During April and May, the Russians formed a dangerous salient against the Ukrainian defenses between Kostiantynivka and Pokrovsk.
The so-called spring offensive has progressed relatively quickly, and serious issues may lie ahead in the near future. 1/
Defending forces in the area initially consisted of newer, less capable brigades, such as the 142nd, 155th & 157th. Elements from other units were also present. Reserves have been brought in – first the 36th marine brigade, and now the 82nd air assault brigade, among others. 2/
Russia's probable operational objectives for the coming months in the area include:
Formation of an encirclement threat around Kostiantynivka
Formation of an encirclement threat around Pokrovsk
Disruption of Ukrainian supply & command elements in the cities in the AO 3/
In the latest development, Ukrainians retreated from Stara Mykolaivka. This enables the Russians to continue north towards Kostiantynivka, while also undermining the long-standing defences in Shcherbynivka. However, the fight here seemingly brought Ukrainians some time. 4/
The most endangered area is Kostiantynivka. The Russians are attacking from three directions – Chasiv Yar, Toretsk and also from the new salient west of the city. The attacks in Chasiv Yar and Toretsk have not made much progress in recent months. 5/
Despite the gradual advancement east and south from the city, developments on the western flank present potential new opportunities for Russian forces. They are positioned approximately 13-15 kilometers from Kostiantynivka and maintain adequate reserves for further operations. 6/
Russians have not achieved a breakthrough in the true sense of the word. An actual breakthrough would entail a rapid collapse of defences, enabling mechanized units to exploit the situation and penetrate deeply into the defender's rear. This scenario isn’t currently unfolding. 7/
The Russians have pushed through an area of dense Ukrainian fortifications. Soon they may reach a less-prepared area, where the Ukrainians can’t bring engineering equipment in safely anymore. However, fortifications don’t solely determine the future of the offensive. 8/
For Ukraine, timely withdrawals from unfavorable positions and careful management of reserves are key elements for a successful defence this summer. The tendency of holding onto nearly encircled pockets usually causes unnecessary losses without significant tactical benefit. 9/
In the worst case scenario, insufficient preparation and bad decisions may lead to a reactive state, where the limited quality reserves are forced to rush from one sector to prevent emerging crises at the expense of another direction, attriting them in the process. 10/
The Russians will likely attack throughout the summer and into the fall with full force, pressuring the Ukrainians on a wide front. The events on the battlefield will also affect the negotiations, which will likely continue in a way or another in the coming months. 11/
Lately I’ve been posting less Ukraine analysis, as I’ve been tied to work, writing my upcoming book and giving interviews (sometimes even multiple per day) to media outlets around the world regarding the actions of the Russian military near our borders here in Finland. 12/
Despite my busy schedule, I continue to closely follow the war in Ukraine. Our team at @Black_BirdGroup is also actively monitoring and analyzing the situation. Don't forget to check our interactive map for daily updates. 13/13
Russia has five active air bases near northern Finland and Norway. In this thread, I will go through the bases and their recent changes in activity and infrastructure, and how the war in Ukraine has affected them.
There have been some surprising developments. 1/
The five air bases are located in Murmansk oblast: Severomorsk-1, -2 and -3, Monchegorsk and Olenya. There are more air bases near Finland further south in Karelia and St. Petersburg, but currently most of the largest and militarily active ones are in the north. 2/
In June 2022 Russia announced plans to repair several of the northern air bases. The work has begun. In Severomorsk-1, fighter shelters on the eastern side of the field were repaired somewhere between 2023-24. However, in Severomorsk-2, there are more surprising changes. 3/
Russia is developing its military infrastructure and conducting organizational reforms near Nato’s northern flank, especially near Finland. News agencies from different countries have asked me about the topic, and in this thread I will share some recent observations. 1/
Firstly, a brief overview of the organisational level. In 2024, Russia reestablished the Leningrad Military District (LMD) as a part of a larger reform of the military districts. The LMD covers the north-western Russia, including Baltic and arctic directions. 2/
At the same time, Russia is expanding its existing brigades into divisions and bringing entirely new troops into Finland's neighboring regions. For example, the 138th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade from Kamenka was recently transformed into the 69th Motor Rifle Division. 3/
Putin declared a temporary ceasefire. What can be expected?
Firstly, Russia only makes such an announcement if it benefits Russia's diplomatic or military goals. Russia isn't suddenly seeking a quick peace, this is most likely a measure related to ongoing negotiations. 1/
Putin says that Russian forces must be ready to repel potential ceasefire violations and provocations.
It's possible Russia will try to accuse Ukraine of breaking the ceasefire, which could then be used as evidence of Ukraine's unwillingness to reach a peace settlement. 2/
Russia may be trying to show the Trump administration that it has some desire for peace. A minimal gesture of goodwill may buy political points from the United States, although its actual impact on the war is likely to be small. 3/
In the Russian-Ukrainian border region, both parties have continued offensive operations since the Ukrainian defense in Kursk collapsed.
While Russia is pushing Ukrainians out of Kursk and its own soldiers into Ukrainian territory in Sumy, Ukraine has again attacked Belgorod. 1/
In Kursk, the Ukrainian-controlled territory had been shrinking for months. It was a slow grind that hit a breaking point in March. The Ukrainian logistical situation had become increasingly difficult, and the Russians conducted a successful operation against the salient. 2/
After a hasty retreat earlier this month, Ukraine is still hanging onto a narrow strip of Russian land in Kursk with 2-3 small villages. This is not a militarily or politically relevant area, but the Russians will likely continue to push Ukrainians back. 3/
Jos Suomi ei voi lähettää edes yhtä pataljoonaa tulitaukoa takaamaan Ukrainaan, en ihan ymmärrä, miksi me olisimme oikeutettuja odottamaan aidosti vaikeita turvallisuuspoliittisiä päätöksiä vaativaa apua keneltäkään kriisitilanteessa.
"Koska Nato" ei ole riittävä argumentti. 1/
Toisekseen, jos Suomen Puolustusvoimat ovat siinä tilassa, ettei edes yhden pataljoonan varustaminen ja lähettäminen onnistu edes silloin, kun koko Euroopan turvallisuusjärjestyksen sorvaaminen on käynnissä, en ihan ymmärrä mihin puolustusbudjettimme oikein uppoaa. 2/
Pataljoona tai kaksi Ukrainaan tulitaukoa takaamaan toisi Suomeen myös arvokasta oppia ja osaamista, josta nimenomaan on kriisitilanteessa hyötyä. Reserviläisiä löytyy kyllä, ei jää vapaaehtoisista kiinni. Tämä olisi investointi, joka tuottaisi turvallisuutta myös Suomeen. 3/
Ukraine has been fighting for three years in increasingly difficult conditions. Today, the Nordic and Baltic countries announced that they will “pledge to provide equipment and training for a scalable brigade-sized unit”. It’s a textbook example of too little, too late. 1/
As far as I understand from this statement, there will be a new Ukrainian brigade based on Nordic & Baltic training and equipment. In theory, this is positive news. This could, at its best, produce a highly capable unit, trained by some of the best militaries in Europe. 2/
But here’s the catch: this brigade is being formed at a time when Ukraine faces a chronic manpower shortage. Simply put, Ukraine doesn’t lack brigades, it lacks men. Depending on its structure, this Nordic-Baltic-trained brigade could be somewhere between 3000-5000 soldiers. 3/