Ukraine has struck multiple strategic bombers in Olenya, Murmansk oblast, 1800 km from Ukraine. This is one of the most successful drone strikes against against Russian air bases in the entire war. The extent of the damage is yet unclear, but I can already say it's significant. 1/
Russia had transferred the valuable planes to Olenya to avoid the exact scenario we're seeing on the videos and photos coming from the area. Bombers operating from the field have repeatedly struck Ukraine with cruise missiles. 2/
These are major and expensive losses for Russia that can't be replaced quickly.
Additionally, the air base in Belaya, roughly 4300 km from Ukraine, has been hit. Also Dyagilevo and Ivanovo air bases are burning. This is a very, very successful day for Ukraine. 3/
At least currently it seems likely this was done with FPV drones flown by SBU-led sabotage groups operating inside Russia, not by "traditional" long-range drones flying all the way from Ukraine. This would also explain why the defensive measures failed so immensely. 4/4
For further reading, my previous thread about the Russian arctic air bases in Murmansk oblast:
During April and May, the Russians formed a dangerous salient against the Ukrainian defenses between Kostiantynivka and Pokrovsk.
The so-called spring offensive has progressed relatively quickly, and serious issues may lie ahead in the near future. 1/
Defending forces in the area initially consisted of newer, less capable brigades, such as the 142nd, 155th & 157th. Elements from other units were also present. Reserves have been brought in – first the 36th marine brigade, and now the 82nd air assault brigade, among others. 2/
Russia's probable operational objectives for the coming months in the area include:
Formation of an encirclement threat around Kostiantynivka
Formation of an encirclement threat around Pokrovsk
Disruption of Ukrainian supply & command elements in the cities in the AO 3/
Russia has five active air bases near northern Finland and Norway. In this thread, I will go through the bases and their recent changes in activity and infrastructure, and how the war in Ukraine has affected them.
There have been some surprising developments. 1/
The five air bases are located in Murmansk oblast: Severomorsk-1, -2 and -3, Monchegorsk and Olenya. There are more air bases near Finland further south in Karelia and St. Petersburg, but currently most of the largest and militarily active ones are in the north. 2/
In June 2022 Russia announced plans to repair several of the northern air bases. The work has begun. In Severomorsk-1, fighter shelters on the eastern side of the field were repaired somewhere between 2023-24. However, in Severomorsk-2, there are more surprising changes. 3/
Russia is developing its military infrastructure and conducting organizational reforms near Nato’s northern flank, especially near Finland. News agencies from different countries have asked me about the topic, and in this thread I will share some recent observations. 1/
Firstly, a brief overview of the organisational level. In 2024, Russia reestablished the Leningrad Military District (LMD) as a part of a larger reform of the military districts. The LMD covers the north-western Russia, including Baltic and arctic directions. 2/
At the same time, Russia is expanding its existing brigades into divisions and bringing entirely new troops into Finland's neighboring regions. For example, the 138th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade from Kamenka was recently transformed into the 69th Motor Rifle Division. 3/
Putin declared a temporary ceasefire. What can be expected?
Firstly, Russia only makes such an announcement if it benefits Russia's diplomatic or military goals. Russia isn't suddenly seeking a quick peace, this is most likely a measure related to ongoing negotiations. 1/
Putin says that Russian forces must be ready to repel potential ceasefire violations and provocations.
It's possible Russia will try to accuse Ukraine of breaking the ceasefire, which could then be used as evidence of Ukraine's unwillingness to reach a peace settlement. 2/
Russia may be trying to show the Trump administration that it has some desire for peace. A minimal gesture of goodwill may buy political points from the United States, although its actual impact on the war is likely to be small. 3/
In the Russian-Ukrainian border region, both parties have continued offensive operations since the Ukrainian defense in Kursk collapsed.
While Russia is pushing Ukrainians out of Kursk and its own soldiers into Ukrainian territory in Sumy, Ukraine has again attacked Belgorod. 1/
In Kursk, the Ukrainian-controlled territory had been shrinking for months. It was a slow grind that hit a breaking point in March. The Ukrainian logistical situation had become increasingly difficult, and the Russians conducted a successful operation against the salient. 2/
After a hasty retreat earlier this month, Ukraine is still hanging onto a narrow strip of Russian land in Kursk with 2-3 small villages. This is not a militarily or politically relevant area, but the Russians will likely continue to push Ukrainians back. 3/
Jos Suomi ei voi lähettää edes yhtä pataljoonaa tulitaukoa takaamaan Ukrainaan, en ihan ymmärrä, miksi me olisimme oikeutettuja odottamaan aidosti vaikeita turvallisuuspoliittisiä päätöksiä vaativaa apua keneltäkään kriisitilanteessa.
"Koska Nato" ei ole riittävä argumentti. 1/
Toisekseen, jos Suomen Puolustusvoimat ovat siinä tilassa, ettei edes yhden pataljoonan varustaminen ja lähettäminen onnistu edes silloin, kun koko Euroopan turvallisuusjärjestyksen sorvaaminen on käynnissä, en ihan ymmärrä mihin puolustusbudjettimme oikein uppoaa. 2/
Pataljoona tai kaksi Ukrainaan tulitaukoa takaamaan toisi Suomeen myös arvokasta oppia ja osaamista, josta nimenomaan on kriisitilanteessa hyötyä. Reserviläisiä löytyy kyllä, ei jää vapaaehtoisista kiinni. Tämä olisi investointi, joka tuottaisi turvallisuutta myös Suomeen. 3/