There is, at least in my view, a lot of sloppy analysis about the role the dollar's reserve currency "status" plays in financing the US external deficit.
I understand how reserve accumulation funds the deficit, but not how the "status" of the dollar does ...
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There was a time when reserve accumulation by the large surplus countries in Asia mapped perfectly to their external surplus, and their reserve accumulation really did generate large financial inflows into the US
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At the time my sense was that the economic conventional wisdom was that fx intervention didn't matter that much; many argued that reserve accumulation wasn't fundamental to the financing of the US external deficit (I disagreed at the time)
Now the CW (even more outside the US than inside the US) attributes the financing of the US external deficit to the dolllar's reserve currency "status" even tho reserve accumulation hasn't driven the Asian surplus flow over the last 10 years
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Even portfolio debt outflows (the Taiwan lifers, the Japanese banks, lifers and the GPIF, etc) don't fully match the Asian surplus -- balance has take some equity flows too
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I would be among the first to acknowledge that "private" portfolio outflows from Asian surplus countries often some from government entities -- China's state banks, Korea's NPS, Japan's GPIF and Postbank ...
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But the fact remains that reserve related flows are playing a smaller role in the financing of the US current account deficit than at almost any point in the last 25 years ... yet all anyone talks about is the dollar's reserve currency role!
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A few thoughts on the JGB sell off last week, as I was surprised that there wasn't a stronger big for duration from Japanese investors pushed out of the JGB market over the last 10ys by low yields and a flat yield curve --
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For quite some time, Japanese banks were pushed out the curve by a flat curve (especially in a world where YCC limited yields on bonds out to 10ys) --
(chart is just for the regional banks and shinkin, and it is from April 24)
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But that has been changing -- "Banks are in the process of rebalancing their yen-denominated bond positions .. All types of banks have shortened the duration of their yen-denominated bondholdings by reducing interest rate risk, especially in the longer-term zone."
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The fact that the Ireland "imports" EUR 50b in IP via royalty payments (mostly to the US) -- and the fact that Ireland now imports EUR 175b in services from the US -- should help frame most discussions of services trade ...
I have highlighted how goods trade is heavily influenced by tax avoidance -- with pharmaceutical trade being the best example. Once you take out tourism (and education) though services trade tends to be much (and I mean much) more distorted ...
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In fact, for a number of services categories, "Ireland" is the United States' largest export market ...
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Trump has been relatively clear on this.He is looking for unilateral concessions from trading partners + acceptance of the base tariff. EU equally has been clear that it wasn't willing to accept this structural set up. From a good NYT piece by @jeannasmialek
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I understand why most folks in the market are discounting Trump tariff threats, but I remain worried -- there just isn't a willingness in Europe to do the unilateral concessions Trump insists are needed.
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And I find the US demands rather uncreative -- a mix of old grievances and things that don't really matter for the US economy. The obvious win (lowering the trade deficit by bringing the US pharma industry's profits back onshore) is being ignored
Why do I think there is still a savings glut? Well the savings rate in North east Asia (NIEs, China, Japan) is ~ 40% of regional GDP, which is VERY high (China is high, China is a rising share of the total)
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Asia's current account surplus is well over $1 trillion, even using China's low ball official number
Apart from reflecting a misguided view of America's economic and diplomatic interest, the threatened 50% tariffs on the EU are big -- imports from the EU are 2 pp of GDP, the just pay it cost is ~ 1 pp of GDP. That's well over 2x the term 1 trade action v China.
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What's more, the reported US asks of Europe reflect a rather stale and dated conception of how to rebalance the bilateral trade relationship -- I was expecting/ hoping for more out of USTR
if Europe dropped the DST, the main impact would be -- lower prices for European consumers of digital services. The available evidence suggest it was mostly paid for by European consumers (like a tariff)
The impact on US services exports would be small
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It is going to take more than a G-7 communique -- and tariffs -- to bring China's trade imbalance down. Lots more talk about imbalances recently. But no change in trend. China's goods surplus has topped $1.1 trillion. Its manufacturing surplus now rounds to $2.0 trillion
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The rising surplus reflects both renewed nominal export growth (volumes are growing even faster, 10-15%) and weak imports ... with manufacturing imports (including parts for reexport) of $1.5 trillion relative to exports of nearly $3.5 trillion -- a huge gap
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Such an extreme swing reflects massive sectoral swings across the board. Autos is a good example. The dollar value of exports of finished autos isn't growing that fast any more, but the surplus is still rising -- as imports are dropping fast