal modernization, leaving them ill-equipped for contemporary battlefield demands.
Read 5 tweets
Jul 17, 2024
Drodzy Państwo, jak wspominałem w jednym z poprzednich nagrań, niedawno wziąłem udział w wyjeździe studyjnym na Ukrainę, którego celem było uzyskanie informacji na jakim etapie jest teraz wojna i w jakim kierunku zmierza, jakie zmiany zachodzą w taktyce oraz sposobach działania. O wnioskach z tego wyjazdu mogą Państwo posłuchać tutaj:
A teraz krótka nitka. Jechałem na Ukrainę będąc pesymistą, a wracam umiarkowanym optymistą. Ci z Państwa, którzy mnie czytają wiedzą, że za największą ukraińską bolączką był brak ludzi. Biorąc pod uwagę, co zobaczyliśmy zakładam, że jeśli mobilizacja utrzyma swoje tempo (bardzo dobre), to front powinien się stabilizować od połowy sierpnia.
Ta teza jest jednak uwarunkowana również priorytetami ukraińskiego Sztabu Generalnego. Jeśli w pierwszej kolejności poborowi będą trafiać do nowo formowanych jednostek zamiast tych liniowych, gdzie są potrzebni na kilka miesięcy temu, to ten okres się wydłuży.
Read 10 tweets
May 23, 2024
Kilka dni temu Gen. broni Krzysztof Król, doradca Doradca Szefa Sztabu Generalnego (w tekście blednie nazwanym Szef Sztabu Dowództwa Sił Połączonych NATO w Brunssum), udzielił wywiadu Radiu Kraków gdzie podzielił się swoimi ocenami dotyczącymi wojny na Ukrainie.
radiokrakow.pl/audycje/gen-br…
Moją uwagę przykul jeden fragment: “Jeśli chodzi o podstawy sztuki operacyjnej, Rosjanie są pierwsza klasa. Natomiast nie zawsze się to przekłada na taktykę i właściwe jej implementowanie.” Nasza ocena jest trochę inna. Na początek jednak kilka slow wyjaśnienia.
Czym jest sztuka operacyjna? Koncentruje się ona na planowaniu, przygotowaniu, prowadzeniu i utrzymywaniu działań wojennych. Wymaga podstawy taktycznej i musi być połączona ze strategią. Jest to suma działań podejmowanych przez sztab(y), co stanowi funkcję wspierającą, ale równoległą do strategii i taktyki.
Read 9 tweets
Apr 29, 2024
Zapraszam na krótką nitkę o obecnej sytuacji na froncie. W skrócie, sytuacja wygląda bardzo źle i nie należy oczekiwać jej poprawy w najbliższych tygodniach.
Są trzy powody obecnego stanu rzeczy i w zasadzie nie ma tutaj nic odkrywczego, gdyż problemy po ukraińskiej stronie są znane od dawna: brak amunicji, ludzi, fortyfikacji.
Aby uzmysłowić sobie braki w amunicji artyleryjskiej, wystarczy wspomnieć, że po stronie ukraińskiej są jednostki, których wydatki zmalały o 70-90% w porównaniu do lata 2023. Ogień artyleryjski jest ograniczony do minimum i często musi być autoryzowany przez dowódców brygad.
Read 10 tweets
Mar 21, 2024
No tak, ta publikacja i wnioski z niej płynące trendują mi dziś na TT. Więc zapraszam na kilka słów komentarza.
Tekst przedstawia szczegółową analizę różnych wskaźników sugerujących, że Rosja może przygotowywać się do konfliktu konwencjonalnego na dużą skalę z NATO. Jednakże istnieje w niej kilka potencjalnych niekonsekwencji logicznych i założeń na które warto zwrócić uwagę.
1) Przypisanie Motywów: Tekst zakłada, że rosyjskie działania gospodarcze i militarnie są skierowane wyłącznie na przygotowania do konfliktu na dużą skalę z NATO. Chociaż jest to możliwość, należy wziąć pod uwagę inne potencjalne motywy działań Rosji, takie jak wpływy regionalne,
Read 14 tweets

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