1/ The commander of Ukrainian's unmanned air forces, Robert "Madyar" Brovdi, has announced a set of reforms to improve the effectiveness and logistical supply of drones in the Ukrainian armed forces. They are to be implemented over the next three months. ⬇️
2/ As described by the 'Cuckoo's Nest' Telegram channel:
🔺 Immediate implementation of existing collective experience.
3/🔺 Transparent results: 6-7 units of the Unmanned Systems Line of Drones will be included in the TOP-10 according to the existing rating of the effectiveness of the UAV units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
4/ 🔺 Unified SYSTEM: all units of the Unmanned Systems Line of Drones performing combat missions at the front will operate in a single electronic system of planning, analysis, coordination, management, and online reporting with automatic verification of all results (June–July 2025).
5/ 🔺 12 layers of SBS influence on the strip in tactical and operational depth: immediate step-by-step launch or reinforcement in SBS units of the drone line of all 12 layers of influence on the assigned strip (following the example of the use of the 414th Separate Brigade,…
6/ …including SIGINT, EW, radar, enemy UAV fighters, remote mining, echeloned use of anti-Shahid means, anti-pilot action groups, etc.), immediate launch of retraining of the armed forces, competent provision of means, technologies and control systems (June–September 2025)
7/ 🔺 Building up our own existing ammunition production for competent and timely provision, and not according to the final principle of "we fight with what we have left." Ammunition is waiting for pilots, and not vice versa.
8/ 🔺 Single composition of critical components. Creation of a single supply warehouse and timely provision of units with a package of 50 critical means and components (such as StarLink, additional batteries for drones, mobile electronic warfare systems, FPV and bomber customization components, peripherals, power banks, pickups, etc.).
9/ 🔺 Ground robotic complexes - as the main means of logistics of warheads, drones and peripherals to pilots in positions, etc.
10/ 🔺 A single recruiting campaign for the SBS and basic + professional at the same time (analogous to the already introduced training system in the Drone Line), its own network of FPV schools, bombers, wings, electronic warfare, radio-electronic warfare, radars, fighters, NRK, etc.
11/ 🔺 PILOTS FLY, EVERYONE ELSE WORKS TO SUPPORT THE PROCESS. Revision and optimization of the combat and emergency response forces of the SBS, retraining and prompt training of inexperienced or incompetent crews,…
12/ … reprofiling by types of flight activities, revision of dead souls, guest workers, draft dodgers in military uniform, the tired and the dodgy.
13/ 🔺 COUNT-PLAN-RECEIVE-FIGHT. Unified analysis of the capabilities and fact of use, results in the context of drone / ammunition models for the implementation of accurate planning and implementation of support.
14/ 🔺 Separate section - the use of UAVs at strategic depth.
15/🔺 R & D (center for innovation and implementation of developments). Transformation of the current center from the brigade level to the level of support of the branch of the armed forces and more (15 models of already implemented projects and means).
1/ Telegram will not be restored in Russia, and tighter restrictions will be imposed on mobile phone ownership, says Sergey Boyarsky, head of the State Duma IT Committee. He cites scammers, pro-Ukrainian sabotage, and drone attacks as the reasons behind these moves. ⬇️
2/ In a wide-ranging interview with the St Petersburg online newspaper Fontanka, Boyarsky has explained the thinking behind the government's new restrictions on Telegram. He says that "Telegram doesn't comply with Russian Federation law, and hasn't done so for many years."
3/ "The requirements are simple, basic: localise user data within the Russian Federation, remove prohibited information (extremism, terrorism), and cooperate with law enforcement agencies to solve serious crimes (for example, the Crocus [terroist attack] case)."
1/ While Telegram is only part of a wider complex of communications systems used in the Russian army, it comprises a keystone without which the wider system falls apart. A commentary by a Russian warblogger explains the Russian army's communications ecosystem in detail. ⬇️
2/ Responding to comments earlier this week by presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov, 'Vault No. 8' provides a "briefing note" on the role of Telegram in the Russian military communications ecosystem.
3/ "A typical motorised rifle regiment (today, the basic tactical unit—the military unit that holds the front line) utilises several tools to manage its troops:
1/ While the Russia army struggles with the impact of Telegram and Discord being throttled or blocked by the government, Ukraine has long used a highly sophisticated indigenously developed digital command and control system. Russian warbloggers have highlighted the contrast. ⬇️
2/ Detailed accounts such as the one in the thread below illustrate how Telegram – a commercial app run from Dubai – has been a central tool in the Russian kill chain, allowing for rapid responses to Ukrainian actions. Discord was also heavily used.
3/ Although this approach has been effective, it has now deliberately been rendered unusable by the Russian government. 'Two Majors' compares how Ukraine has approached digital command and control, and never made itself reliant on Telegram:
1/ The Russian army is reportedly forcing its soldiers to abandon Telegram and move over to the government-authorised MAX app. A Russian warblogger explains why the transition will prove to be very difficult. ⬇️
"Some challenges of switching from Telegram to MAX for our military personnel.
Telegram doesn't require a Russian number to be linked, making it difficult for adversaries to [de]anonymise users."
3/ "Max requires not only a Russian number but also real data (according to the messenger's rules), which enemy electronic warfare systems will immediately receive (although a Russian number alone is sufficient for the enemy to identify a user).
1/ Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov recently said (very wrongly) that "It's difficult, if not impossible, to imagine ... frontline communications being provided via Telegram or any other messenger." Warblogger Nikita Tretyakov has a list of other 'unimaginables'. ⬇️
2/ "What else is unimaginable?
It's unimaginable that just a week ago, our troops' communications relied on an enemy country's satellite constellation.
3/ "It's unimaginable that soldiers still obtain many essential items for war and military life (anti-thermal blankets, radios, gasoline-powered and electric tools, inverter generators, etc.) almost exclusively from their salaries or from volunteers.
1/ Russian warbloggers are outraged at being told by a journalist that it's their own fault that the Russian government is restricting Telegram. They argue that if not for the warblogger community, the military's lies would have gone unchallenged – which is exactly the point. ⬇️
2/ Komsomolskaya Pravda journalist Ivan Pankin has prompted fury with his claim that "endless nameless insiders, all those endless bloggers, the smartest people on earth who know everything and who have been spreading all sorts of nonsense" have annoyed the Russian government.
3/ He is almost certainly correct, but the warbloggers aren't having any of it and have responded angrily. They claim they have been consistently right in warning about the failures of the Russian military, to the overall benefit of the war effort and Russian population.