Thread by @ArmsControlWonk

Trump's offer to Iran, as reported by @BarakRavid, is a dollar-store-JCPOA.

The JCPOA -- which Trump abandoned -- had all of these provisions, usually in ways that were stronger or more carefully constructed.

He's trying to put Humpty Dumpty back together again. A thread.

@BarakRavid Here is the original story. The proposal was "described to Axios by two sources with direct knowledge — one of whom provided a point-by-point breakdown." This is a paraphrase, so sometimes its hard to know what they are getting at.
axios.com/2025/06/02/ira…

@BarakRavid Here is the text of the JCPOA. You don't have to take my word for it; you can look it up yourself.
europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122460…

1. "Under the proposal, Iran would not be allowed to build any new enrichment facilities ..."

The JCPOA also limited Iran to enrichment at Natanz. See: Annex. F¶31.

"For 15 years, Iran will install gas centrifuge machines, or enrichment-related infrastructure, whether suitable for uranium enrichment, research and development, or stable isotope enrichment, exclusively at the locations and for the activities specified under this JCPOA."

2. "... must "dismantle critical infrastructure for conversion and processing of uranium."

This one is a little unclear because "conversion" can refer to different activities, some of which Iran would need to continue enriching as envisaged in the rest of the proposal.

Annex. E¶24 ruled out uranium metal.

"For 15 years, Iran will not engage in producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium metals or their alloys, or conducting R&D on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys) metallurgy, or casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium metal."

Annex E¶24 had a possible exemption for future work on TRR fuel assemblies, but that's pretty limited.

"If Iran seeks to initiate R&D on uranium metal based TRR fuel in small agreed quantities after 10 years and before 15 years, Iran will present its plan to, and seek approval by, the Joint Commission."

This is the one place that the offer might improve on the JCPOA, if Iran dismantled its ability to produce uranium metal. But I am skeptical about that.

3. "halt new research and development on centrifuges."

Note: "new" R&D ≠ "all" R&D.

Annex A¶3 also limited Iran's R&D to existing centrifuge types on an agreed schedule. That mattered because the much more capable IR-6, which is now mature, was still under development.

4. "Iran won't be allowed to develop domestic enrichment capabilities beyond those necessary for civilian purposes."

This is literally the whole JCPOA. That's how they calculated the enrichment level, LEU stockpile size and every other limit. Read the preamble.

5. "Iran will have to temporarily reduce its enrichment concentration to 3%."

The JCPOA annex contains 13 references limiting enrichment levels to 3.67%. That's just the level for nuclear fuel.

6. "underground enrichment facilities will have to become 'non-operational' for a period of time ..."

Annex, A¶5 required that Iran "refrain from any uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment R&D and from keeping any nuclear material" at the underground Fordow site and A¶6 required that Iran convert the FFEP to stable isotope separation.

7. "The enrichment activity in Iran's above-ground facilities will temporarily be limited to the level needed for nuclear reactor fuel ..."

Again this is the JCPOA. That's where 3.67% enrichment, the size of the stockpile of LEU, and the limit on centrifuge numbers came from.

8. "strong system for monitoring and verification including immediate approval of the IAEA's additional protocol."

The JCPOA also applied the Additional Protocol. (C¶13)

Also, Witkoff forgot Modified Code 3.1. That's a BIG oversight to be honest.

I would note that the JCPOA created elaborate series of @iaea safeguards -- what I called the Additional Protocol Plus -- that clarified some ambiguities in the AP and extended to areas like uranium milling and centrifuge production.

This agreement doesn't do that,.