In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll talk about Finland and how pro-Kremlin propagandists have become more active in the Finnish political space since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. For the first time since 2022, they’ve gained some political power in Finland.
1/16
Russia’s political strategy in countries with Russian-speaking minorities (such as Finland and the Baltics) is typically quite similar: it seeks to rally these minorities around issues like language and minority rights, and then frames the situation as oppression.
2/16
At the same time, Russian speakers are extremely wary and skeptical of local media, and instead tend to follow Russian domestic outlets like Russia-1 and NTV, thereby reinforcing an almost impenetrable information bubble.
3/16
Since Russian spin doctors and propagandists are aware that, due to historical factors, it is difficult for new parties promoting these issues to gain popularity, they often infiltrate existing parties with an established voter base.
4/16
In Finland, there are around 100,000 Russian speakers, the majority of whom are ethnic Russians. Before February 2022, they were relatively apolitical, but since then, some have begun actively campaigning and attempting to portray Russia in a more positive light.
5/16
Their most common strategy is what I call the “political Trojan horse”: during their campaigns, they support broadly appealing issues like universal healthcare and social welfare, but once elected, they begin promoting topics such as reopening the Finnish-Russian border.
6/16
In Finland, their campaign centered around two candidates: Katja Marova and Ivan Deviatkin. Both ran as Left Alliance candidates and won council seats in South Karelia, ultimately receiving a relatively high number of votes.
Here’s how they did it:
7/16
The two live near the Russian border in southeastern Finland. In March 2025, they held a closed, Russian language-only event requiring prior registration. Organized by Deviatkin and Marova, the event focused mainly on the concept of “tactical voting.”
8/16
The strategy was a great success: Marova & Deviatkin were elected to the regional and city councils with 653 541 votes. Their pro-Russia messaging helped boost the Left Alliance’s seats in Lappeenranta from 1 to 3.
They ignored all interview requests from Finnish media.
9/16
Marova and Deviatkin spread typical Kremlin narratives and both claim widespread “Russophobia” in Finland. Marova even considers “Slava Ukraini” hate speech. Deviatkin handed out Russian embassy WWII medals and liked online comments defending Stalinist-era policies.
10/16
Both are dual citizens. Deviatkin refused to condemn Russia’s war in Ukraine, claiming it would endanger him and his son. But he went much further by spreading blatant Russian propaganda to Russian-speakers in Finland.
11/16
Marova has echoed Kremlin talking points online. She shared a post questioning the Bucha massacre, claiming the victims were Russians or that it was staged by Ukrainians. Since then, she has toned down her online rhetoric.
12/16
The two had previously co-founded Aleksanterinliitto, a group that advocates for reopening Finland’s eastern border. The group files complaints about alleged discrimination against Russians to Finnish courts, the EU, and the UN. Interestingly, Marova was later expelled…
13/16
…from the group after she spoke out against homophobic slurs made by one of its members. After this, Deviatkin also left the organization. After the elections, other parties froze out the Left Alliance. Eventually, Deviatkin was expelled from the party’s council group…
14/16
…for behavior “contrary to party values.” Naturally, he played the martyr card after. Left Alliance’s national leadership admitted letting them run was a mistake. Still, Marova and Deviatkin built a base by blending identity politics, conspiracy, and Kremlin bullshit.
15/16
This investigation was done by a fantastic Finnish journalist, @OutiSalovaara. Check out her new book (unfortunately only in Finnish):
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll talk about engagement farming: a cynical social media tactic to rack up likes, shares, and comments. From rage farming to AI-powered outrage factories, engagement farming is reshaping online discourse and turning division into profit.
1/23
Engagement farming is a social media tactic aimed at getting maximum likes, shares, and comments, with truth being optional. It thrives on provocative texts, images, or videos designed to spark strong reactions, boost reach, and turn online outrage into clicks and cash.
2/23
One subset of engagement farming is rage farming: a tactic built to provoke strong negative emotions through outrageous or inflammatory claims. By triggering anger or moral outrage, these posts often generate 100s or even 1,000s of heated comments, amplifying their reach.
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll cover the autocratic concept of “Good Tsar, Bad Boyars”: the idea that the leader is wise and just, but constantly sabotaged by corrupt advisors. This narrative shields the ruler from blame, and it’s used by both Putin and Trump today.
1/20
The phrase “Good Tsar, Bad Boyars” (Царь хороший, бояре плохие), also known as Naïve Monarchism, refers to a long-standing idea in Russian political culture: the ruler is good and benevolent, but his advisors are corrupt, incompetent and responsible for all failures.
2/20
From this perception, any positive action taken by the government is viewed as being an accomplishment of the benevolent leader, whereas any negative one is viewed as being caused by lower-level bureaucrats or “boyars”, without the approval of the leader.
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll introduce a Russian politician and First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of Russia, Sergey Kiriyenko. He’s best known for running both domestic and foreign disinformation and propaganda operations for the Kremlin.
1/20
On paper, and in photos, Kiriyenko is just as boring as most of the Kremlin’s “political technologists”: between 2005-2016 he headed the Rosatom nuclear energy company, but later played a leading role in the governance of Russia-occupied territories in Ukraine.
2/20
What is a political technologist? In Russia, they’re spin doctors & propaganda architects who shape opinion, control narratives, and manage elections — often by faking opposition, staging events, and spreading disinfo to maintain Putin’s power and the illusion of democracy.
Let me show you how a Pakistani (or Indian, they're usually the same) AI slop farm/scam operates. The account @designbonsay is a prime example: a relatively attractive, AI-generated profile picture and a ChatGPT-style profile description are the first red flags.
1/5
The profile's posts are just generic engagement farming, usually using AI-generated photos of celebrities or relatively attractive women.
These posts are often emotionally loaded and ask the user to interact with them ("like and share if you agree!").
2/5
Then there's the monetization part. This particular account sells "pencil art", which again are just AI-generated slop.
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll introduce an American lawyer and politician, Mike Lee (@BasedMikeLee). He’s best-known for opposing the aid to Ukraine, undermining NATO by calling the US to withdraw from the alliance, and for fighting with a bunch of braindead dogs online.
1/21
Like many of the most vile vatniks out there, “Based Mike” is a lawyer by profession. He hails from the holy land of Mormons, Utah, where he faces little political competition, allowing him to make the most outrageous claims online without risking his Senate seat.
2/21
Before becoming a senator, Mike fought to let a nuclear waste company dump Italian radioactive waste in Utah, arguing it was fine if they just diluted it. The state said no, the public revolted, and the courts told poor Mikey to sit down.