Dmitri Alperovitch Profile picture
May 31 63 tweets 15 min read Read on X
Fascinating interview with a private drone designer for the RU military. His knowledge of UKR & Western drones is limited and should be taken with some skepticism but he still presents a quite candid picture into the current state of unmanned warfare:🧵
Russian military was very slow to adapt to drone warfare even though Ukrainian forces have been experimenting with drones on a limited basis in the Donbas well before 2022. Russians dismissed it at the time as mere expensive toys Image
FPV tactics:
Humvees can be destroyed with a single FPV hit. Russians have learned to hit M1 Abrams tanks in the rear turret compartment that stores ammunition to have it go up in flames consistently. Hitting it in the turbine also disables it completely Image
Western drones:
He has a very negative view of Western drones, especially Switchblades. Switchblade 300 won’t even kill an infantryman with armor. Switchblade 600 is more capable but extremely expensive for what it offers Image
Boeing ScanEagle looks like ‘it was built in a high school workshop - everything held together with zipties and cheap Chinese glue’ (Ed: He doesn’t talk about Anduril, Helsing, etc drones that have earned some begrudging respect from the Russians lately)
Drone industrial complex:
Ukrainian drone designers innovate faster because their private developers work directly with military units and are able to adapt rapidly to the changing environment. Prototypes get sent to the front for experimentations. Image
In Russia, things move forward ‘not because the system helps, but in spite of it.’ Russian military is not well setup to work with private defense companies. However, the situation is now improving
Chinese components:
All Russian and Ukrainian drones are built with the same Chinese electronic components. But the real value is not in the components but how they are being put together
Chinese weapons:
Ironically, he believes that the Chinese developed weapons aren’t any good. They are built like ‘toys’ - not rugged and built without combat experience and knowledge Image
"Military hardware has to survive being tossed out of a trunk in the mud, sitting in the rain for a week, being covered in dirt and still work perfectly. Chinese gear just doesn’t hold up like that"
However, the quality of Chinese electronic components is not far off from Western ones. A bit worse but not critically so, while 20-100x cheaper. No sanctions enforcement means that thousands of microcontrollers from China can be bought easily by the Russians for their drones Image
Chinese exports:
Payments to Chinese sellers cannot be made with Russian bank cards anymore. A lot of military exports from China to Russia are officially restricted, including motors over 700W which are used in heavy drones Image
But private companies in CN still move parts across the border
“It’s hard to believe the government doesn’t know what’s going on. It feels they are turning a blind eye to it or maybe even quietly approving. If they wanted to stop this kind of trade, they could do so instantly”
Future of drones:
The drones we are seeing now in this conflict on both sides are toys. Most of them run on Chinese flight controllers, motor drivers and toy-grade motors. Image
Future of drones:
"Once the war ends, the first thing that will happen is these drones will be redesigned as actual military-grade products. Right now makeshift drones are used out of necessity and need for scale despite their fragility. But that won’t last."
Autonomy:
Major progress will also happen in autonomous target recognition and guidance. EW and shortage of skilled pilots are increasing the urgency of that evolution. Cheap AI at the edge of throwaway drone gear is still a big challenge but improving rapidly. Image
Scale of drone production:
Early in the war, fielding 1000 drones was a big deal. Now, a single assembly line can crank out 40,000 drones per week Image
Remote mine lying:
Ukrainians have pioneered drone-based remote mine laying tactic over 18 months ago but it’s becoming more widespread lately due to the volume of drones in circulation. What make this so powerful is you can re-mine roads that infantry thinks are safe.
A new mine can be deployed within minutes and drop it into the recently created tire track. Even a weapon from the Roman times - cheap caltrops welded from rebar - are today dropped from drones to shred vehicle tires (mil truck tires are expensive). There is no counter to it. Image
Sleeper drone:
New capability has emerged of sleeper/ambush drones.
Drone flies to a target area. Lands by the roadside and waits for a target to come through. Image
Sleeper drones were pioneered by the Ukrainians. Initially they pretended to crash to get the Russians to pick it up as a trophy to reverse engineer or to repurpose against Ukraine in whole or as spare parts. Soldiers would pick it up and it would explode Image
Now sleeper drones land on rooftops or hills near roads and wait for hours for the vehicles to approach and then rapidly strike them from a short distance before they can be seen it
Fiber optic drones:
The sleeper drone tactic exploded in use with the invention of fiber optic controlled drones because they consume very little power when idle. A regular drone sitting on the ground idle still burns 5-10W because of video transmission
With fiber optics drone, the video travels through cable and, thus, the power usage is minimal, enabling it to lie in wait for a long time. The Russians first started using them in Kursk and it was a nightmare for the Ukrainian forces
The fiber optics sleeper would sit in wait hidden and silent - virtually invisible and then spring into action at the right moment and launch at its target just 15m away. The truck drivers don’t even have time to react Image
Downsides of fiber optics cables:
Fiber optic cable catches sunlight and reflects it back like a spiderweb. Those reflections during sunrise or sunset can help to identify the cable from above. The cable can let the enemy know where the operator is positioned.
Fiber optics cables also physically clutters up the area and gets in the way. If you hit a cable on a motorcycle at full speed, you get hurt. Bikes are used often now on the Russian side for assault because of importance of speed of assault (Ed: & lack of availability of armor) Image
Payload on fiber optics drones is also limited due to the weight of the cable spool. Often only 500g are left for explosives, which is not a lot. Thus, these are not wonder weapons Image
Kursk:
Ukrainians initially succeeded in Kursk with the help of large use of EW equipment. They brought in pickup trucks with antennas to jam lots of frequencies. Image
Russian fiber optic drones later started to target these EW trucks first and then use regular drones with larger payloads to target other vehicles and infantry that were now left without EW protection. Main use for fiber optics is for neutralizing enemy jammers. Image
Innovation cycle on the battlefield is now very short - 2 months or less. New breakthroughs might work only once before countermeasures are developed.
Remote piloting:
Russians have developed a system called Orbit to fly drones with skilled operators based in Moscow, far removed from the battlefield. Ukrainians first pioneered this tactic with the use of radio relays and internet bridges using Starlink long ago. Image
Remote piloting:
High speed internet bridge is created at a forward position and then a radio link is established to the drone. Then you don’t need to send drone operators to the front and risk their lives, since they are so valuable
It takes months to train skilled drone operators. And many don’t have the physique and training for combat. They are often gamers who don’t do well carrying body armor, helmet, gear and hike with that to the frontline
Now can use grunts who don’t know how to fly drones but can carry them to a launch point, setup the equipment, and radio a trained remote operator to take control and fly the mission from far away
This also provides an advantage of scale - one operator can work nonstop covering a huge section of the front without putting themselves in danger.
However, latency of control and video feed is still a big issue, even with Starlink. Thus, this tactic is still not yet mainstream
Starlink:
"Starlink is the holy grail - the only Western technology that has worked flawless in this war. It has completely transformed modern warfare."

Russians don’t have an answer to it (Ed: except buying Starlink subscriptions through shell companies in Dubai, etc)
Heavy drones:
Ukrainian Baba Yaga drones : drop bombs, lay mines remotely, deliver supplies. The Russians haven’t yet developed an equivalent heavy drone because the military had dismissed it as not a real battlefield tool. Image
Russian military response to heavy drones was: ‘We’ve got proper aircraft that can drop guided bombs. Why do we need DIY drones when we can use Su-34s to drop 500kg bombs and wipe everything out in one strike?’ But this turned out to be a big mistake.
Some of these Baba Yaga drones are not even remotely controlled but simply fly to coordinates and drop bombs. They are nicknamed ‘shuttles’ or ‘buses’.
These heavy drones are fairly easy to shoot down using machine guns with thermal scopes. Drones run hot - their batteries and motors glow in infrared. One hit to the battery, and the drone drops
Russia now has two full-scale factories under construction to produce heavy-class drones similar to Baba Yaga using Chinese sourced components. Small drone makers are now producing their own variants as well
Anti-Tank mines:
Baba Yaga drones turned out to be very effective after Ukrainians modified them to drop anti-tank mines. Ukrainian mines with 6-8kg of TNT can cause serious blasts Image
Anti-Tank mines:
"You feel the shockwave in your bones even in a trench or dugout. If you are out in the open, it’s almost always fatal. And even those underground aren’t safe."
Anti-tank mines:
When multiple mines are dropped together in a quick succession, you can wipe out an entire fortified area bunker by bunker
Drone purchases by soldiers:
Some Russian units aren’t issued drones or even if they are, they aren’t allowed to use them at their own discretion
So Russian soldiers often pool together their own money to buy a dozen cheap FPVs just in case they need them to repell an assault. They become a last resort defense tool. But heavy drones are too expensive to buy privately - >$10k. They have to be procured by the military Image
Shahed drones:
Russian variants of Shahed (Geran) have moved far away from its Iranian origins. They have added stealth coating, jet engines and used Wankel engines that create high frequency pitch during flight Image
Some Geran drones even have built-in sirens like the Nazi Stuka bombers to intimidate and terrorize. Russian approach has been to start with someone else’s base model (i.e. Shahed) and then improve upon it and develop independently. Image
Recon drones:
With the rise of Ukrainian interceptor drones, effectiveness of Russian recon Orlan and Lancet drones has taken a hit
Russians are responding by adding rear-facing cameras with autonomous recognition of interceptor drones, which then executes an evasive maneuver Image
Because interceptor drones typically have small battery life due to their speed (need to be faster than drone they are intercepting), they will not have enough charge to try a second time
Drone countermeasures:
Most effective countermeasures are special anti-drone rounds for rifles/machine guns - plastic cartridges that burst open when fired and release pellets. With each shots, 3 projectiles are fired Image
Why not shotguns? Carrying another gun+ammo on top of standard gun is not practical
Drones also carry up to 3kg of explosives - if you shoot it with a shotgun at close range, you will get hit with a shrapnel. A rifle can keep you at a safer distance and keep a high rate of fire to saturate the air with projectiles. Image
Anti-Drone Nets:
Nets are effective but not fullproof. For valuable targets, 2 drones can be sent - one to cut the net, another to hit the target inside the net corridor Image
Because Ukrainian nets often don’t go all the way to the ground, RU fiber optics drones can dive underneath. Regular drones typically can’t operate that low as they lose signal but not an issue for fiber optics. They can lay inside net tunnels waiting for their target to arrive
Lasers:
Lasers don’t work well at long distances. They also don’t work well in cloudy/heavy moisture environment. Need dry weather and clear skies and short distance (150m or less) to be effective. Both Russia and Ukraine are actively working on short range laser systems Image
Personnel protection:
To protect an individual infantryman, only one thing helps - running fast. Backpack mounted jammers don’t work. There are always frequencies that jammers don’t cover. Image
Soldiers can’t guess what frequencies a drone that’s flying at them is using and turn on the right jammer. They panic and activate all jammers at once and advertise to the entire frontline their jamming frequencies
Then the enemy sends another drone tuned to a different frequency that is not being blocked and takes out the guy with the expensive jamming backpack. “It’s useless. It’s like wearing a good luck charm” Image
The best defense against drones is smart movement - move fast, stay unpredictable, stay in wooded areas, under branches, near vegetation. Places where a drone might get tangled, its contact fuses might snag on a branch and detonate before it reaches you. That’s what works
Attitude towards Germans:
Russians have a very antagonistic view towards Germans and Poles for providing weapons to Ukraine (and Nazi memories). If Germans or Polish volunteers are taken prisoner, they are executed on the spot. Americans might still get taken as POWs though

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More from @DAlperovitch

Apr 13
About this Chinese rare earth ban..

Refining of rare earth minerals is NOT a complex issue to solve. In fact, we have partially solved it already!

Story time. Last year I visited the Mountain Pass mine in CA owned by @MPMaterials, the only operating RE mine in North America 🧵 Image
The unique thing about this mine is not just that it is producing ~15% of the world’s RE oxide BUT @MPMaterials is also refining them onsite in an extremely clean way with NO harmful byproducts or pollution.

I wish I could share photos but you could eat off the floor there!
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He Weidong, Vice Chair of the Central Military Commission, one of Xi’s loyalists and old time colleagues, rumored to have been purged recently has not attended a voluntarily tree planting ceremony in Beijing, the first time in over a decade that someone in that role skipped it 🧵
If He is indeed purged by Xi, as is starting to look increasingly likely, it would have significant implications for better understanding Xi’s nature.

It would put his “anti-corruption”purging drive in a very different light
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“An attack of this scale is a sufficient reason to trigger the collective defense clause of NATO, but our critical infrastructure was blown up by a country that we support with massive weapons shipments and billions in cash,” said a senior German official familiar with the probe.
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Opening up Black Sea exports was clearly Ukraine’s greatest strategic success since the liberation of Kherson in fall of 2022

It is now clear how this was achieved - via development of credible threats against Russian Black Sea shipping
🧵
With the concerted effort by the SBU with the participation of the Ukrainian Navy (and later GUR) since mid 2022, Ukraine was able to develop more and more capable maritime drones that showed their capabilities against Russian military ships and land infrastructure
It is interesting to see how strategically they are thinking about the development of capabilities of these drones:

"We want to decompose a large warship into its functions - air defense, weapons, protection - and put these weapons on several drones," Hunter (SBU) explains.
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The more important question to ask is what would bring about that improved position for an eventual negotiation with Moscow
The only one that’s being discussed as at all plausible is having Ukraine get to the Sea of Azov, destroy the Kerch Bridge and put fire pressure on Crimea🧵
Putting aside the feasibility and likelihood of success of each of those elements of the strategy, I think it’s worth questioning the assumption that Putin would be driven to the negotiation table even if all of the above conditions come to pass
A big assumption in this strategy is that without the Kerch bridge and under constant fires from the Azov coast, Crimea would be difficult to resupply

But the Kerch bridge didn’t exist until 2018 and the rail part until 2019, yet occupied Crimea was just fine since 2014
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Dec 5, 2023
Good article on the challenges seen in the early days of the Ukrainian counteroffensive back in June. Some key points: washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/…
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“Rather than making a nine-mile breakthrough on their first day, the Ukrainians in the nearly six months since June have advanced about 12 miles and liberated a handful of villages. Melitopol is still far out of reach”
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