There is, at least in my view, a lot of sloppy analysis about the role the dollar's reserve currency "status" plays in financing the US external deficit.
I understand how reserve accumulation funds the deficit, but not how the "status" of the dollar does ...
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There was a time when reserve accumulation by the large surplus countries in Asia mapped perfectly to their external surplus, and their reserve accumulation really did generate large financial inflows into the US
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At the time my sense was that the economic conventional wisdom was that fx intervention didn't matter that much; many argued that reserve accumulation wasn't fundamental to the financing of the US external deficit (I disagreed at the time)
Now the CW (even more outside the US than inside the US) attributes the financing of the US external deficit to the dolllar's reserve currency "status" even tho reserve accumulation hasn't driven the Asian surplus flow over the last 10 years
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Even portfolio debt outflows (the Taiwan lifers, the Japanese banks, lifers and the GPIF, etc) don't fully match the Asian surplus -- balance has take some equity flows too
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I would be among the first to acknowledge that "private" portfolio outflows from Asian surplus countries often some from government entities -- China's state banks, Korea's NPS, Japan's GPIF and Postbank ...
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But the fact remains that reserve related flows are playing a smaller role in the financing of the US current account deficit than at almost any point in the last 25 years ... yet all anyone talks about is the dollar's reserve currency role!
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Bloomberg reports that China's regulators have warned China's state banks about the risk of holding too many Treasuries --
The Chinese regulators must know something that the Treasury doesn't, as the Treasury data doesn't suggest that China has been buying any Treasuries
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The official US data on foreign holdings doesn't show any basis for Chinese concern -- China's Treasuries in US custodianship (in theory state accounts as well as state bank accounts) are heading down not up
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That is of course inconsistent with the warning that the regulators provided to the state banks! They seem to be warning about nothing ...
The Treasury has indicated that it will look at the activities of China's state banks in its next assessment of China's currency policies--
It is hard to see how this doesn't become a bit of an issue ... unless of course summitry gets in the way of analysis 1/
It is quite clear that state bank purchases (and in 23/ early 24 sales) of fx have replaced PBOC purchases and sales and the core technique China uses to manage the band around the daily fx -- i.e. settlement looks like an intervention variable
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My latest blog looks both at how fx settlement (a measure that includes the state banks) has displaced the PBOC's own reported reserves as the best metric for Chinese intervention & lat some of SAFE's balance sheet mysteries
The blog is detailed and technical -- and thus probably best read by those with a real interest in central bank balance sheets, the balance of payments and how to assess backdoor foreign currency intervention
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Drawing on historical data, I propose that the gap between fx settlement and the foreign assets on the PBOC's balance sheet (fx reserves + other f. assets) is a good indicator of hidden intervention --
Obviously overshadowed by the news about a Fed nomination, but the Treasury released its delated October 2025 FX report today and it is worth reading -- not the least b/c of a clear warning to SAFE.
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This seems clear
"An economy that fails to publish intervention data or whose data are incomplete will not be given any benefit of the doubt in Treasury’s assessment of intervention practices."
This report only covers the period between July 24 and June 25, so it misses the bulk of the 2025 surge in fx settlement (December = $100b plus). But this chart suggests the use of more sophisticated analytical techniques than those used in past reports --
A bit of background. Taiwan's lifers hold $700 billion in foreign currency assets abroad (more counting their holdings of local ETFs that invest heavily in foreign bonds) v ~ $200 billion in domestic fx policies -- so fx gap (pre hedging) of $500 billion
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Taiwan's regulator (perhaps the most complicit regulator on earth) not allows the lifers NOT to mark their fx holdings to the fx market -- so the lifers are incentivized not to hedge (and they are rapidly reducing their hedge ratio)
Japan is an interesting case in a lot of ways. It has a ton of domestic debt (and significant domestic financial assets) which generates heated concerns about its solvency/ ability to manage higher rates. But it is also a massive global creditor --
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Japan's net holdings of bonds (net of foreign holdings of JGBs) is close to 50% of its GDP (a creditor position as big v GDP as the US net det position). That includes $1 trillion in bonds held in Japan's $1.175 trillion in reserves, + over $2 trillion in other holdings
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That translates into big holdings of US debt -- the MoF's Treasuries all show up in the US TIC data, but the corporate bonds held by the lifers, postbank and the GPIF are only partially captured in the US data b/c of third party management/ the use of EU custodians