π§΅ The Gaza Sahawat has undergone some iterations in implementation, with this latest form being the most successful. Initially, the IDF tried to duplicate the Iraqi Sahawat w little modification, attempting to directly bribe (usually Fatah aligned) tribes in Gaza into defecting.
This effort failed due to several factors, most important of which was that Hamas had already defanged dissident tribes and coopted tribal society shortly after they took power. Early on, the infamous Dughmush was often mentioned, but it publicly rejected IDF overtures.
The next phase began mid-2024 when the IDF occupied the Philadelphi Axis in particular and Rafah in general. This is when banditry began to considerably worsen. By late last yr, the bandits were openly working under the protection of the IDF w their own designated zones.
At this pt, it's unclear if contacts were made b/t the Yassir Abu Shabab network and the PA. It's plausible that some already existed due to Abu Shabab's previous Fatah membership, but this is speculation. I suspect the operation at this stage was directed b/t IDF and Abu Shabab.
Anti bandit operations in the final weeks before the ceasefire and during the ceasefire put significant pressure on the bandit network. Abu Shabab was reportedly nearly killed in Dec 2024 and went into deep hiding during the ceasefire, allegedly even offering to pay off Hamas.
The current phase of the Gaza Sahawat likely began once Israel imposed the complete siege in the final weeks of the ceasefire. I suspect concrete links b/t the Abu Shabab network and the PA were made during late March and finally put into effect in early April.
Around this time, we saw images of Yassir Abu Shabab sporting military gear and uniform, indicating formalization of the network. Tellingly, bandit social media accounts became active in the March - April timeframe. In mid-April, news of the deaths of 4 PA operatives --->
was circulated on these social media accounts. At this stage, we can conclude that the Abu Shabab gang and the PA were working together. The plot has escalated. Instead of buying off tribes (thus elements Gazan society), this phase of the Gaza Sahawat --->
seeks to fragment and coerce Gazan society by way of starvation. On social media, all of the bandits describe their work as dismantling Hamas AND returning PA authority. The essentially criminal nature of the original Sahwa (and of the PA itself) is made especially clear here.
In maintaining such tight control of humanitarian aid, the bandit networks are able to force obedience from the public. An essential element (and weakness) of the plot is sustained IDF deployment. The Abu Shabab gang operates strictly in Rafah which is under IDF control.
The strategy to overthrow Hamas seems to be: IDF occupies area => protects bandit networks => bandits work w the PA to seize civilian "governance" ie control of aid => coerce population into acquiescing, thus undermining Hamas' authority. The PA actually orchestrates banditry.
This is perhaps the most dangerous threat yet to Hamas as it attacks the physical survival of Gazan society, forcing ppl to make desperate choices. However, its reliance on Israeli protection is a key weakness. In the absence of this, the bandits are highly vulnerable.
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π§΅ Later in this piece, the authors say that Israel (in Sept) had 2 choices: (1) accept defeat and make a deal or (2) escalate against the Axis. The authors' triumphant rhetoric has not aged well. Israel chose (2) and has since decisively degraded the Axis except Yemen.
Israel correctly assessed that it faced an existential crisis and acted accordingly by massively escalating the war. The Axis' failure to make the same assessment led to its crushing defeat in Lebanon, followed by its total collapse in Syria --->
due to long-term processes that captured the fatal flaws of the Axis model. The Assad regime's swift defeat bookended the extremely corrosive Syria intervention, which severely ultimately sabotaged the Axis. This was best shown by the regime's refusal to open a Golan Front --->
Exclusiveβ
There is strong evidence to suggest that Yassir Abu Shabab's bandit network aka "Counter Terrorism Service" is a Fatah/PA op to overthrow Hamas by fragmenting Gazan society. The bandits are all Fatah loyalists, largely of the Tarabin clan, w ties to the PA.
Posts from bandits express intense hostility to Hamas. Fatah's influence is apparent in the terms used to denounce Hamas eg "Iranians" & "Sons of Khomeini." Conversely bandits express allegiance to the PA, describing their role as the PA's return to Gaza.
*mesh ser = "no secret"
Posts from the bandits indicate that they work on the orders of Majid Faraj, PA GIS chief, who reports directly to PA leader Mahmud Abbas. In one post, we can see the PA Presidential Seal above the "Counter Terrorism Service" logo.
π§΅ It seems that Hizbullah will likely not recover. Naim Qassim's role as current leader is to coax the organization and its base into giving up militancy and accept the Lebanese state's authority. The systematic destruction of Hizbullah thus continues unrestricted.
There are no good roads out of this. One proposal has been the integration of Hizbullah fighters and commanders into the LAF. This could inject real patriotism into the notoriously quisling LAF; or it could definitively kill all militant spirit in South Lebanon.
Amidst this domestic isolation, Hizbullah is internationally isolated. The Jews defile South Lebanon, killing and bombing at will. The Syria road is closed, so arms shipments cannot reliably come in. The PMF continues to do nothing in Iraq, while Iran is in normalization talks.
π§΅ Atiyatullah al Libi and Abu Musab al Zarqawi in the Sahelβ
We can observe different but complementary tactics in JNIM's war against the Juntas. The top leadership essentially endorses international diplomacy and negotiations, while the battlefield commanders take no quarter.
Both positions boost one another, as the Zarqawist violence strengthens JNIM's negotiating power while the willingness to negotiate makes the violence that much more potent. It doesnt "need" to happen so when it does, it becomes that especially intimidating.
The campaign in Boucle in Mouhoun will end in total victory for one side and total defeat for the other. There is no middle room available here. JNIM's policy of revenge massacres is strategically accelerationist a la Zarqawi. So long as Fulani know no peace, --->
π§΅ Hizbullah's allegiance to the Lebanese state is due to several reasons: 1. They cannot or will not enter grinding civil war w Maronites and Sunnis to seize the state 2. They are fully integrated into the confessional system, which ultimately benefits them
More broadly, Hizbullah's relationship to the Lebanese state is downstream from the broader Axis strategy of not seizing the state but instrumentalizing elements of it. In theory this meant having the benefits of a state without any of the responsibilities. This strategy failed.
The easiest contrast is Ansarallah in Yemen, which seized the prewar Yemeni state to great strategic success - but I won't focus on this comparison. Instead contrast Hizbullah to Hamas in Gaza, whose circumstances are much harder than in Lebanon.
π§΅ Israel's current prognosis is worse than on Oct 6. Zionism has been meaningfully hurt. However, recurring bad decisions by AoR since Oct 7 have needlessly prolonged Israel's existence. Herzi Halevi said Hizb could've met Hamas in Tel Aviv. Instead AoR is largely dismantled.
It is difficult to overstate the significance of the Lebanon ceasefire last yr. Israel has had completely free reign and Hizb impotently watches. This isn't a strategic choice, this is a fait accompli. Hizb's degradation is best shown by this statement.
Ma Dara understood the stakes of the ceasefire:
"The next few hours of negotiations in Lebanon are likely to either cool the front between the two sides or continue and expand at the same pace as today. Critical hours now in Lebanon."