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Jun 6 15 tweets 5 min read Read on X
The latest satellite images show 3 major developments: a large Russian troop buildup in Bryansk Oblast, damage from recent drone strikes in Kyiv, and unusual military activities at Taiwan’s Wangan Airport.

All three have one thing in common - they were generated by AI. 🧵Thread: Image
2/ While those who regularly work with satellite imagery or OSINT can quickly tell that something is "off," the quality of AI-generated satellite images is improving fast. As the number of convincing fakes grows, I've put together a few recommendations to help avoid being misled Image
3/ In the case of the "Kyiv attack," it took just a single prompt on a free platform to generate the image. While it appears convincing at first glance, a closer look reveals clear geometric irregularities - distorted car shapes, and irregular windows and balconies on buildings Image
4/ Similarly, a closer look at the "Bryansk build-up" image shows many geometric flaws. In the central part of the image, vehicle shapes often appear distorted - turning into cubes or misshapen rectangles. It’s also hard to identify what type of vehicles you’re looking at. Image
5/ Another good method is to compare the claimed location with actual satellite maps. A quick check on Google Maps will show that area either doesn’t exist or is heavily distorted. In the case of the Bryansk image, the location shown doesn’t match any real place in the region
6/ Imagery generated to imitate Synthetic Aperture Radar, or SAR, can be trickier. Compared to standard optical satellite images, SAR is often more complex and inherently more "distorted", especially if you aren't used to work with it. Yet, the same rules still apply Image
7/ Besides the problem with the helicopter blades, the lengths of helicopters in the same "class" don’t match. You can also compare them to other objects, like the "truck." A Russian Kamaz truck is about 7 to 8 meters long, while the Ka-52 helicopter should be twice long - 16 m Image
8/ Now the task becomes more challenging. Take a close look at these two high-quality images — one optical, the other SAR, and try to identify at least three geometric inconsistencies or suspicious anomalies in each Image
9/ We’re now reaching the most pivotal part of discussion - both images are original and made by Maxar and Umbra. In other words, there are no AI-made inconsistencies or anomalies here. If you spotted any or dismissed the imagery as fake, you flagged real images as false.
10/ And that’s precisely the problem — going forward, for every real image, there may be several convincing fakes. This risks eroding trust in satellite imagery altogether, making it easier to dismiss authentic visuals as AI-generated and undermining its value as evidence.
11/ To protect yourself, the best practice is to always verify the origin of the image. Companies like Maxar, Planet Labs, BlackSky, Airbus, or Umbra typically release imagery through their official channels, social media accounts, or via trusted journalists at major news outlets Image
12/ Organizations like ours, Frontelligence Insight, purchase imagery from resellers and publish analyses under specific licenses or conditions. In such cases, trust depends largely on the organization's track record and transparency - credibility that often takes years to build
13/ To summarize: always refer to the chain of custody. A Telegram channel sharing the image is unlikely to be the source. A visual investigator from an outlet like NYT, BBC, FT, or The WaPo with direct press access to Maxar or Planet Labs is far more reliable
14/ This kind of scrutiny will only grow more important going forward.

If you found this thread useful, consider liking and sharing the initial post, or leaving a comment to help boost it in the algorithm
15/ You can also support our work by following this account - we’ll be sharing more high-quality materials and investigations throughout the month. If you'd like to contribute directly, even a small donation via Buy Me a Coffee makes a difference: buymeacoffee.com/frontelligence

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More from @Tatarigami_UA

Oct 11
Russia’s T-90 tank production in 2024 reached around 240 units, including both new and modernized tanks. But internal planning papers analyzed by Frontelligence Insight show Moscow’s plan to lift output by 80% and launch production of a new T90 variant. 🧵Our Special Report: Image
2/ Our investigation began with what appeared to be a routine document: Uralvagonzavod requested “IS-445” engine RPM sensors from Zagorsk Optical-Mechanical Plant (ZOMZ) for a project listed as “Product 188M2.” This single line became the starting point of a larger discovery Image
3/ Digging deeper, we identified “Product 188M2” as the T-90M2, the latest variant of the T-90M (Product 188M). A careless online bio from a Russian engineer posted on Russian Scientific and Engineering Union revealed its name: “Ryvok-1", which roughly can be translated as Dash-1 Image
Read 15 tweets
Oct 10
Recently, @CITeam_en has raised some good and bad points about verifying the authenticity of RU mil documents. I’ll start with a pushback: the notion that the legitimacy of Russian documents can be judged by whether they have all the formal characteristics is outdated:
2/ While it is true that all classified documents follow strict protocols, the reality of war is far messier. Most documents are produced internally, shared outside of formal chains: in Excel, Word, or PDF formats and shared through messengers, email, or other convenient channels
3/ I have personally reviewed hundreds, if not thousands, of pages of Russian documents: leaks, data from captured phones or submissions to our team, that contained sensitive information. Yet only a tiny fraction carried any formal classification stamps, despite being valuable
Read 7 tweets
Oct 9
Despite progress, including holding Pokrovsk, inflicting tangible casualties, and striking Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure, it would be dangerous for Europe to assume that “Ukraine has this.”

The battlefield situation has improved but remains suboptimal.

🧵Thread:
2/ The recent negative dynamics in Kupyansk show that the fundamental issue of Ukraine’s military remains: it is forced to operate in a fire-brigade fashion, reinforcing threatened sectors of the front such as Pokrovsk at the cost of other directions.
3/ As our team’s investigation into desertions shows, Russian troops are abandoning their posts at increasingly growing rate. Yet desertions still remain more frequent on the Ukrainian side, and Moscow is more effective at returning its troops to the front.
Read 5 tweets
Oct 6
The Ukrainian project @hochuzhit_com has published a photo of a document with Russian losses over 8 months, from January to September 2025. According to it, total KIA numbers 86,744, roughly 10,843 per month, which is very close to our earlier estimates. Total losses are 281,550 Image
2/ The published document contains a breakdown by units. Our team will work tonight to verify whether the numbers match the Russian documents we have on hand, but at first glance, it appears authentic. Notably, over 33,966 are listed as MIA, so the majority of them are likely KIA Image
3/ This is very close to our earlier estimates published in July and August, which pointed to 8,400–10,500 KIA per month. These estimates have proven to be quite accurate, demonstrating that our methodology is precise and reliable
Read 5 tweets
Oct 6
The Economist:

About 60% of the deep strikes on Russian territory are carried out by Ukrainian Fire Point FP-1 drones, which with a smaller payload can reach targets 1,500km within Russia and have sophisticated software that has proved resistant to EW jamming.
🧵Thread: Efrem Lukatsky / AP
2/ Olena Kryzhanivska, an expert on Ukrainian weapons systems, notes that the FP-1s cost only about $55,000 each and are now being churned out at a rate more than 100 a day. Ukraine is also using the heavier and more expensive Lyutyi drone, which has a range of 2,000km
3/ There are also reports that FP-5 “Flamingo” cruise missiles have begun to be used. They are much faster than the drones, flying just 50 metres above the ground, with a range of over 3,000km and packing a huge punch thanks to a 1,150kg warhead
Read 6 tweets
Oct 3
Russia is resorting to increasingly drastic measures to find recruits. The list has grown: beyond coercing detainees and conscripts, Moscow is now pressuring businesses to supply contract soldiers while further raising enlistment payments. 🧵Thread with all recent updates: Image
2/ Thanks to recent updates from @CITeam_en and iStories, we’ve learned that In Russia’s Primorsky region, officials told local business leaders they must help recruit men for the front. Employers were instructed to pressure their staff into signing contracts or contribute money Image
3/ In Voronezh oblast, officials sharply raised the bonus for signing a contract with the Defense Ministry. Governor Alexander Gusev boosted the regional payout from 505,000 rubles to 2.1 million. With federal payments added, the total now stands at 2.5 million rubles (~$27,000)
Read 10 tweets

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