Yes, Israel is arming militias in Gaza — and yes, some already know about Yasser Abu Shabab. But what’s still missing is the full picture: the criminal records, the aid looting, the strategy of engineered chaos, and what this means for Gaza’s future. A thread.🧵 
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Yasser Abu Shabab, a resident of Rafah, currently leads a group calling itself the “Popular Resistance Forces.” Before the war, he was reportedly imprisoned for criminal activity, including theft and drug-related offenses. Since his release post-Oct 7, he has been leading a militia now confirmed to be armed by Israel.
Yasser Abu Shabab, a resident of Rafah, currently leads a group calling itself the “Popular Resistance Forces.” Before the war, he was reportedly imprisoned for criminal activity, including theft and drug-related offenses. Since his release post-Oct 7, he has been leading a militia now confirmed to be armed by Israel.
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This militia is not affiliated with any recognized Palestinian political body. It operates independently in southern Gaza, especially near Rafah and Kerem Shalom, and has been repeatedly accused by residents and aid workers of looting humanitarian trucks and using force to control aid distribution.
This militia is not affiliated with any recognized Palestinian political body. It operates independently in southern Gaza, especially near Rafah and Kerem Shalom, and has been repeatedly accused by residents and aid workers of looting humanitarian trucks and using force to control aid distribution.
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Abu Shabab presents himself as a tribal leader with broad local support. He claims to operate in coordination with local families under the umbrella of the Tarabeen tribe and says he liaises with the Palestinian Authority to help secure humanitarian aid routes. These claims appear carefully crafted to frame his group as a legitimate, stabilizing force.
Abu Shabab presents himself as a tribal leader with broad local support. He claims to operate in coordination with local families under the umbrella of the Tarabeen tribe and says he liaises with the Palestinian Authority to help secure humanitarian aid routes. These claims appear carefully crafted to frame his group as a legitimate, stabilizing force.
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However, these assertions are contested. The Palestinian Authority has formally denied any coordination with Abu Shabab or his group. More notably, the Abu Shabab family — a sub-branch of the Tarabeen tribe — issued a public statement disowning him and distancing themselves from his activities. This suggests that he lacks both formal political backing and meaningful tribal support.
However, these assertions are contested. The Palestinian Authority has formally denied any coordination with Abu Shabab or his group. More notably, the Abu Shabab family — a sub-branch of the Tarabeen tribe — issued a public statement disowning him and distancing themselves from his activities. This suggests that he lacks both formal political backing and meaningful tribal support.
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Another figure tied to this militia network is Essam Soliman Nabahin, who was convicted in 2023 for the murder of a police officer. He was released on parole after the war began and soon joined the same Israeli-backed armed group. His own family publicly disowned him days ago, accusing him of theft, looting, and being exploited for political purposes.
@muhammadshehad2
Another figure tied to this militia network is Essam Soliman Nabahin, who was convicted in 2023 for the murder of a police officer. He was released on parole after the war began and soon joined the same Israeli-backed armed group. His own family publicly disowned him days ago, accusing him of theft, looting, and being exploited for political purposes.
@muhammadshehad2
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What’s emerging is a militia-driven economy where power, coercion, and aid intersect. These groups do not serve civilian protection or public administration. They control access to food and fuel, enforce localized authority by force, and answer to no legal structure or governing institution.
What’s emerging is a militia-driven economy where power, coercion, and aid intersect. These groups do not serve civilian protection or public administration. They control access to food and fuel, enforce localized authority by force, and answer to no legal structure or governing institution.
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This is not the accidental byproduct of Hamas’s weakening. It reflects a deliberate policy of fragmentation. By empowering armed actors with criminal histories and no social mandate, Israel is preventing the emergence of any coherent, civilian-led governance in Gaza after the war.
This is not the accidental byproduct of Hamas’s weakening. It reflects a deliberate policy of fragmentation. By empowering armed actors with criminal histories and no social mandate, Israel is preventing the emergence of any coherent, civilian-led governance in Gaza after the war.
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The risks are well-known. Similar strategies have been deployed elsewhere — in Libya, for instance, after 2011, when international powers backed local militias to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime. Over time, those militias fractured the state, hijacked public resources, and derailed every serious attempt at national reconstruction.
The risks are well-known. Similar strategies have been deployed elsewhere — in Libya, for instance, after 2011, when international powers backed local militias to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime. Over time, those militias fractured the state, hijacked public resources, and derailed every serious attempt at national reconstruction.
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A comparable scenario is now being shaped in Gaza. Arming unaffiliated groups without oversight or accountability creates localized power centers built on access, not legitimacy. These actors can quickly become gatekeepers — to aid, territory, and even violence — and can easily outlast the short-term goals that empowered them.
A comparable scenario is now being shaped in Gaza. Arming unaffiliated groups without oversight or accountability creates localized power centers built on access, not legitimacy. These actors can quickly become gatekeepers — to aid, territory, and even violence — and can easily outlast the short-term goals that empowered them.
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This isn’t a stopgap. It’s the architecture of a new crisis. By empowering militias without oversight, Gaza is being carved into zones controlled by men with weapons, not institutions. These actors will not dissolve when the war ends. They will entrench themselves, compete for territory, exploit aid, and make any postwar governance effort vastly more unstable and dangerous.
This isn’t a stopgap. It’s the architecture of a new crisis. By empowering militias without oversight, Gaza is being carved into zones controlled by men with weapons, not institutions. These actors will not dissolve when the war ends. They will entrench themselves, compete for territory, exploit aid, and make any postwar governance effort vastly more unstable and dangerous.
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If the objective is to weaken Hamas and make space for alternative leadership, then arming irregular actors without oversight or civilian legitimacy introduces serious unintended consequences. It fragments the social landscape, introduces competing power centers, and undermines future governance efforts before they begin.
If the objective is to weaken Hamas and make space for alternative leadership, then arming irregular actors without oversight or civilian legitimacy introduces serious unintended consequences. It fragments the social landscape, introduces competing power centers, and undermines future governance efforts before they begin.
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This is not just about one militia. It is about the precedent being set. A postwar Gaza shaped by ad hoc armed groups will likely remain unstable, aid-dependent, and politically incoherent. The international community, including donors and humanitarian organizations, should consider this dynamic carefully.
This is not just about one militia. It is about the precedent being set. A postwar Gaza shaped by ad hoc armed groups will likely remain unstable, aid-dependent, and politically incoherent. The international community, including donors and humanitarian organizations, should consider this dynamic carefully.
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