This is probably the the new North Korean uranium enrichment facility that @iaeaorg DG @rafaelmgrossi briefed the Board of Governors about. @sam_lair and I have a summary on the blog. Nice shot by our friends at @planet. armscontrolwonk.com/archive/122048…
The dimensions, layout and other features do resemble the Kangson UEP when it was constructed. Here is a 2002 image of the Kangson under construction -- the central enrichment hall is about 93 m long, which is the right length for two 164-centifuge cascades end-to-end.
You remember the Kangson Uranium Enrichment Plant, surely. (Good times with @DaveSchmerler and @nktpnd.) thediplomat.com/2018/07/exclus…
That's the same set up as the first two enrichment halls at Yongbyon, as well as the early enrichment halls at Kahuta in Pakistan. Pakistan's AQ Khan was, of course, an important source of assistance to North Korea's centrifuge program (as well as others) in the 1990s.
The big question is how many centrifuges will it hold? If the new facility is a copy of the OG hall at Kangson -- and it is about the same size -- the new facility might hold ~24 cascades or 3,936 centrifuges. At 4 kg per machine, that's ~15,744 kg SWU or 73 kg of HEU a year.
However, North Korea has been squeezing more and more centrifuges into the smaller spaces in recent years. We really saw that when Kim visited the Kangson and Yongbyon UEPs. Here's a table showing the meters per centrifuge at different facilities and the meters per cascade width.
All the above estimates on numbers come from looking at the pictures, geolocating and then measuring the buildings in satellite images. You get the idea.
If North Korea squeezes in 28 or even 32 cascades, which is not impossible given other places we've seen, then the number could be a lot higher -- 3,936-4,592
5,248 centrigues or 85-98 kg of HEU a year.
I'd probably guess 28 cascades or 4,592 machines if I had to, but we won't really know unless Kim Jong Un decides to visit. Which, given the way things have been going lately, seems more likely than not.
How many bombs is 73, 85 or 98 kg of HEU? I hoped you wouldn't ask me that! The @iaea "significant quantity" is 25 kg of HEU. The Iraqi design used ~15 kg of HEU. Pakistan probably does better than that. Tom Cochran thinks the number should be 3 kg. ambienteparco.it/pdf/fissionwea…
The question probably isn't worth answering, anyway, since North Korea likely uses composite pits, which would layer both Pu and HEU, has a mix of fission and staged thermonuclear weapons. So, a lot depends on what kind of arsenal one assumes they are building.
*One of the above posts was to read: "If North Korea squeezes in 28 or even 32 cascades, which is not impossible given other places we've seen, then the number could be a lot higher than 3,936 -- 4,592 or 5,248 centrifuges/85 or 98 kg of HEU a year."
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A few (ok, many) thoughts on possible Chinese nuclear testing, after @UnderSecT declassified the fact that the IC believes China has been conducting low-yield nuclear explosions including on on June 22, 2020. Ends with Trump getting a Nobel Prize if he wants it. Weird journey.🧵
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans nuclear explosions. Both countries have signed, but not ratified, the treaty. Under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, China is "obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose" of the treaty.
China, like the United States, has declared a moratorium on nuclear testing. The CTBT, though, bans "nuclear explosions", not testing, but it does not define a nuclear explosion. The debate concerns whether China is abiding by our definition.
Why am I so unimpressed by these strikes? Israel and the US have failed to target significant elements of Iran's nuclear materials and production infrastructure. RISING LION and MIDNIGHT HAMMER are tactically brilliant, but may turn out to be strategic failures. 🧵 1/17
Netanyahu's justification for conducting this strike was that "Iran has produced enough highly enriched uranium for nine atom bombs -- nine." He refers to Iran's stockpile of ~400 kg of 60% U-235 which, if further enriched, would be enough for 9-10 weapons. Let's consider. 2/17
The 400 kg of HEU was largely stored in underground tunnels near the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility. Despite extensive Israeli and US attacks the facility, there does not seem to have been any effort to destroy these tunnels or the material that was in them. 3/17
References to "tactical" nuclear weapons in this otherwise great @guardian story by @hugolowell are misleading. The US would drop a strategic B61-11 nuclear earth penetrator with a yield of 300 or 400 kilotons. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 15 and 21 kt. theguardian.com/world/2025/jun…
Here are the nuclear weapons in the US "enduring stockpile" from @ENERGY's stockpile management plant. Note that the B61-11 nuclear earth penetrator is labeled as a "strategic bomb" -- and for good reason. energy.gov/sites/default/…
The yield of the B61-11 is classified, but it is a converted B61-7 bomb. The yield of the -7 and -11 are usually given as more than 300 kilotons. @nukestrat says the B61-11 was increased to 400 kt. Either way, this is a very powerful nuclear weapon.
I see @SangerNYT asked why Israel hasn't hit the stockpile of enriched uranium. My understanding is that the hex is stored in the tunnels at Isfahan and Israel hasn't been able to destroy the hard, deeply buried targets. Thread.
Isfahan UCF has some tunnels that are are about 100 m under a mountain that Israel has not yet tried to hit. The Iranians were pretty proud of these tunnels, which were constructed around the same time as Fordow by the same dwarves (aka the Passive Defense Organization).
This is pretty esoteric knowledge that is only covered in specialists journals like ... the @nytimes. 😉 (Sorry, I just appreciate Bill Broad and want to give him some love.)
Trump's offer to Iran, as reported by @BarakRavid, is a dollar-store-JCPOA.
The JCPOA -- which Trump abandoned -- had all of these provisions, usually in ways that were stronger or more carefully constructed.
He's trying to put Humpty Dumpty back together again. A thread.
@BarakRavid Here is the original story. The proposal was "described to Axios by two sources with direct knowledge — one of whom provided a point-by-point breakdown." This is a paraphrase, so sometimes its hard to know what they are getting at. axios.com/2025/06/02/ira…
@BarakRavid Here is the text of the JCPOA. You don't have to take my word for it; you can look it up yourself. europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122460…
The claim of 25 missiles a month is falsely attributed to the @DI_Ukraine. What @DI_Ukraine says, according to other news outlets, is 25 IRBMs per YEAR, not per MONTH. babel.ua/news/113282-ro…
Oreshnik is the first two stages of the Yars missile. Oreshnik production rates should be similar to Yars production rates, which the Russians claim is "about 20 launchers and their supporting systems per year." web.archive.org/web/2021041112…