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Dilawar Karwan Profile picture
Dilawar Karwan
@RashmanTheHorse
So wait, we too are waiting with you | Researcher | Analyst | Third Worldist | W. Africa | Iraq | Khorasan |
Jun 24 • 16 tweets • 4 min read
🧵 I'm not losing my mind anymore, so here's my read of where things stand–

Israel did not achieve its maximalist goals but it still took the W bc it was able to establish the precedent that it could bomb Iran when it wants and the US will save them when it gets too hot. Iran withstood the initial onslaught and demonstrated self-defense capabilities while Israel had control of Iranian airspace. This is a W in that they didn't completely fold but a L in that accomplishing the absolute bare minimum is now a sign of success. --->
Jun 3 • 13 tweets • 3 min read
🧵 The Gaza Sahawat has undergone some iterations in implementation, with this latest form being the most successful. Initially, the IDF tried to duplicate the Iraqi Sahawat w little modification, attempting to directly bribe (usually Fatah aligned) tribes in Gaza into defecting. This effort failed due to several factors, most important of which was that Hamas had already defanged dissident tribes and coopted tribal society shortly after they took power. Early on, the infamous Dughmush was often mentioned, but it publicly rejected IDF overtures.
May 28 • 16 tweets • 3 min read
🧵 Later in this piece, the authors say that Israel (in Sept) had 2 choices: (1) accept defeat and make a deal or (2) escalate against the Axis. The authors' triumphant rhetoric has not aged well. Israel chose (2) and has since decisively degraded the Axis except Yemen. Israel correctly assessed that it faced an existential crisis and acted accordingly by massively escalating the war. The Axis' failure to make the same assessment led to its crushing defeat in Lebanon, followed by its total collapse in Syria --->
May 27 • 11 tweets • 6 min read
Exclusive—
There is strong evidence to suggest that Yassir Abu Shabab's bandit network aka "Counter Terrorism Service" is a Fatah/PA op to overthrow Hamas by fragmenting Gazan society. The bandits are all Fatah loyalists, largely of the Tarabin clan, w ties to the PA. Image
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Image Posts from bandits express intense hostility to Hamas. Fatah's influence is apparent in the terms used to denounce Hamas eg "Iranians" & "Sons of Khomeini." Conversely bandits express allegiance to the PA, describing their role as the PA's return to Gaza.
*mesh ser = "no secret" Image
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May 18 • 17 tweets • 3 min read
🧵 It seems that Hizbullah will likely not recover. Naim Qassim's role as current leader is to coax the organization and its base into giving up militancy and accept the Lebanese state's authority. The systematic destruction of Hizbullah thus continues unrestricted. There are no good roads out of this. One proposal has been the integration of Hizbullah fighters and commanders into the LAF. This could inject real patriotism into the notoriously quisling LAF; or it could definitively kill all militant spirit in South Lebanon.
May 16 • 11 tweets • 2 min read
🧵 Atiyatullah al Libi and Abu Musab al Zarqawi in the Sahel—

We can observe different but complementary tactics in JNIM's war against the Juntas. The top leadership essentially endorses international diplomacy and negotiations, while the battlefield commanders take no quarter. Both positions boost one another, as the Zarqawist violence strengthens JNIM's negotiating power while the willingness to negotiate makes the violence that much more potent. It doesnt "need" to happen so when it does, it becomes that especially intimidating.
Apr 26 • 10 tweets • 3 min read
🧵 Hizbullah's allegiance to the Lebanese state is due to several reasons:
1. They cannot or will not enter grinding civil war w Maronites and Sunnis to seize the state
2. They are fully integrated into the confessional system, which ultimately benefits them More broadly, Hizbullah's relationship to the Lebanese state is downstream from the broader Axis strategy of not seizing the state but instrumentalizing elements of it. In theory this meant having the benefits of a state without any of the responsibilities. This strategy failed.
Apr 4 • 15 tweets • 4 min read
🧵 Israel's current prognosis is worse than on Oct 6. Zionism has been meaningfully hurt. However, recurring bad decisions by AoR since Oct 7 have needlessly prolonged Israel's existence. Herzi Halevi said Hizb could've met Hamas in Tel Aviv. Instead AoR is largely dismantled. It is difficult to overstate the significance of the Lebanon ceasefire last yr. Israel has had completely free reign and Hizb impotently watches. This isn't a strategic choice, this is a fait accompli. Hizb's degradation is best shown by this statement.
Apr 2 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
Exclusive—
Evidence from local sources strongly suggests that Uday al Rubai was indeed a collaborator. Before the ceasefire, he was repeatedly sighted in the north and south, suggesting he was able to freely cross the Netzarim Corridor which otherwise was a kill zone. In the north, he looted several homes of neighbors who had fled south or to shelters. Most shockingly, he participated in several flour massacres. Locals say that Uday would wait for survivors to get bags, hold them at gunpoint - in some cases killing them - & resell at 13x price
Mar 31 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
🧵 Interesting contrast to HTS. The Taliban fundamentally still represent their mass base of the (displaced) rural poor. This also animates their ultra conservatism and general indifference to international norms. The more bourgeois backed wings would be less likely to pass this. Decades ago @JonathanNealeA1 and Nancy Lindisfarne wrote that there had never been a regime like the IEA in Islamic history. They were and remain correct. The direct installation to power of militant village mullahs and students (Taliban) is unprecedented.
Mar 21 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
Disturbing and believable report. In the 1st wave of PMF "strikes," CTC Sentinel assessed that Tehran had attempted to mitigate the attacks. When they felt the PMF's pantomime had gone too far, they ordered them to halt, hence the pause to "avoid embarrassing the Iraqi govt." PMF leaders were the first to publicly float separating the fronts. This was at the time that they were drawing down their bottle rockets sent to Israel. Once Hizb signed the deal, the PMF halted all strikes. They remain inactive today. Tehran is prioritizing itself over Gaza.
Feb 28 • 13 tweets • 3 min read
🧵 2 key lines from this fascinating and important thread:
"Hamas had been developing developing this plan [Tufan al Aqsa] continuously since 2019, w/ the ultimate goal being to 'destroy the State of Israel' if the Hizbullah-Iran axis joined the fighting." ----> "The investigation examines another dimension of the attack: Hamas's attempt to recruit the Axis for a joint strike. The investigation indicates that w/ this understanding, Hamas began to push the plan forward and its implementation was accelerated." ---->