1/ Russian warbloggers say that Russian army commanders are causing unnecessary problems for other units, and heavy casualties for their own men, by lying about their successes. This exposes the flanks of neighbouring units and causes men to be sent into unsupported assaults. ⬇️
2/ The Russian army has had widespread problems with commanders falsely claiming to have captured objectives – a practice dubbed "taking on credit" – since the early days of the war in Ukraine.
3/ False reporting often takes the form of sending a few expendable men forward to plant a flag on a building in a Ukrainian-held settlement, so that a drone can video it for a report of a successful capture to be sent to HQ. This is termed a "photo fact".
4/ This has very adverse effects for their men. As one soldier has said, "There is no preliminary reconnaissance, no preliminary artillery preparation, because they had already written off in advance that they had already taken [the target] and no one had given us shells."
5/ Russian warbloggers reports that the line of contact shown on Russian maps is kilometres ahead of the actual line of contact on the ground, due to the extent to which false reports of battlefield successes have distorted senior commanders' assessments.
6/ 'Yuri Podolyaka' writes that despite steps taken to discipline officers for false reporting in the 25th Army, the practice of "padding" the line of contact has continued and in some respects got worse:
7/ "Since these same paddings have already grown in some places to EIGHT kilometers (for which someone will certainly receive orders and titles, and the army and the country, respectively, senseless losses).
8/ "And therefore ... I recommend asking the army command a question: why has our army aviation practically not been operating in its zone for many months? Only FABs [air-dropped bombs] are used "in depth".
9/ "Despite the fact that the stormtroopers are literally groaning from the lack of fire support!!!
10/ "Everyone in the army knows the answer to this question (and the command first of all). And I really hope that it will be asked to this very command (I would like to hear the answer).
11/ "In the meantime, unfortunately, I have to state that in THIS SPECIFIC SECTION the enemy's maps lie much less than ours...
12/ "And the "neighbours" of the 25th Army, swearing, go on the attack with uncovered flanks and ... suffer unjustified losses."
13/ The author explains that private complaints about this practice go unanswered; only public denunciations appear to work: "Unfortunately, non-public requests on these topics will not be checked by us. Only publication gives progress to the matter."
14/ "I simply have to do this to try to save the lives of hundreds of our soldiers who are being thrown into assaults without fire support by some of our military leaders (who are thus hiding their own lies)."
15/ 'Romanov Light' highlights a recent example. On 6 June 2025, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced the capture of Komar, a settlement near the border of the Donetsk region. The channel reports that this was false:
16/ "The settlement of Komar, contrary to the official statement of the Ministry of Defence, is not fully controlled by the Russian Armed Forces ... The 36th Army which according to the plan was supposed to take the northern section of the settlement, did not even enter it.
17/ "But it made a false report to the top about the completion of the task, as a result of which the Ministry of Defence announced the capture of the settlement."
The DeepState map shows a sliver of Russian control in the settlement with most of it as contested territory.
18/ The Russian claim was based on the raising of a Russian flag on an isolated building in the far south of the settlement, outside of the main population area, in territory which DeepState suggests is still under Ukrainian control.
19/ 'Romanov Light' reports that "now they want to quietly send the 336th Brigade to do the work of taking the northern part, so that the report of the 36th Army coincides with reality. Without the participation of the 36th Army."
20/ He asks whether anyone will be held accountable (unlikely) and recommends that the Russian MOD should create a unit for "checking the real line of contact on the ground for compliance with incoming official reports."
21/ 'Tactical Medical Courses' is scathing about the situation: "Shame on the 'commander' who reported to the General Staff that everything was taken. The price of this lie is the lives of the guys who will go to correct the situation."
22/ "And I would really like to see such 'commanders' go ahead of the guys going to their deaths.
23/ "Of course, you can say later that the [Ukrainians] knocked them out / took them / an information leak was made for regrouping and so on, but we all understand perfectly well that this was done so that the 'commander's' ass would not shake in the chair he sits on and…
24/ …from which he can fly off (along with his position), well, and at the same time with the case, maybe also to hang another medal on his chest, or maybe someone else at headquarters.
25/ "You know, I have already spoken about this many times, with the arrival of [Defence Minister] Andrei Removich Belousov, he noted the inadmissibility of lies on the battlefield and in the form of official reports.
26/ "Remember his phrase: 'it is possible to make mistakes, but it is impossible to lie.' So, in some areas, this lie has become many times greater, because of the conventional [formulation] 'colonel cannot be wrong.'"
27/ Roman Alekhine agrees about the problem, but points out that structures are supposedly already in place to resolve it in the form of headquarters representatives – who have been ineffective in dealing with many of the other critical frontline problems.
28/ "Again a lie and again because of lies ordinary Russian soldiers will die . Moreover, most often because of lies the most effective ones die, because they are driven to correct the lies and mistakes of lying generals.
29/ "Although ['Romanov Light's proposal] is a half measure, because, firstly, the General Staff, as we remember from August 2024 in the Kursk region, is not very interested in the truth and itself broadcasts things that are far from the real situation, secondly, the commissars…
30/ …could study and report not only on the real line of contact, but also on the material support of units, on discipline, on the introduction of innovations, on the real effectiveness of what different services purchase under the guise of effective and innovative products.
31/ "And this is already we are talking about something completely different, but also about what has already happened: about the representatives of the Supreme Headquarters."
32/ 'Yuri Podolyaka' corroborates the ineffectiveness of interventions by headquarters representatives, who he says are more interested in stopping leaks than fixing problems. After he publicly complained about false reporting, the 3th Army carried out three inspections:
33/ "True, I don't know what the army command told them and how they convinced them (probably killed several more groups of soldiers to get a "photo fact"), but according to my information, this commission did not reveal the fact of "padding of successes".
34/ "But even so, this result is obvious progress. When in the fall of 2024 I sounded the alarm about padding in the 3rd Army, the first two commissions, unfortunately, did not check the facts presented, but looked for my sources (information leaks).
35/ "And only as a result of the work of the third commission, the heads of high-ranking liars flew, and 'in commercial quantities'. And the situation in the army immediately improved."
36/ Even then, as he points out, it took only a few months for the situation to deteriorate again and become worse than ever. It highlights how much this is the product of Russia's military culture, not just individual corrupt commanders. /end
1/ Russian warbloggers are increasingly speculating about what will happen after the war ends and/or the fall of Putin. They predict chaos, disorderly struggles, repression, and not least their own violent elimination. ⬇️
2/ In a since-deleted post, Maxim Kalashnikov sees gloomy prospects ahead for Russia:
3/ “I believe that after the Transition (change of the central figure of power), as a result of this untriumphant war, a period of chaos and instability is inevitable.
No matter what “Sukharev conventions” are signed by the highest beau monde these days. What do I predict?
1/ After spending years demanding a full mobilisation, Igor 'Strelkov' Girkin has come to the realisation that it would now be pointless: Ukraine's swarms of drones are capable of destroying "any number of infantry", and Russia doesn't even have enough weapons to arm them. ⬇️
2/ A reader of his Telegram channel asks:
"Question: there's increasing talk of possible mobilisation—do you think the government will take such a step? And is mobilisation necessary under the current circumstances?"
To which Girkin replies:
3/ "Mobilisation was needed in the spring of 2022, the spring of 2023, the spring of 2024, and perhaps even the spring of 2025. Now, mobilisation is catastrophically late. Currently, mobilisation, as perceived by the majority of the population, will yield no results.
1/ Russian drone developers are complaining that because of bureaucratic restrictions, they are having to use firecrackers as the warheads on interceptor drones, or rely solely on kinetic methods instead of explosive warheads. ⬇️
2/ The Russian warblogger 'UAV Developer' shows a photo of two firecrackers and asks:
"Do you know what this is?
It's the warhead of an interceptor drone."
3/ "While those Ukrainian drones are hitting a house in Yekaterinburg, smashing a landing craft in Crimea with shrapnel, and killing a dozen civilians along the way, the developers of interceptor drones are trying to somehow circumvent the restrictions of the mad printer…
1/ Ukrainian citizens are reportedly selling 'whitelisted' Starlink terminals to Russia, to enable the Russian army to get around the blocking of unauthorised Starlink terminals. The trade highlights how corruption in Ukraine is directly aiding Russia's war effort. ⬇️
2/ Russian forces in Ukraine used Starlink on a large scale for both battlefield communications and, increasingly, drone guidance. Since early February 2026, however, only whitelisted terminals – which can only be acquired with Ukrainian government permission – can be used.
3/ However, some in Ukraine appear to be helping Russia to circumvent these restrictions. So-called 'White Starlink' offers are proliferating on Telegram channels, offering whitelisted "Starlink for military and civilians in the new territories of the Russian Federation".
1/ Starving Russian soldiers in Ukraine have been eating their comrades and Ukrainians, according to intercepted Russian communications. Audio and photographic evidence indicates that several incidents of cannibalism likely occured in 2025. ⬇️
2/ The UK's Sunday Times newspaper has published evidence of what Ukrainian intelligence sources say were at least five instances where Russian soldiers were said by their fellow soldiers and commanders to have engaged in cannibalism.
3/ The evidence reportedly came to light from intercepted messages on Telegram, which has universally been used by the Russians for battlefield communications until it was recently blocked by the Russian government.
1/ Russia's attempts at import substitution have "completely failed" and the corrupt state procurement system is effectively killing off domestic factories, warns a Russian factory head. He says the system makes some rich, but will lead to a domestic economic collapse. ⬇️
2/ Kubanzheldormash JSC is a large engineering company in Southern Russia. It is one of the few domestic manufacturers of mechanised track tools for railway construction and maintenance, as well as agricultural machinery and hydraulic equipment.
3/ The company marks its 93rd anniversary this August, but it may be its last, warns company head Vyacheslav Yakovlev in a YouTube video.